Upjohn Press

Upjohn Research home page

1-1-1989

Strikers and Subsidies: The Influence of Government Transfer
Programs on Strike Activity
Robert M. Hutchens
Cornell University

David B. Lipsky
Cornell University

Robert N. Stern
Cornell University

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_press
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, Labor Economics Commons, and the Labor
Relations Commons

Citation
Hutchens, Robert M., David B. Lipsky, and Robert N. Stern. 1989. Strikers and Subsidies: The Influence of
Government Transfer Programs on Strike Activity. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/9780880996006

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License.

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

The Influence of
Government
Transfer Programs
on Strike Activity

Robert Hutchens
David lipsky
Robert Stern

STRIKERS
and
SUBSIDIES
The Influence of
Government
Transfer Programs
on Strike Activity
Robert Hutchens
David Lipsky
Robert Stern
New York State School
of Industrial and Labor Relations
Cornell University

1989
W. E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan

Library of Congress Catalogmg-in-PublicatRra Data
Hutchens, Robert M.
Strikers and subsidies : the influence of government transfer
programs on strike activity / by Robert Hutchens, David Lipsky,
Robert Stern,
cm.
p.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-88099-080-5. - ISBN 0-88099-079-1 (pbk.)
1. Strikes and lockouts Government policy United States.
2. Insurance, Unemployment United States. 3. Labor disputesUnited States. 4. Insurance, Strike United States. 5. Trade
unions United States Strike benefits. 6. Transfer payments
. H. Stern, Robert
I. Lipsky, David B., 1939United States.
. m. Title.
N., 1948HD5324.H79
89-16693
331.89'8 dc20
CIP

Copyright

1989 W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

THE INSTITUTE, a nonprofit research organization was established on July 1, 1945.
It is an activity of the W. E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was
formed in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late Dr. W. E. Upjohn for the
purpose of carrying on "research into the causes and effects of unemployment and
measures for the alleviation of unemployment."

The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are
the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of
the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.

To our families

Authors

Robert Hutchens is professor of Labor Economics at Cornell's School of
Industrial and Labor Relations. He also serves as Chairman of the Depart
ment of Labor Economics. Hutchens received his Ph.D. in economics from
the University of Wisconsin in 1976, specializing in labor economics, public
finance, and econometrics. He has written several papers on the economics
of government transfer programs, with an emphasis on unemployment insurance
and Aid to Families with Dependent Children. In 1980-81 he was a Policy
Fellow at the Brookings Institution, devoting part of his time to the Depart
ment of Health and Human Services. In 1984 he was a visitor in the Depart
ment of Economics at the University of British Columbia. His current research
encompasses not only government transfer programs, but also long-term im
plicit contracts and the market for older workers.
David Lipsky is Dean of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations, Cornell University. Lipsky has been a member of the Cornell Univer
sity faculty for 20 years. His field of teaching and research is collective bargain
ing. He has been associate dean for academic affairs at ILR, and assistant pro
fessor, SUNY, Buffalo; visiting associate professor, MIT; visiting associate
professor, Boston University; Co-Director, Harvard Institute in Employment
and Training Administration; adjunct lecturer, Brandeis University; and visiting
scholar, University of British Columbia. He has served as Chairman of the
Department of Collective Bargaining, Labor Law, and Labor History; and as
Editor and Associate Editor of the ILR Review. He has published over 30
articles and essays and is the author or editor of 11 books, including Collec
tive Bargaining in American Industry (1987), and Paying for Better Teaching
(1984).
Robert Stern is associate professor of Organizational Behavior and Sociology
at Cornell's School of Industrial and Labor Relations. He has completed ex
tensive research on the determinants of strikes and currently works in the areas
of worker participation and union-management cooperation. He has been a
Fulbright Scholar at the University of Leiden, The Netherlands and a visiting
professor at the School of Management and Institute of Industrial Relations
at the University of California at Berkeley. Stern has written or coauthored
30 articles and 4 books, including Employee Ownership in Plant Shutdowns,
ESOPs: Benefits for Whom? and Worker Participation and Ownership:
Cooperative Strategies for Strengthening Local Economies.

IV

Acknowledgements

This volume is the culmination of a research project that we conducted over
the course of several years. During that period we relied on numerous people
for support, advice, information, data, and assistance. The project was sup
ported by a grant from The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
We owe a special debt of gratitude to the Upjohn Institute, and particularly
to H. Allan Hunt, Louis Jacobson, and the late Earl Wright for their encourage
ment, comments, and suggestions. We especially thank Lou Jacobson for pro
viding us with valuable comments on and criticisms of the early versions of
several chapters.
Charles Rehmus, former dean of the School of Industrial and Labor Rela
tions at Cornell University, was enthusiastic about the project and encouraged
us to begin: we are grateful for his support. Robert Doherty, the current dean
of the ILR School, was equally encouraging and we acknowledge our gratitude
to him. We also thank Ronald Ehrenberg, professor and Director of Research
at the ILR School, who helped to make our research task a little easier than
it might have been and offered advice at every stage of the project.
The authors conducted interviews with many government, union, and
management representatives, and we thank them all for their cooperation and
assistance. Through the auspices of the Interstate Conference of Employment
Security Agencies, we also conducted a survey of administrators of 54 statelevel employment security agencies. We wish to thank William L. Heartwell,
Jr. of the ICESA for making this survey possible. Many of the survey
respondents supplied us with invaluable information on the treatment of labor
disputes under their unemployment insurance statutes, and we thank them all
for their help. William J. Yost, Chief Hearing Officer with the Iowa employ
ment security agency, and George A. Michaud, Chief Hearing Officer with
Alaska Agency, also provided us with information on some of the important
aspects of their state laws, and we appreciate their assistance.
We obtained the information and data we needed to conduct this study from
individuals in a variety of federal, state, and private agencies; we benefited
from having the services of several research assistants and computer program
mers; we used several secretaries to type and re-type our work; and we used
a crew of students to code and verify the data used in the analysis. All of these
individuals are thanked by name in Appendix A. If we have inadvertently omit
ted from this appendix the names of people who assisted us, we apologize to

them and want them to know that we are grateful. We would be remiss if we
did not especially thank Tim Schmidle, who supervised the collection, coding,
and verification of the data, and Nancy Hanks and Melissa Barringer, whose
diligent assistance greatly improved the quality of the manuscript. Of course
we must add the usual disclaimer: any errors of fact or interpretation that re
main are solely the responsibility of the authors, and none of the views ex
pressed in the volume are necessarily shared by any of the individuals
acknowledged here or in Appendix A. Finally, we wish to thank our wives
and families for their love and patience.

VI

Contents
1 Setting the Stage ..........................................
What are our current practices, where do they come from,
and what is their rationale? ..............................
Does the provision of government transfers to strikers
affect strike activity? ...................................
What is the proper policy? ................................
Notes..................................................

9
12
13

2 Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes: Part I .........
Policy Development......................................
What is a Labor Dispute? .................................
The Establishment Rule...................................
Lockouts ...............................................
Interim Employment .....................................
Summary...............................................
Notes..................................................

15
18
20
23
24
31
33
33

3 Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes: Part II.........
Stoppage-of-Work Provisions ..............................
New York..............................................
Rhode Island ...........................................
The New York Telephone Case ............................
Innocent Bystanders......................................
Grade or Class ..........................................
The Air Traffic Controllers ...............................
Conclusion .............................................
Notes..................................................

39
40
46
48
49
51
57
59
68
70

4 Welfare in Labor Disputes ..................................
Aid to Families with Dependent Children ....................
AFDC-U 1961-1981 .....................................
Food Stamps............................................
General Assistance.......................................
Conclusion .............................................
Notes..................................................

77
80
84
102
112
114
121

vn

1
4

5 Government Transfer Programs and Strike Theories: Designing
an Empirical Test.......................................
Models of Strike Activity .................................
Modified Model .........................................
Interpreting Transfer Payment Effects on Strikes ..............
Empirical Implementation .................................
Conclusion .............................................
Notes..................................................

133
134
138
141
146
159
161

6 An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Government Transfer
Programs on Strike Activity............................... 165
Labor Disputes Disqualification Policies and Strike Behavior.... 165
The Interaction of labor Dispute Disqualification Policies
and Program Generosity ................................ 169
Replicating the Results ................................... 174
The Effect of the AFDC, Food Stamp, and General
Assistance Programs on Strike Behavior ................... 181
Conclusion ............................................. 183
Notes................................................... 184
7 What is the Proper Policy?..................................
Goals for Public Policy ...................................
Policy Options ..........................................
A Proposal .............................................
Notes..................................................

187
188
190
198
200

Appendix A: People Who Contributed to This Book .............. 203
Appendix B: Sources of Variables ............................. 205
References ................................................. 211
Index ..................................................... 219
Index of Cases ............................................. 227

vni

Tables
5.1 Existence of Work-Stoppage and Innocent Bystander
Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws
Regarding Strikers, 1961................................
5.2 Changes in Unemployment Disqualification
of Strikers, 1961-1974 ..................................
5.3 Work-Stoppage Historical Files, 1953-1974
Variables Available for Each Strike Observations ...........
5.4 Measures of Strike Frequency .............................
5.5 Means and Standard Deviations of Strike Measures Over
All States and All Years, 1960-1974 ......................
5.6 Variables Measuring Characteristics of Transfer Programs ......
5.7 Control Variables Employed in the Analysis..................
6.1 Regressions on the Frequency, Duration, and Size of Strikes ....
6.2 Strike Frequency Regressions That Include
Interaction Variables ...................................
6.3 Strike Regressions with Alternative Control Variables..........
6.4 Strike Frequency Regressions for Different Years .............
6.5 Strike Duration Regressions for Different Years ..............
6.6 Fixed-Effects Regressions on the Frequency and Duration
of Strikes, 1960-1974 ..................................
6.7 Fixed-Effects Regressions on the Frequency and Duration
of Strikes, 1960-1974, with Welfare Variables Included ......

IX

143
144
148
148
152
156
160
167
170
172
175
176
178
182

1
Setting the Stage
One of the most controversial labor policy issues is whether strikers
should be eligible for government transfer payments, such as unemploy
ment compensation, public assistance, and food stamps. Under current
policies, strikers after an extended waiting period, are eligible for
unemployment compensation in two states (New York and Rhode Island)
and can collect unemployment benefits in many other states under cer
tain conditions (e.g., if a strike does not result in the employer shutting
down operations). Railroad workers engaged in a lawful strike are also
eligible for unemployment compensation under the federal Railroad
Unemployment Insurance Act. Needy strikers may also be eligible for
cash grants and other forms of public assistance made available by state
and county governments.
Consider the following cases:
In July 1971, about 38,000 workers employed by the New York
Telephone Company went on strike. Under New York's unemployment
insurance law, these workers were allowed to collect unemployment
benefits after they had been on strike for eight weeks. Before the strike
was settled in February 1972, the strikers had collected $49 million
in benefits. The New York Telephone Company financed most of these
benefits through payroll taxes the company subsequently paid to the state.
In 1972, 166 workers went on strike against the Dow Chemical
Company's Bay City, Michigan plant. Michigan's unemployment in
surance law allows strikers to collect unemployment benefits if the
strikers obtain, and are then laid off from, "bona fide interim jobs."
Most of the Dow strikers obtained temporary jobs with "friendly"
employers who, after a few days, laid off the strikers. The strikers then
applied for, and collected, unemployment benefits for the duration of
their strike. Michigan, like New York, raised Dow's unemployment
insurance taxes to cover the cost of the strikers' benefits.
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During the winter of 1977-78, about 160,000 members of the United
Mine Workers (UMW) staged a strike against the Bituminous Coal
Operators Association. As the strike dragged on through January and
February, thousands of miners applied for and received food stamps.
In West Virginia, for example, 35,000 miners collected $18 million
in food stamps. 1 In Pennsylvania, nearly 12,000 miners received food
stamps and 2,700 received other forms of public assistance. 2 In 1981,
the UMW once again struck the coal operators, and once again thousands
of miners qualified for food stamps and public assistance.
In August 1981, 12,000 air traffic controllers launched a nation
wide strike against their employer, the Federal Aviation Administra
tion. President Ronald Reagan ordered the striking controllers to return
to their jobs. When they refused to do so, the president discharged the
controllers for conducting an illegal strike against the federal govern
ment. Subsequently, many controllers applied for unemployment com
pensation. Although many states denied the controllers' claims for
benefits, several allowed them to collect.
At midnight on July 31, 1986, the collective bargaining agreement
between the United Steel Workers union and the USX (formerly the
United States Steel Corporation) expired. In the face of the failure to
negotiate a new contract, USX shut down its plants across the country
and declared a lockout. Some states ruled that the unemployed steelworkers were ineligible for unemployment benefits because of their par
ticipation in a labor dispute. Other states, however, allowed workers to
collect benefits because of the lockout. In particular, nearly 800 steelworkers in Illinois and 7,500 steelworkers in Pennsylvania were allowed
to collect unemployment compensation during their dispute with USX.
These are not isolated cases. Although comprehensive data on the
use of public aid in strikes are lacking, it would be an easy task, using
accounts in newspapers and periodicals as well as administrative and
court decisions, to cite dozens of other examples. Indeed, Thieblot and
Cowin, in a book published in 1972, predicted that the cost of public
aid to strikers would exceed $300 million in 1973. Although that figure
was probably an overestimate, it is known that in 1980 strikers receiv
ed $30 million in food stamps and $5 million under the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-U) program.
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Unfortunately, no one knows the total cost of unemployment benefits
received by workers involved in labor disputes.
But the cost of public aid to strikers is only one issue of concern to
policymakers and citizens. Clearly, public aid to strikers also provides
benefits, not only to the strikers themselves but also to their families
and, indirectly at least, to the communities in which the strikers live.
Many strikers' families suffer great hardship during prolonged strikes,
and the benefits associated with the alleviation of that hardship may
be worth more than the costs. Moreover, an entire community may suffer
as a result of a protracted strike (especially when the strikers constitute
a significant proportion of the community's workforce), and subsidiz
ing strikers with public funds may do much to bolster the community's
welfare. Providing public subsidies to strikers, then, may serve an en
tirely suitable public interest.
The extension and liberalization of various welfare programs during
the 1960s laid the foundation for the increasing use of transfer payments
by strikers in the 1970s. This development did not go unnoticed by the
business community. Business interests and their allies increasingly decried
the use of tax dollars to subsidize strikers. For example, in 1978 Richard
L. Lesher, then president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said:
our members consider it highly inappropriate that taxpayers
should subsidize strikers. Such subsidies are even more in
comprehensible when beneficiaries are continuing their strike
outside the law. ... In fact, our members continue to believe
that taxpayers should not be required to subsidize strikers
in any event, since their decision to cease working is volun
tary. We believe public assistance should be available only
to those who are out of work through no fault of their own.
In supporting the 1981 legislation that made strikers ineligible for
food stamps, Senator Jesse Helms (Rep., N.C.), a long-time opponent
of public aid for strikers, said,
any worker who walks off the job to go on strike has given
up the income from that job of his own volition. A person
making such a choice, and participating in a strike, must bear
the consequence of his decisions without assistance from the
taxpayers. 3
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On the other hand, unions and their allies have defended the use of
transfer payments in strikes as a fair and even necessary use of public
funds. In 1975, the late George Meany, then president of the AFL-CIO,
said, "It is our position that welfare benefits should be available to
citizens who are demonstrably in need without regard for the cause of
that need. "4 When the Carter administration threatened to cut off food
stamp assistance to striking coal miners in 1978, Meany said the threat
was an "outrage, especially for an administration dedicated to protect
ing and preserving human rights. . . . This attempt to force the miners
to agree to an unacceptable contract by starving their wives and children
is a vindictive act." 5
In the congressional debate over the retention of striker eligibility
for food stamps in 1981, Senator Carl Levin (Dem., MI) said,
Elimination of striker participation in the food stamp pro
gram will pose hardship for the poorest of strikers. . . . The
labor laws of this country protect the right to strike. The
workers who choose to exercise this right should not be
singled out for denial of food stamp benefits if they other
wise qualify under the Act and program regulation. 6
While the debate over the use of government transfer payments in
labor disputes continues, that debate is often characterized by rhetorical
appeals to the emotions rather than analysis of hard evidence. In the
hope that a more informed debate can lead to better policy, this book
seeks to present a few pieces of hard evidence. The book is organized
around the following questions.
(1) What are our current practices, where do they come from, and
what is their rationale?
(2) Does the provision of government transfers to strikers affect
strike activity?
(3) What is the proper policy?
Our answers to those questions are summarized as follows.
What are our current practices, where do they come from, and what
is their rationale?
Chapters 2 through 4 address this issue. Chapters 2 and 3 examine
unemployment insurance, and chapter 4 examines public assistance.
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To write these chapters we not only searched through libraries, but
also talked to experts in the field. We interviewed representatives of
the AFL-CIO, the National Association of Manufacturers, and U.S.
Department of Labor. We sent a survey to the employment security
agency in each state (and conducted follow-up telephone calls) in order
to obtain information on state policies and court cases. In each of these
efforts we sought views on whether and how specific provisions of
government transfer programs influence strike activity.
This inquiry leads us to conclude that there is considerable confu
sion surrounding the issue of striker eligibility for unemployment in
surance benefits. First, it should be recognized that the Social Security
Act of 1935, which established the unemployment insurance system,
gives the states the authority to establish the rules governing claimant
eligibility for unemployment benefits (provided the states meet certain
minimum federal standards). Therefore, each state can determine
whether, and under what conditions, workers unemployed because of
a labor dispute can collect unemployment benefits. 7 Federal tolerance
of state autonomy on this issue, reinforced by several key Supreme Court
decisions, results in considerable diversity in the unemployment in
surance eligibility rules that affect strikers.
It is widely believed, even by those with knowledge of the subject,
that only two states, New York and Rhode Island, routinely permit
strikers to collect unemployment benefits. Although it is true that these
two states do allow strikers to collect benefits (in New York after an
eight-week waiting period and in Rhode Island after a seven-week
period), it is also true that a majority of other states allow workers
unemployed because of a labor dispute to collect unemployment benefits
under certain conditions. Moreover, in these states the workers are eligi
ble to collect benefits after the normal waiting period (usually one week),
or virtually from the outset of a strike. While the relevant state UI pro
visions .take many forms, the following are particularly important.
(1) In 1984, 27 states had a "stoppage-of-work" provision, whereby
strikers collect unemployment benefits if their employer continues to
operate at or near normal operating levels during the course of the labor
dispute. In a sense, this provision provides insurance against a failed
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strike; if the strike fails to shut down the employer, then unemploy
ment insurance benefits are available to the strikers.
(2) In 1984, 21 states qualified claimants for benefits if the labor
dispute is caused by an employer lockout. For example, in the dispute
between the USW and the USX Corporation in 1986-87, cited earlier,
the union instructed a large number of its Pennsylvania members to report
to work after the expiration of the national contract. When the corporation
turned the workers away from the locked gates of its Pennsylvania steel
mills, it became a near certainty that the state would allow the
steel workers to collect unemployment insurance benefits.
(3) In 1984, 44 states had an "innocent bystander" provision whereby
workers obtain unemployment insurance benefits if they are unemployed
because of a labor dispute but are not participating in, financing, or
directly interested in the dispute. Typically, innocent bystanders are
employed at the struck establishment, but are not members of either
the union or the bargaining unit that is on strike.
Of course, these rules interact. Some states have none of the provi
sions, others have one or two, while still others have all three. Interesting
ly, New York popularly regarded as a state with liberal policies on
the use of unemployment benefits in labor disputes has none of the
three policies. A New York worker engaged in a labor dispute receives
no unemployment insurance benefits during the first eight weeks of the
strike, irrespective of whether he is a participant or an innocent
bystander, and irrespective of whether the employer continues to operate
or has locked strikers out. Of course, after the eight-week waiting period,
the New Yorker receives full UI benefits. In contrast, Rhode Island
uses a stoppage-of-work rule. Thus in Rhode Island, a striker can col
lect benefits after a one-week waiting period if his employer does con
tinue to operate during a strike and can collect benefits after a sevenweek waiting period if his employer does not continue to operate dur
ing a strike.
It should be clear from this brief preview that the rules governing
the payment of unemployment benefits in labor disputes are complex
and diverse. The variation in the rules across states means that strikers
who are otherwise identical may be eligible to collect benefits in one
state but not in another. Some states, particularly those with work-
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stoppage, lockout, and innocent bystander provisions, e.g., Georgia,
Maryland, West Virginia, are relatively liberal in qualifying workers
for benefits. Other states, particularly those without work-stoppage,
lockout, and innocent bystander provisions, e.g., Alabama and North
Carolina, are quite strict. By providing a thorough understanding of
the "rules of the game," chapters 2 and 3 lay the foundation for our
subsequent empirical analyses of the effect of variation in the rules on
strike activity.
Chapter 4 deals with the eligibility of strikers for AFDC-U benefits,
food stamps, and general assistance. For nearly 20 years, opponents
of federal assistance to strikers had struggled to remove striker eligibility
for AFDC-U and food stamps from the law, but without success. When
Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, however, the stage was set
for Congress to enact a package of sweeping budget cuts. On July 31,
1981, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA),
which cut federal expenditures by $35 billion. The Act brought about
major policy changes in many domestic programs, including AFDC,
Medicaid, food stamps, job training, and others. 8 Elimination of striker
eligibility for AFDC-U and food stamps were only two of the many
policy changes incorporated in the OBRA.
Because Congress eliminated striker eligibility for AFDC-U and food
stamps in 1981, the material covered in chapter 4 is primarily historical
in nature. Yet the issue of whether strikers should be eligible for welfare
benefits continues to be relevant, particularly because in 1986 a federal
district court ruled that the provision in the 1981 law that denies food
stamps to the families of strikers violates due process and interferes
with the striker's First Amendment right of freedom of association. 9
Although the Supreme Court reversed this decision in 1988, thereby
ending legal challenges to the OBRA, the issue will continue to be the
subject of congressional debate on public policy. 10 But in deciding on
which transfer policies, if any, should be used in labor disputes, it is
necessary to understand how the federal welfare system operated in the
1960s and 1970s, when strikers could qualify for assistance. Moreover,
because the data gathered for our empirical analysis cover the period
1960-75, we are able to make an assessment of the effect of striker

8 Setting the Stage

eligibility for AFDC-U and food stamps on the frequency and duration
of strikes.
Until 1961, the AFDC program targeted families with children where
the father was absent and the mother did not work. In 1961 Congress
extended coverage under the program to dependent children in
households with an unemployed father. States were given the option
of deciding whether to participate in the AFDC-U program and by 1967,
21 had decided to do so. 11 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the pay
ment of AFDC-U benefits to strikers remained a contentious issue, with
controversy centering upon whether a striker fell within the definition
of an unemployed parent. In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Batterton
v. Frances, ruled that this definitional decision should be left to the states.
Thus, the issue of whether states participating in the AFDC-U program
could deny benefits to strikers' families was finally settled. By 1980,
of the 26 states participating in the AFDC-U programs, 8 had chosen
to deny benefits to strikers.
AFDC-U benefits were never an important source of income sup
port for strikers. This is in part because, as noted above, many states
either did not have an AFDC-U program or denied benefits to strikers.
In addition, even if a participating state did permit strikers to collect
benefits, a striker could only qualify if he met the same federal and
state eligibility requirements imposed on all other applicants for
assistance. The most salient requirements were that he was unemployed
for at least 30 days, that he have a dependent child, that he could
demonstrate financial need under his state's resource and income tests,
and that he did not receive unemployment insurance benefits. In com
bination, these requirements always seriously limited the number of
strikers eligible for AFDC-U. For example, since the average strike
in the United States lasts about three weeks, the 30-day waiting period
by itself prevented most strikers from ever becoming eligible for AFDC-U
benefits.
Food stamps were a somewhat different story. The food stamp pro
gram is funded entirely by the federal government but is administered
jointly by the federal government and the states under uniform federal
standards. It is clear that during the 1960s and 1970s many more strikers
qualified for food stamps than for AFDC-U. First, unlike the AFDC-U
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program, all states participated in the food stamp program. Second,
there is no waiting period for food stamp benefits. Third, the resource
and income tests used to qualify applicants for food stamps have been
more liberal than those used in most state AFDC programs. Fourth,
after 1970 the Food Stamp Act specifically provided that otherwise eligi
ble strikers would not-be disqualified from receiving food stamps.
Strikers may also benefit from the General Assistance program.
General Assistance is distinguished from AFDC-U and food stamps by
an absence of federal involvement. It is funded and administered by
state and local governments; in some states eligibility rules differ from
county to county. Since it is a very old program, there are instances
where strikers have received General Assistance throughout the 20th
century. Indeed, since the program was not touched by the 1981 OBRA
legislation, strikers can still receive General Assistance. In most states,
however, this is a small program that provides minuscule benefits to
people with the lowest of family incomes. To choose an extreme ex
ample, in August, 1974, Alabama provided General Assistance benefits
of $12.50 to 42 people. While we have no hard numbers, it is unlikely
that many strikers benefit from this program.

Does the provision of government transfers to strikers affect strike
activity?
This question is not merely "academic." It has arisen in the most
practical of settings. For example, in Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, a case
involving the payment of unemployment compensation to strikers in
Rhode Island, the first circuit court demanded an empirical burden of
proof. The court said:
[The] present record suffers from a fundamental defect. It
provides no support for a causal relationship between the
receipt of benefits, which unions obviously desire and often
actively seek, and longer, costlier strikes. . . . [The] record
lacks even a crude form of what we assume would be the
most relevant and probative type of evidence statistical com
parisons of the length and cost of strikes in states granting
unemployment benefits (Rhode Island and New York) and
the length and cost of strikes of similar size in similar in
dustries in other states not granting such benefits. 12
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Similarly, in ITT Lamp Division v. Minter, a case involving payment
of AFDC-U benefits to strikers, the first circuit court called for evidence
indicating,
. . . how many states permit strikers to receive welfare;
whether or not strikes tend to be of longer duration where
welfare is received; and studies or expert testimony evaluating
the impact of eligibility for benefits on the strikers' resolve. 13
There exist but a handful of studies that examine the relationship be
tween transfer payments and strike activity. Perhaps best known is a
work by Thieblot and Cowin, which is primarily based on case studies. 14
A study of Great Britain by Gennard similarly relies on description,
case studies, and gross cost estimates. 15 John Kennan16 applies modern
statistical methods in examining the relationship between unemploy
ment insurance and the duration of strikes. His work, however, focuses
on the New York and Rhode Island policy of providing UI benefits in
very long strikes, and thereby ignores the multitude of other policies
under which strikers receive government transfers. 17
A distinguishing feature of the present work is that it uses modern
statistical methods in an analysis of a broad range of government policies.
Chapter 5 introduces the relevant theory, the hypotheses to be tested,
the methods, and the data. Chapter 6 presents quantitative results and
draws conclusions.
Chapter 5 opens with a discussion of theory. Theory is crucial to this
project because it provides a bridge between the institutional details in
chapters 2-A and the quantitative results in chapter 6. Chapters 2-4 essen
tially tell us that in certain circumstances workers involved in strikes
obtain government transfers. Theory addresses the question of whether
there is a logical basis for arguing that these transfers affect strike ac
tivity. Much past work has treated this as a simple question that can
be glided over in one or two sentences. In our view, that is a serious
mistake for two reasons.
First, the answer is not at all obvious. Payment of government transfers
to strikers will surely make it easier for workers to support themselves
during a strike. But why would that result in more strike activity? The
employer is presumably aware of the availability of such transfers. If
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government transfers strengthen the bargaining position of the union,
then one might expect a rational employer to be more willing to settle
without a strike, or, failing that, settle sooner rather than later. That
means less strike activity. The point is that a concept of what starts and
stops strikes necessarily underlies any claim that government transfers
increase strike activity. That concept deserves critical examination; it
should not be left between the lines.
The second reason for exploring theoretical issues is that empirical
work always raises questions that are best answered with a theory. What
explanatory variables should be included in an analysis of strike activi
ty? What is the appropriate dependent variable? What are the key
hypotheses? What is the proper interpretation of a result? Empirical
work always requires answers to such questions. Theory helps to make
the answers logically consistent and explicit rather than implicit.
Thus, chapter 5 opens with a review of theories. On the basis of this
discussion it is clear that there is no general consensus on the "right"
theory of strikes. Rather, there are competing and often contradictory
theories. Fortunately, for our purposes a general theory of strike ac
tivity is not requisite. We only need a theory that links transfer policies
to strike activity. That theory was found in the work of Melvin Reder
and George Neumann. The fundamental proposition of the theory is
that strike activity is a decreasing function of the combined (union plus
management) cost of strikes. As the potential cost of a strike increases,
according to Reder and Neumann, the parties have a greater incentive
to develop protocols that allow them to reach peaceful settlements. From
this theory we derive a series of hypotheses linking specific provisions
of unemployment insurance and welfare programs to strike activity.
Those hypotheses can be tested with state level data. Transfer policies
affecting strikers usually vary across but not within states. If transfer
policies affect strike behavior, then that should be revealed through dif
ferences in the "average" level of strike activity across states. In con
sequence, we collected data on several dimensions of strike activity for
the 50 states over the period 1960-1974. We also collected data on the
specifics of state transfer policies ("stoppage-of-work," "innocent
bystander," etc.) for the same period. Chapter 5 closes with a discus-
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sion of the nuances of data sources, variable measurement, and statistical
methodology.
Chapter 6 then presents results from a sequence of regression analyses
on annual cross-sections and on the full (1960-1974) panel. On the basis
of the statistical evidence, we conclude that there is a link between the
unemployment insurance system and strike activity. A more generous
unemployment insurance program is related to a higher strike frequen
cy in states that use "innocent bystander" or "stoppage-of-work" dis
qualification rules. Similar results were not obtained for other unemploy
ment insurance provisions, e.g., the New York-Rhode Island waiting
period, or other dimensions of strike activity, e.g., average duration
of strikes. Finally, our statistical models did not uncover evidence linking
welfare programs to strike activity. Either such a link is nonexistent
or our methods are insufficiently precise to discern it.
What is the proper policy?
When should government transfers be provided to workers engaged
in strikes? As discussed in chapter 7, at the heart of this question lies
a philosophical problem concerning the appropriate role of the modern
state in what are usually two distinct spheres: government transfers and
industrial relations. The answer necessarily involves finding a balance
between what are often conflicting policy goals in the two spheres. For
example, a goal like government neutrality in labor relations comes in
conflict with the goal of alleviating hardship and distress. Thus, the
chapter begins with an examination of current policy goals and tradeoffs
between those goals.
Chapter 7 ends with the authors' position on the proper policy. Briefly
stated, in our opinion the present system is seriously flawed. It denies
public assistance benefits to the family of a law-abiding striker irrespec
tive of hardship. It provides unemployment insurance benefits to strikers
when the involuntary nature of their unemployment is fraught with am
biguity. It places part of the burden of financing strike related transfers
on the larger society, and thereby increases the level of strike activity.
Chapter 7 proposes a package of alternative policies that are oriented
toward the twin goals of alleviating hardship and promoting industrial
peace.
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2
Unemployment Compensation
in Labor Disputes
Parti

The unemployment compensation laws of all states contain provisions
that disqualify workers if they are unemployed because of the existence
of a labor dispute. State employment security agencies have the respon
sibility of determining, first, if a labor dispute exists and, second, if
the claimant's unemployment is the result of the labor dispute. These
are only threshold tests, however, in determining the claimant's eligibility
for unemployment benefits. Whether workers unemployed because of
a labor dispute qualify for benefits depends on the precise policies follow
ed by a particular state and there is considerable variation in these
policies. The most common provisions are summarized for the reader's
use as a reference in exhibit 2.1. We will discuss these provisions in
more detail in this and the following chapter.
A fundamental distinction hinges on whether a state imposes a blanket
disqualification on workers unemployed because of the existence of a
labor dispute or disqualifies such workers only if the labor dispute has
caused a "stoppage of work" at the establishment where the worker
is employed. In the former category, approximately 20 states disqualify
workers while a labor dispute is in "active progress" (or alternatively
as long as the workers' unemployment continues to be the result of the
dispute). In the latter category, approximately 27 states disqualify
workers only if the labor dispute has caused a substantial curtailment
of the employer's operations. In stoppage-of-work states, striking
workers can collect benefits if their employer continues to operate at
or near normal levels. In simplest terms, workers are denied benefits
if their strike is a success, but are granted benefits if their strike fails.
15
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Exhibit 2.1
Principal Labor Dispute Disqualification Provisions
in Unemployment Insurance Systems
Standard provisions:
Individuals filing claims for benefits are
Labor dispute
disqualified if unemployed because of the ex
disqualification
istence of a labor dispute.
A worker is ineligible for benefits if the
Establishment
labor dispute causing his unemployment
rule
is at the "factory, establishment, or premises
at which he is or was employed."
Otherwise eligible claimants cannot be
New work
denied benefits for refusing to accept new work
if the job vacancy was created by a strike,
lockout, or other labor dispute.
Exceptions:
Stoppage-ofwork

Prevalence
as of 1984
All jurisdictions

Almost all
jurisdictions

All jurisdictions

Also referred to as the "American Rule."
Striking employees are not disqualified for
benefits if an existing labor dispute has not caus
ed a cessation or substantial curtailment of
operations at the plant or establishment where
the strikers are employed.

27 states

Waiting period

Strikers become eligible for benefits
if, after a specified period of time, the
labor dispute has not ended.

Two states (New
York & Rhode
Island)

Innocent
bystander

Workers who are unemployed because of
a labor dispute may qualify for benefits if
they can show that they are not participating
in, financing, and/or directly interested in the
dispute.3

Approximately
44 states

Lockout

Workers may collect benefits if their
employer is withholding available work in order
to bring pressure to bear in support of his
bargaining position, or to resist recognition of
an employee bargaining agent.

21 states

Illegal actions
by employers

Benefits are paid to workers if the employer
is found to be the cause of the labor dispute,
by refusing to conform to the provisions of a
collective bargaining contract and/or by failing
to comply with federal or state laws pertaining
to collective bargaining or the terms and con
ditions of employment.

Nine states
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Exhibit 2.1 (continued)

Exceptions:
Interim
employment

Workers are eligible for benefits if, after
going on strike, they obtain bona fide
interim jobs from which they are then
laid off.

Grade or
class
disqualification

A worker, regardless of his own level of
participation in a labor dispute, is ineligible
for benefits if he was, at the time of the
commencement of the dispute, a member of
a grade or class o£ workers any one of
whom participated in, financed, or had a
direct interest in the dispute.

Prevalance
as of 1984
Several states
including
Massachusetts,
Michigan,
Missouri, and
Illinois
Approximately
40 states

a. Innocent bystander statutes do not uniformly include all three conditions; requirements vary
across states. In some jurisdictions, for example, a worker need only prove that he did not par
ticipate in the labor dispute in order to qualify for benefits.

The remaining states, most notably New York and Rhode Island, fall
outside either of these two categories. Both New York and Rhode Island
disqualify strikers in the early stages of a labor dispute, but allow strikers
to collect benefits if a strike lasts longer than eight weeks (New York)
or seven weeks (Rhode Island).
Most states will allow workers to collect benefits if they can show
that they are not actually participating in, financing, or directly interested
in the labor dispute. Such workers are often called "innocent
bystanders.'' These workers may be unemployed because of a dispute,
but if they are not picketing or otherwise aiding the strikers, do not
help to finance strike benefits paid to the strikers, and do not stand to
benefit from a settlement growing out of the strike, they will usually
be allowed to collect unemployment benefits.
About 21 states pay benefits to workers if their employer has locked
them out. These states do not believe workers should be denied benefits
if the labor dispute is in fact the employer's fault. The remaining states
do not distinguish between strikes and lockouts, disqualifying workers
regardless of which side bears responsibility for the dispute.
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Policy Development
The development of most state policies regarding the eligibility of
strikers for unemployment compensation began with the passage of the
Social Security Act in 1935. When Congress passed the Social Securi
ty Act, it provided the impetus for the establishment of a stateadministered unemployment compensation system. The Social Securi
ty Act imposed a tax of 3 percent on the payrolls of all employers of
eight or more employees. 1 The Act allowed a state to avoid up to 90
percent of this tax, however, if it passed legislation providing for the
payment of benefits to unemployed workers. If the state's legislation
met federal standards, the state could retain the bulk of the federal tax
in a state-administered unemployment compensation fund. Benefits paid
to eligible unemployed workers would be financed out of the monies
collected in the fund. The portion of the payroll tax retained by the federal
government would be used to assist the states in the administration of
their unemployment compensation laws. 2
All states and territories that had not previously enacted unemploy
ment compensation legislation proceeded to pass such laws in the two
years following the passage of the Social Security Act. To assist the
states in the development and administration of their legislation, the
Social Security Act created the Social Security Board as an indepen
dent agency. The Board was also charged with the task of deciding
whether state laws qualified for the tax offset and allotting the funds
appropriated for the administration of the state laws. 3
The Board drew up several "Draft Bills for State Unemployment Com
pensation," modeled largely on state workers' compensation laws and
the British Unemployment Insurance Act of 1911. 4 One of the Board's
Draft Bills became the prototype for almost all state laws that were subse
quently passed. 5 According to Edwin Witte, "Each of the (state) laws
had some provisions different from every other law, but all had far more
similarities than differences." 6 In fact, Hetherington reports, most states
simply copied most of the provisions in the Social Security Board's Draft
Bill and enacted their own legislation "in great haste and without a great
deal of independent study." 7
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One of the provisions contained in the Draft Bill sought to disqualify
workers whose unemployment was "due to a stoppage of work which
exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment or premises
at which he is or was last employed. " 8 The Draft Bill also recommended
that such workers be allowed to collect benefits if they could show that
they were "not participating in or financing or directly interested in
the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work'' and ' 'do not belong
to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the com
mencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the
premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating
in or financing or directly interested in the dispute."9 Most states in
cluded this language without modification in their unemployment com
pensation statutes. But, given the haste with which the laws were pass
ed, it is unlikely that many legislators understood the implications of
the labor dispute qualification provisions they were adopting.
Many of the problems that the states have encountered in administering
and interpreting the labor dispute disqualification provisions stem from
the fact that the key terms in the Draft Bill's recommendations were
left undefined. For example, what precisely is a "labor dispute"? How
does a labor dispute differ from a "stoppage-of-work"? What is an
"establishment"? How should a state distinguish between those workers
at an establishment who are ' 'participating in or financing or directly
interested in" a dispute from those who are not? What is a "grade or
class" of workers?
State agencies and courts have had more than five decades to grapple
with these terms. Out of a multitude of agency and judicial decisions,
some common interpretations have developed, but there is also con
siderable diversity in the definitions. The differences in the treatment
of workers involved in labor disputes has been multiplied by numerous
revisions that states have made in their unemployment compensation
laws down through the years. For example, several states have amend
ed their statutes to exclude lockouts and other employer-caused disputes
from the definition of "labor dispute." These amendments have often
been passed as a result of a state's experience with particular labor
disputes or in response to lobbying efforts by unions, employers, and
other interested parties. 10
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The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to the fundamental ques
tions each state must answer when formulating its policy on the use
of unemployment compensation in labor disputes. First, does a labor
dispute exist? If it does, is the claimant's unemployment the result of
that labor dispute? How have the states and the federal courts inter
preted the provision that holds that the labor dispute must be at the
"establishment" where the worker was last employed? To aid the reader
in understanding the complexities of the rules governing the eligibility
of a claimant for unemployment compensation in a labor dispute, we
will, in the next chapter, use flow charts that summarize the principal
questions that must be answered in determining that eligibility.
But the exceptions used to remove a claimant's disqualification are
numerous, and vary from state to state. For example, is the claimant
in a state with a lockout exception? How is the lockout exception ap
plied in such states? Has the claimant had other employment during
the strike? How does interim employment affect striker eligibility for
unemployment compensation? These questions will be discussed in this
chapter.
The next chapter discusses the three rules that later become the focus
of our empirical tests: the stoppage-of-work rule, the policies followed
by New York and Rhode Island, and the innocent bystander provisions.
Chapter 3 will also examine the most significant Supreme Court deci
sion regarding unemployment compensation in labor disputes, the New
York Telephone case. In this decision, the Court gave each state wide
latitude to shape its own policy regarding striker eligibility for unemploy
ment compensation. 11 Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of
unemployment insurance cases arising out of the air traffic controllers'
strike in 1981.

What is a Labor Dispute?
With the exception of Alabama, Arizona, and Minnesota, the term
"labor dispute" has not been defined in state unemployment compen
sation statutes. 12 As a result, it has fallen upon state administrative agen
cies and courts to formulate definitions of the term. Without statutory
guidance, agencies and courts have frequently relied upon the definitions
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of "labor dispute" contained in federal statutes, such as the NorrisLaGuardia Act and National Labor Relations Act, or in state labor rela
tions statutes. 13
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act requires, for example, that
unemployment compensation be paid to otherwise eligible claimants if
they have refused to accept new work because "the position offered
is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute." 14
This language suggests that Congress had a broad definition of labor
dispute in mind not one confined merely to strikes and lockouts, but
one that encompasses other types of labor disputes as well. Arguably,
picketing, secondary boycotts, jurisdictional disputes, representational
disputes, and other forms of concerted activity fall within the defini
tion of labor dispute. Workers away from their jobs because of their
involvement in such activities would not, in most jurisdictions, be eligible
for unemployment benefits.
Difficult questions arise when there is an absence of concerted ac
tivity or other forms of "manifest conflict," but it is nonetheless alleg
ed that workers are unemployed because of the existence of a labor
dispute. In 1946 the United States Supreme Court had occasion to con
sider such a situation. 15 The case arose when a group of Alaska can
nery workers were laid off at the end of the fishing season, but before
a new collective bargaining agreement had been negotiated with their
employers.
The canneries then announced that they would not reopen for the new
season unless the workers agreed to a new contract. The workers filed
claims for unemployment benefits, arguing that the term' 'labor dispute,''
in the Court's words, must be "narrowly construed to require a strike
or leaving of employment which, in turn, calls for a presently existing
employment relation at the time the dispute arises. According to this
view, the term would not cover a situation, such as presented here, where
the controversy precedes the employment." 16
The Court, however, rejected the argument of the cannery workers,
holding that "the term, 'labor dispute,' has a broader meaning than
that attributed to it by the respondents." 17 Although the Court did not
believe that a "labor dispute" must always be construed "as broadly
as it is defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the National Labor
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Relations Act," 18 nevertheless it did find that there was a "full-scale
controversy" between the workers' union and their employers. 19 Thus,
the Court ruled that the workers were not eligible for benefits, even
though their employment relationship had been severed and they were
not engaging in a strike or any other form of concerted activity.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court did not accept a claim that
a controversy arising out of an employee's charge that her employer
had committed an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Rela
tions Act constituted a "labor dispute" under the state's unemployment
insurance statute. Florida had disqualified a union member for unemploy
ment benefits because she had filed a charge against her employer with
the National Labor Relations Board. A Florida court ruled that the fil
ing of the charge initiated a "labor dispute," thus disqualifying the
worker for benefits under the state's unemployment insurance statute.
In Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, the Supreme Court concluded,
' 'Florida should not be permitted to defeat or handicap a valid national
objective by threatening to withdraw state benefits from persons sim
ply because they cooperate with the Government's constitutional plan. "20
Nash suggests that the exercise of an employee's rights under a federal
statute cannot be interpreted by a state as a "labor dispute" that dis
qualifies the employee for unemployment benefits. The term "labor
dispute" cannot be defined so broadly that it encompasses every type
of disagreement between an employer and an employee.
Nevertheless, as Lewis has pointed out, " 'Labor dispute' as a
threshold concept in unemployment compensation proceedings has come
to include virtually any controversy affecting the terms and conditions
of the employment situation, regardless of whether the disputants stand
in an employer-employee relationship. The restrictive construction of
'labor dispute' has not received judicial acceptance." 21 The broad con
struction given the term "labor dispute" means that employers have
many opportunities to challenge their employees' entitlement to benefits
if their employees' unemployment is arguably the result of a labormanagement controversy.
But it must be emphasized that the finding that a labor dispute exists
is only the first step in determining whether a worker involved in such
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a dispute is eligible for unemployment benefits. All but a handful of
states remove a worker's disqualification for benefits, despite the ex
istence of a labor dispute, if the worker falls under one of several' 'escape
clauses," which we will presently discuss.

The Establishment Rule
In almost all jurisdictions, a worker is disqualified for benefits if the
labor dispute is at the "factory, establishment, or premises at which
he is or was last employed." Thus, as a general rule, a worker who
is unemployed because of a strike at another, separate establishment
is eligible for unemployment benefits, even if the establishment is owned
and operated by his employer.
States have differed, however, in their definition of "establishment."
Some states have defined establishment primarily on the basis of spatial
or geographical terms. An establishment, under this approach, is a
distinct physical place of business where the worker was last employed. 22
Two plants belonging to the same employer but in different cities would
be considered separate establishments, and workers laid off at one of
the plants because of a strike at the other would be eligible for benefits.
The only problem, as Milton Shadur points out, is "how small to draw
the circle of physical proximity." 23
Other states, however, dismiss the significance of physical proximi
ty and rely instead on a test that weighs the "functional integration"
of the units regardless of the distance that separates them. In one early
case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered a situation in which
workers at a Racine automobile plant set up a picket line to protest
management's plan to close the plant; as a consequence, workers at
the company's Kenosha plant were laid off. The Wisconsin court ruled
that the workers at both plants were ineligible for benefits, even though
there was technically no strike at the Racine plant and no picketing or
other concerted activity at the Kenosha plant. The court held that the
workers were disqualified because there was a labor dispute in active
progress at the Racine plant and the Racine and Kenosha plants were
functionally integrated. 24
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Taken to its limit, the functional integration test could be applied to
separate plants owned by different employers or even to plants located
in different states. Most jurisdictions, however, have not been willing
to apply the test that broadly, but instead have limited its application
to functionally integrated establishments owned by the same employer
within the same state. 25
Almost all states will allow laid-off workers to collect benefits even
if they are employed in a struck establishment but are engaged in a
"separate branch of work" from the strikers. 26 Suppose, for example,
an employer has two businesses located on the same premises. If a strike
by the employees of the one business causes the employer to lay off
the employees of the other business, the laid-off workers would be eligi
ble for benefits by virtue of their being employed in a separate branch
of work. Whether workers in a separate branch of work are permitted
to collect benefits depends in part, however, on whether they are truly
"innocent bystanders," that is, on whether in fact they all refrain from
participating in or financing the labor dispute and have no direct in
terest in it.
Lockouts
Although Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides unions with the
right to strike or to refrain from striking, the statute does not clearly
establish the right of employers to lock out. 27 The National Labor Rela
tions Board and the courts have vacillated over the question of whether
the right of the employers to lock out is the corollary of the right of
unions to strike. 28
A lockout has been defined as ' 'the employer's withholding of available
work from employees hired to perform such work in order to obtain
a change, or resist a change, in terms or conditions of employment,
or to resist recognition of an employee bargaining agent. " 29 It has clearly
been established by the NLRB and the courts that the lockout can never
be used to destroy the union or the union's bargaining rights. 30 Beyond
that general principle, the NLRB has said that the employer's right to
lock out depends on the circumstances of the individual case:
The nature of the measures taken, the objective, the timing,
the reality of the strike threat, the nature and extent of the
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anticipated disruption, and the degree of resultant restriction
on the effectiveness of the concerted activity, are all matters
to be weighed in determining the reasonableness under the
circumstances, and the ultimate legality, of the employer's
action. 31
The NLRB and the courts have consistently recognized the employer's
right to lock out in two situations: to protect the employer against the
threat of a strike that might result in "unusual economic hardship" and
to preserve the institution of multiemployer bargaining. In both these
situations, the lockout is considered a "defensive" weapon that may
lawfully be used by employers. In the former situation, the Board has
particularly been tolerant of lockouts if the parties' contract has expired
and the employer is uncertain about the timing of a strike by the union.
In the latter situation, the board and the courts have approved an
employer lockout if the employer is a member of a multiemployer
association that has traditionally bargained with the union, and the union
has struck one or more of the other members of the association. Where
there has been a history of multiemployer bargaining, an employer
lockout in reprisal for a strike against other employers in the associa
tion has been deemed a lawful action by the Supreme Court. 32
Several ambiguities have attended the legality of a lockout when it
is used by the employer as an "offensive" weapon. In the American
Ship Building case, the Supreme Court held that a single employer's
right to shut down his plant "for the sole purpose of exerting economic
pressure against a union and in support of a lawful bargaining posi
tion" was lawful, provided the employer had bargained in good faith
to an impasse with the union. 33 The NLRB, however, has ruled that
an offensive lockout becomes unlawful when an employer hires per
manent replacements. 34 Moreover, although the employer's right to hire
temporary replacements during a defensive lockout has been clearly
established, 35 the employer's right to do so during an offensive lockout
has been problematic. 36
In recent years, however, the Board has been more tolerant of offen
sive lockouts and use of temporary replacements. The Supreme Court's
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ruling in American Ship Building has been extended to pre-impasse of
fensive lockouts. 37 Furthermore, the right to use temporary replacements
during an offensive lockout was substantially expanded in Harter Equip
ment. 38 The Board, in this case, held that "an employer does not violate
Section 8(a)(3) and (1), absent specific proof of antiunion motivation,
by using temporary employees in order to engage in business opera
tions during an otherwise lawful lockout, including a lockout initiated
for the sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support
of a legitimate bargaining position." 39 The decision has not been ap
pealed and has been consistently applied to subsequent cases involving
the use of temporary replacements during an offensive lockout. 40 The
test for legality in lockout cases, then, is no longer a balance of com
peting interests between employers' business concerns and employees'
statutory rights. An offensive lockout is currently considered lawful
unless initiated in support of bad faith bargaining or if motivated by
antiunion animus. Since a struck employer's right to hire permanent
or temporary replacements has long been recognized,41 limitations on
the scope of similar employer behavior during a lockout suggest that
under federal labor policy the employer's right to lock out is not precisely
the corollary of the union's right to strike.
The distinctions that have been crafted in federal labor policy,
however, have not had much influence on state policies regarding the
payment of unemployment benefits to locked-out employees. As Willard
Lewis has pointed out, court decisions involving unemployment in
surance statutes have not been "distracted by 'offensive-defensive' or
like tortious considerations of the underlying labor disputes."42 Initially,
as noted previously, state policies were principally influenced by the
Social Security Board's "Draft Bill," which in turn had been based
largely on the British unemployment insurance act. The British statute
disqualified employees unemployed because of a labor dispute from
receiving unemployment compensation, and defined "labor dispute"
to cover both strikes and lockouts. 43
Although the majority of states continue to deny unemployment
benefits to employees without work because of a lockout, 21 currently
pay benefits to such workers. 44 Evidently states with lockout provisions
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believe that workers who have been locked out are involuntarily
unemployed in the sense that they are willing and able to work but are
prevented from doing so by the action of their employer. Defenders
of the lockout exception maintain that a state that refuses to pay benefits
to locked-out employees violates the principle of state neutrality in labormanagement relationships. 45 Moreover, in a state without a lockout ex
ception, an employer facing a business downturn can avoid the increase
in unemployment insurance taxes that would follow the layoff of his
employees by ' 'provoking a dispute and then locking out his employees
instead of laying them off." 46 Thus, a lockout rule serves to close a
loophole in the unemployment compensation tax system.
Critics of the lockout exception have argued that it is inconsistent
to grant an employer the (qualified) right to lock out under federal law,
but to allow his employees to collect unemployment benefits under state
law if the employer uses the weapon. They have argued that such state
policies frustrate the operation of the National Labor Relations Act,
and that a state's attempt to distinguish between a lockout and a strike
is "discriminatory, arbitrary, and capricious." 47
Fierst and Spector, writing in 1940, thought that the effort of several
states to distinguish between a strike and a lockout was "quixotic."
These authors noted the "enormous" administrative difficulties of mak
ing such distinctions on a case-by-case basis. 48 On the other hand, Fierst
and Spector thought that denying benefits to locked-out employees would
work an inequity on employees by unreasonably enhancing the bargain
ing power of employers. 49 Thus, the advisability of a lockout provi
sion depends in part on whether the difficulties of administering the
provision are outweighed by the state's interest in maintaining a
reasonable balance of power between labor and management.
Predictions that a lockout rule would impose heavy administrative
burdens on state unemployment insurance agencies are borne out in our
survey of those agencies and by an examination of the decisions of the
agencies and courts. States with lockout provisions have had to grap
ple with a variety of vexing issues. For example, since state unemploy
ment compensation statutes do not define "lockout," there has been
extensive litigation concerning definitional issues. Cases that involve
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employers who have "physically" locked out their employees do not
generally present major difficulties. The harder cases deal with employers
who unilaterally change the terms and conditions of employment after
reaching a bargaining impasse with the union. When is a unilateral
change so unreasonable as to constitute a lockout? Minnesota and Penn
sylvania, two states with lockout provisions, represent contrasting ap
proaches to this question.
In 1980, Local 4-P of the United Food and Commercial Workers
Union and Sunstar Foods, Inc., a beef-slaughtering and packing com
pany in Minnesota, reached impasse in contract negotiations over the
employer's demand to reduce wages by approximately 20 percent. Union
members walked off their jobs after Sunstar imposed its proposed wage
scale unilaterally. Because of Minnesota's lockout provision, most of
the workers then filed claims for unemployment benefits.
The claims deputy for the Minnesota Department of Employment
Security determined that the claimants were ineligible for benefits
because they were participating in a labor dispute. The Appeals Tribunal
affirmed the decision of the claims deputy. But the workers then ap
pealed the determination to the commissioner of the DES, and he revers
ed the ruling of the Appeals Tribunal. In his view, the workers were
separated from their employment because of a lockout. The case went
to the Minnesota Supreme Court, where Sunstar argued that since it
had offered work to the employees, albeit at a substantially lower wage,
there had been no lockout. The employees argued that the unilateral
imposition by Sunstar of employment terms so unreasonable that the
employees had no alternative but to leave did indeed constitute a lockout.
The Minnesota Court examined a large number of judicial decisions
in jurisdictions with lockout provisions, seeking guidance on the ques
tion of whether Sunstar's action had been so harsh as to constitute a
lockout. In an earlier decision by the Minnesota Court, for example,
an employer's unilateral wage cut of 2 to 4 percent had not been ruled
a lockout. 50 But in cases in other states involving employer wage reduc
tions of 15, 20, and 25 percent, the Courts had found the employers
to be engaged in a lockout and permitted the claimants to collect benefits.
The Minnesota Court seemed to suggest that if a unilateral wage reduc-
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tion amounted to less than 15 percent, the ensuing work stoppage should
not be considered a lockout. But if the wage reduction were greater
than 15 percent, the employer's action was so unreasonable that it had
to be considered a lockout. 51
Clearly, such a rule may be administratively convenient but it is also
highly arbitrary. It gives no weight to whether the employer and the
union had bargained in good faith (an issue that was never raised in
the Sunstar case) or to whether the employer's action was or was not
justified by his financial condition. Moreover, the Minnesota Court prob
ably overestimated its ability to find a general rule on wage reductions
in the decisions of other state courts; we have found state practice to
vary so greatly on this issue that seeking a general standard is probably
a chimera.
Arguably, Pennsylvania interprets the lockout rule more liberally than
any other state. 52 It not only insists that the employer bargain in good
faith, but also requires that if the parties' contract has expired, the terms
and conditions that existed under the contract must be maintained until
a new agreement is reached. According to the acting executive direc
tor of Pennsylvania's Office of Employment Security,' 'If the employer
withholds work or fails to honor all of the terms and conditions of the
prior agreement, the resultant stoppage is a lockout. " 53 Thus, in Penn
sylvania, a work stoppage that results from any unilateral change of
the wage scale by the employer following the expiration of a contract
would be considered a lockout, and the affected employees would be
deemed eligible to collect unemployment benefits. 54
In a leading Pennsylvania case, a union of oil refinery workers fail
ed to reach agreement with the Sun Oil Company before the expiration
of an existing contract. For five weeks after the termination of the con
tract the parties worked on a day-to-day basis. When a federal mediator
certified that an impasse had been reached, Sun Oil began to imple
ment its contract proposals unilaterally. Union members responded by
walking off their jobs. The Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review held that a lockout had occurred because of the company's
"unreasonable" action and the refinery workers collected unemploy
ment benefits. Sun Oil took the case to the United States Supreme Court,
which dismissed the appeal "for want of a substantial, federal ques
tion." 55
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According to one authority, "Pennsylvania has adopted a position
both difficult to understand and difficult to justify." 56 Our Pennsylvania
correspondent notes that as a result of his state's definition of a lockout,
"union members have become more successful in gaining benefits
in ... work stoppages at any time. This has created serious problems
for service industries, light manufacturers, and . . . school districts." 57
Clearly Pennsylvania's broad definition of a lockout differs substan
tially from the treatment of lockouts by the NLRB and the federal courts.
Yet, given the Supreme Court's decisions in the Sun Oil and New York
Telephone cases, the Court obviously intends to tolerate such diversity.
Related to the lockout rules in unemployment insurance laws are those
statutory provisions that pay benefits to workers if the employer is found
to be the cause of the labor dispute. Seven states pay strikers benefits
if the employer has refused to conform to the provisions of a collective
bargaining contract. Seven states pay benefits if the employer has fail
ed to comply with any federal or state laws pertaining to collective
bargaining or the terms and conditions of employment. (Five of these
states Alaska, Arizona, Maine, Minnesota, and New Hampshire
have both of these provisions in their statutes. 58) Lewis has written,
"Such exclusions from the labor dispute definition on the basis of il
legal actions by employers leaves the state employment security agen
cy charged with the double duty of policing the collective agreement
and interpreting federal law. This makes possible inconsistent interpreta
tions of the same law by federal and state courts." 59 Our research,
however, suggests that these provisions are considered neither particular
ly significant nor a cause of much concern.60 No doubt this view stems
in part from the fact that so few states have such provisions. Also, the
use of contract grievance procedures and arbitration has dramatically
reduced the number of strikes occurring because of employer viola
tions of collective bargaining agreements. On the other hand, one might
expect that the growth of federal regulation of the workplace would
have resulted in more strikes over alleged employer violations of federal
law. The parties, however, generally avoid the use of economic weapons
to resolve disputes over their adherence to federal regulations, prefer
ring instead to use their own grievance procedures or to have the ap
propriate agencies and the courts settle such issues. 61
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Interim Employment
Several states, including Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, and Il
linois, pay unemployment benefits to employees who, after going on
strike, obtain bonafide interim jobs from which they are then laid off. 62
In several states the courts have wrestled with the problem of drawing
the line between interim (or temporary) and permanent jobs. In Florida,
for example, a striker took a job that, in "good faith," he expected
to be permanent. Nine months later he was laid off. The court then rul
ed that he qualified for jobless pay. 63
In other states, attempts by strikers to obtain unemployment benefits
after a period of temporary employment have been unsuccessful. The
courts in most states seek to determine whether a striker who obtains
new work has severed his employment relationship with the struck
employer. Most courts have ruled that obtaining new work does not
by itself indicate that the striker has severed his prior employment rela
tionship. They have ruled instead that a striker's unemployment following
an interim job is actually due to the labor dispute and not to the layoff
by the new employer. 64
In 1968 Michigan developed a contrary rule in Great Lakes Steel Corp.
v. Michigan Employment Security Commission. 65 There the court in
terpreted the Michigan statute to allow strikers to collect benefits even
when they had worked on interim jobs for as little as one day and their
labor dispute with their regular employer had yet to be resolved. 66 In
1974 the Michigan statute was amended in an attempt to clarify the mean
ing of "bonafide interim employment." The Michigan statute now holds
that a striker's disqualification for unemployment benefits is terminated
by the striker "performing services in employment in at least two con
secutive weeks falling wholly within the period of the individual's total
or partial unemployment due to the labor dispute." 67
In a letter to the authors, the director of the Bureau of Unemploy
ment Insurance, Michigan Employment Security Commission, offered
his interpretation of the state's interim employment rule: "In each con
secutive week the individual must earn wages in excess of [his] poten
tial weekly benefit rate based on wages earned with the labor dispute
employer." 68 Thus, it would appear possible for a striker in Michigan
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to work as little as one day in each of two consecutive weeks on an
interim job to qualify for unemployment benefits.
Two strikes against the Dow Chemical Company illustrated how the
Michigan rule operates in practice. In 1972, 166 workers represented
by District 50, Allied and Technical Workers Union, went on strike
against Dow's Bay City plant. (The Bay City local later became part
of the United Steelworkers Union.) At first the strikers were declared
ineligible for unemployment benefits. "But, at the urging of their local,
many immediately took advantage of the 1968 court decision that held
that any striker who takes an interim job and is then laid off can qualify
for compensation even if he works only one day. Of 166 who struck,
at least 135 took jobs with 'friendly' employers, many in local bars,
earning as little as $1 to $18 to qualify for weekly benefits." 69
In 1974, workers at Dow's Midland, Michigan plant went on strike
and once again the union urged the strikers to obtain interim jobs with
"friendly" employers. Most of the strikers did so, were laid off, and
then collected unemployment benefits for the duration of the strike. The
strike lasted 26 weeks and was settled precisely at the point when most
strikers' eligibility for benefits was about to expire. In an amicus brief
submitted to the Supreme Court in the New York Telephone case, Dow
charged, "This utilization of benefits was not fortuitous or unplanned
but was, in fact, a part of the Steelworkers' comprehensive strike and
defense progrant used by its local affiliates, in conjunction with
allotments from the [Steelworkers'] Strike and Defense Fund, to aid
local members in withstanding the financial pressure of a strike situa
tion." 70
Under Michigan's experience rating provisions, only a proportional
part of the strikers' benefits was assessed against their interim employers.
Therefore, almost all of the benefits paid to the Dow strikers were charg
ed to that company. As a result, Dow was ordered to pay most of the
$3,400,000 that had been disbursed to the strikers in Bay City and
Midland. 71 Dow challenged the Michigan law in the courts, arguing
that payment of unemployment benefits to striking workers who had
obtained and then been laid off from temporary jobs interfered with
the employer's "federally protected right to bargain collectively."72 The
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suit was dismissed by the district court, but the court retained jurisdic
tion and ordered that Dow not be charged with the expense of the
unemployment benefits. 73

Summary
In this chapter we have provided an overview of the development
of public policy with respect to the use of unemployment compensa
tion in labor disputes. We have also discussed the fundamental issues
that all states consider in determining striker eligibility for unemploy
ment benefits, including the definition of a * 'labor dispute'' and the in
terpretation of the establishment rule. Last, we examined two sets of
circumstances that some states consider adequate to remove the dis
qualification of strikers for unemployment compensation. The first set
of circumstances involved lockouts and other employer-caused disputes;
the second set involved strikers who obtain, and are then laid off from,
interim jobs.
A theme of the chapter is the diversity across states in the treatment
of workers away from their jobs because of a labor dispute. Although
all states define a labor dispute in broad terms, they otherwise vary in
their treatment of the establishment rule, lockouts, and interim employ
ment. This theme is carried over into the next chapter where we take
up the three unemployment insurance provisions that are arguably the
most important rules affecting striker eligibility for benefits.
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3
Unemployment Compensation
in Labor Disputes
Part II

One of the most common misconceptions about unemployment com
pensation in labor disputes is that only two states New York and Rhode
Island have provisions authorizing payment of benefits to workers
unemployed because of a strike. Even putative experts on this topic
sometimes maintain the fiction that the practice is confined to two states.
For example, one authority made the case against the payment of
unemployment benefits to strikers in the following terms:
The only redeeming factor of programs calling for unemploy
ment compensation to persons involved in a labor dispute
is that they are the practice in only two states. The misguid
ed policy of two state legislatures has created an inequitable,
albeit legal, arrangement that does injustice to employers and
to the collective bargaining process as well. 1
Quite apart from this author's normative judgments about the prac
tice, he simply errs in believing other jurisdictions never pay unemploy
ment benefits to strikers. We have already examined, in the previous
chapter, some of the conditions under which workers in labor disputes
will qualify for benefits. In this chapter, we will first discuss the most
important exception to the general rule that "strikers never collect
benefits": the stoppage-of-work provision, which is in the statutes of
more than half the states. Although many authorities seem to believe
that the little-known stoppage-of-work provision is a statutory oddity
of little consequence, we will argue in this chapter and later, on the
basis of our empirical results, that the provision is critically important.
This chapter next examines the policies of New York and Rhode
Island. We maintain that it is another misperception to believe that New
39
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York has the most liberal policy regarding striker eligibility for
unemployment compensation. On the contrary, we will argue that New
York's policy is less liberal than the policies of many other states, par
ticularly those that have lockout, interim employment, stoppage-of-work,
and innocent bystander provisions. Since New York does not use such
qualifying provisions, and since very few strikes last longer than eight
weeks, only a small minority of strikers ever collect benefits under New
York's law.
A large majority of states recognize an obligation to protect workers
who are unemployed because of a labor dispute but are not involved
in the dispute. Accordingly, the next section of this chapter analyzes
"innocent bystander" provisions. It is particularly important to under
stand these provisions because of the role they will play in our empirical
tests. We also examine "grade or class" provisions, which to some
extent dovetail with innocent bystander rules.
In 1981 the nation's air traffic controllers went out on strike, in viola
tion of a federal law prohibiting strikes by federal employees. When
the striking controllers refused to obey President Reagan's order that
they go back to work, the president discharged them. Subsequently,
many of these controllers filed claims for unemployment compensa
tion. The treatment of these claims by state agencies and the courts is
considered in the last section of this chapter. The story of the air traffic
controllers graphically illustrates the disparate experience of strikers
under our unemployment insurance statutes.

Stoppage-of-Work Provisions
Approximately 27 state unemployment compensation statutes contain
so-called stoppage-of-work provisions. 2 These provisions allow strikers
to collect benefits if an existing labor dispute has not caused a cessa
tion or substantial curtailment of operations at the plant or establish
ment where the strikers are employed. Eligible strikers in work-stoppage
states can collect benefits from the outset of a strike (or, more precise
ly, after the normal waiting period, which in most states is one week
after the claimant has filed for benefits). In the statistical analysis con
tained in this study (see chapter 6), we will provide evidence that the
work-stoppage rule does affect the level of strike activity in a state.
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It is therefore particularly important to consider the implications of a
work-stoppage provision.
In effect, such provisions allow strikers to collect unemployment com
pensation if their strike has failed that is, if the strikers have been unable
to shut down their employer or otherwise cause a significant decrease
in the level of his operations. As the figure 3.1 shows, in work-stoppage
states, if a strike succeeds in forcing employers to close down or to
reduce the scale of their operations significantly, the strikers cannot
collect unemployment benefits (unless the state has other "exceptions"
that remove the strikers' disqualification). But if employers hire
replacements (or strike-breakers) or are able to use supervisors or other
nonstriking employees to continue to operate at or near normal levels,
the strikers can collect benefits. Thus, in work-stoppage states,
unemployment benefits become a kind of insurance against a failed
strike. 3
Under British law it had been established that the clause did not per
tain to a stoppage-of-work by an individual employee; rather the law
had been construed by the British Tribunal and British courts to per
tain to a stoppage-of-work at the establishment where the striker was
employed. 4 Using British precedents, most states adopted this interpreta
tion of the work-stoppage rule. 5 In addition, most work-stoppage states
will qualify strikers for benefits even if the plant or establishment is
operating at only 75 or 80 percent of normal levels. 6 Hetherington has
discussed the rationale for the work-stoppage rule:
[The] state interest in granting benefits to strikers is greater
in cases where the strikers have failed to shut down their
employer. For in these cases the employer ordinarily prevents
a shutdown by hiring replacements for the strikers, and the
fact of replacement represents a drastic change in the strikers'
employment status. While they are technically still employees
under the NLRA, they often have little prospect of getting
their jobs back. Thus they are in essentially the same posi
tion as workers who have permanently lost their jobs because
the employer has replaced them with machines or gone out
of business. A state would have good reason, then, for giv
ing them the same compensation as it provides those
workers. 7
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In adopting the work-stoppage rule, the initial motivation of British
and American lawmakers may have been to protect striking employees
in cases where the employer had broken their strike by hiring perma
nent replacements. But in recent years an increasing number of
employers have been able and willing to operate during strikes without
depending on replacements to do so. Automation and other forms of
new technology have given many employers the technical capacity to
operate during strikes. The increasingly competitive markets in which
many American companies conduct business have also strengthened
employers' resolve to protect their sales, revenues, and profits by
operating during a strike. Plant operation during strikes also grew in
part because of high unemployment rates during the 1970s and early
1980s: struck employers wishing to hire replacements had a large,
available pool of workers from which to draw new employees. The ero
sion of union strength and solidarity is also related to the increase in
the number of employers who operate during strikes (although in this
regard cause and effect are difficult to disentangle). Finally, some
employers have been influenced by the perceived success of the federal
government in operating the nation's air traffic control system despite
a walkout in 1981 by virtually all of the controllers in the country. 8
We will give this strike a closer look at the end of this chapter.
It can be assumed that a company's decision to operate during a strike
may give it the bargaining power it needs to force the union to accept
a settlement on (or close to) the employer's terms. It is perhaps the case
that the growing number of employers who operate during a strike may
choose to do so out of a desire to "break the strike" or even "break
the union.'' But recent research suggests that employer decisions in this
regard are primarily motivated by strategic considerations related to
the employer's market position. This assertion is demonstrated by the
fact that most employers who operate during strikes nowadays consider
the hiring of permanent replacements only as a last resort. As Perry,
Dramer, and Schneider conclude, "For the most part . . . plant opera
tion has not been perceived or practiced as a weapon to enable an
employer to break a union."9
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In the past, employer operation during a strike was a rarity in American
labor relations. In the immediate post-World War II period the prac
tice was largely confined to high technology industries such as oil refin
ing, telephones, and broadcasting. In recent years, however, the prac
tice has spread to more labor-intensive industries, such as newspapers,
hotels, paper, and shipbuilding. 10 The trend to employer operation during
strikes magnifies the importance of the work-stoppage rule. Such pro
visions may have had little practical significance in the era when
employers routinely shut down their plants during strikes. But in workstoppage states, it is probably the case that the growth of plant opera
tion during strikes has resulted in growth in the number of strikers col
lecting unemployment benefits. Moreover, the use and cost of unemploy
ment compensation under work-stoppage provisions should have a grow
ing influence on the parties' relative bargaining power and hence on
the frequency and duration of strikes. 11
Curiously, most authorities on this topic have failed to recognize the
significance of the work-stoppage rule. For example, Hetherington
speculated that the work-stoppage rule was likely to have less impact
than other rules allowing strikers to collect unemployment benefits:
In pre-strike bargaining, for instance, [the work-stoppage
rule] is not likely to have much influence on either the
employer or the employees; for both, the prospect of the
employees collecting unemployment benefits at the
employer's expense will be balanced by the knowledge that
this prospect will be realized only if the strike fails. Nor is
there likely to be much of an effect on either side after a strike
has begun and failed: at this point the relative bargaining
power of employer and employees will be fixed by the failure
of the strike, not by the availability of unemployment benefits
to the strikers. 12
Hetherington, however, does not supply any evidence to support his
view. A contrary view is that, in fact, unions and their members can
make informed estimates of the likelihood of employers operating dur
ing strikes, particularly in industries such as telephones and oil refin
ing where the practice is routinely followed, and that the payment of
unemployment benefits to strikers does alter the relative bargaining
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power of the parties. In states with work-stoppage provisions, employees
may be more prone to strike because they know that if their strike fails
they will not suffer a cessation of income. In addition, if struck employers
bear none or only a small part of the expense of the unemployment
benefits, which is frequently the case under experience rating provi
sions, and if they know continued operation will serve to protect their
market position, they may not have much incentive to avoid strikes.
Clearly, empirical evidence on the effect of work-stoppage provisions
on strike activity is needed to assess the validity of the two contrary
points of view.
Down through the years the work-stoppage rule has been the subject
of considerable litigation. For example, in Kimbell, Inc. v. Employ
ment Security Commission, the Supreme Court dismissed, for want of
a substantial federal question, an appeal that involved New Mexico's
work-stoppage provision; the plaintiff in the case had contended that
the retroactive post-strike award of unemployment benefits to strikers
was preempted by federal labor law. 13 Apparently Oklahoma is cur
rently the only state with a work-stoppage provision in which the state's
highest court has held that the provision refers to a stoppage-of-work
by the employee, and not the employer. 14 Since 1975, the highest courts
of four additional states have ruled that the work-stoppage provision
allows strikers to collect benefits so long as their activities have not
substantially curtailed the operations of their employer. 15
The most recent of these decisions dealt with a 1980 strike by the
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union against the marketing divi
sion of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. in Anchorage, Alaska. In response to
the strike, Chevron hired replacements, reassigned nonstriking
employees, and used subcontractors to take over the work normally per
formed by the strikers. As a result, Chevron had no difficulty making
all of its deliveries and meeting its customers' demands during the strike.
Using Alaska's work-stoppage provision as the basis for their claim,
39 strikers applied for unemployment benefits.
The director of the Alaska Division of Employment Security, in cor
respondence with the authors, noted that Alaska had always tacitly
followed the lead of other states in holding that "stoppage-of-work"
referred to the work carried on at the employer's establishment, and
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not the work of the individual employee. "Accordingly, we would pay
benefits to strikers who did not bring about a substantial curtailment
of their employer's operations." 16 But when the Chevron strikers filed
for benefits, the Division of Employment Security decided to deny their
claim. According to the director, "We [found] that the courts of other
jurisdictions were frequently ill-informed in the subject matter, and that
they had a tendency to rely upon the stare decisis principle (the deci
sions of the courts of other states) without seriously weighing public
policy considerations, the legislative intent or history of their own states,
or even the rationale of the courts upon which they place their
reliance." 17 The Alaska agency decided to use the Chevron strike to
create a legal test of the interpretation of the state's work-stoppage
provision.
The initial denial of benefits to the Chevron strikers was upheld by
the assistant director of the Division, a referee for the Department of
Labor, and the Commissioner of Labor, who overruled his prior inter
pretations of the work-stoppage provision. The Commissioner's deci
sion was affirmed by the Alaska Superior Court in 1981. The Chevron
workers appealed to the state's Supreme Court, which reversed the lower
court's ruling. 18
In reviewing the history of the stoppage-of-work provision in Alaska
and other states, the Supreme Court found that the great majority of
states had interpreted the provision to mean a stoppage-of-work at the
employer's plant or establishment, not a stoppage-of-work by the in
dividual employee. In Alaska, this interpretation had prevailed for 27
years. During that period the Alaska legislature had, on several occa
sions, amended the state's unemployment compensation statute but had
never tried to alter the standard meaning of the work-stoppage provi
sion. The Court took the inaction of the legislature as a sign that it ac
quiesced in the Employment Security Division's formerly consistent
interpretation of the provision.
The Employment Security Division maintained that the standard in
terpretation of the work-stoppage provision forced the state to take sides
with the employee in a labor dispute, thereby placing the employer "in
the ridiculous position of having to finance the strike against him through
his direct reimbursement of the [unemployment insurance] fund, or
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through taxes paid into the fund." 19 The superior court agreed that the
work-stoppage rule compromised the state's neutrality in labor disputes.
But the state's Supreme Court disagreed:
This statute can be seen as attempting to chart a neutral course
between two absolute approaches to the payment of
unemployment benefits. If compensation were always paid
to striking workers, the state would abolish the labor dispute
disqualification entirely and could be viewed as always siding
with the striker. If compensation were never paid to
strikers ... the state could be viewed as seriously interfer
ing with the right to strike and thus siding with management.
The legislature, by enacting the "stoppage of work"
language has avoided these positions, and ocalled upon the
[Employment Security Division] to refrain from passing on
the merits of the dispute in evaluating benefit claims. Strikers
who do not stop the employers' operations qualify for benefits
while those who succeed in curtailing production do not.
Employers whose operations continue must therefore con
tribute to the fund while employers whose work is stopped
do not. We do not find this scheme to be without some
measure of logic. 20
The Alaska court then found that the OCAW strike in fact had not
caused a stoppage-of-work at Chevron's Anchorage facility; therefore
the strikers were entitled to receive unemployment benefits.

New York
New York passed its unemployment compensation law in April 1935,
before Congress enacted either the National Labor Relations Act or the
Social Security Act. New York legislators, therefore, could not know
whether their treatment of strikers would be consistent with the subse
quent recommendations of the Social Security Board. The New York
law was drafted by a tripartite committee, consisting of employer, union,
and public representatives. 21 The committee recommended that workers
unemployed because of a labor dispute (called an "industrial controver
sy" in New York law) be paid benefits after a 10-week waiting period,
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and the New York legislature adopted this recommendation. In April
1941, the legislature reduced the waiting period to eight weeks. 22
In contrast to the great majority of states, New York disqualifies not
only strikers but also innocent bystanders during the first eight weeks
of a labor dispute. 23 Thus, New York uses a "no-fault" approach, dis
qualifying all workers unemployed because of a labor dispute in its early
stages, and qualifying them for benefits thereafter. 24
The New York State Department of Labor has explained the state's
unique approach in the following terms:
New York's provision reflects a "hands-off' policy in in
dustrial controversies. Once the fact of an industrial con
troversy has been established, the state does not examine the
issues or the merits of the dispute. It does not determine who
is "participating in," "financing," or "interested in" the
dispute or who belongs to the same "grade or class of
workers" involved in the dispute. It does not decide whether
the dispute is a "lockout" or a "strike," or whether it is
legal or illegal. 25
The committee that drafted the New York law believed that any at
tempt to affix responsibility for a labor dispute would be administratively
cumbersome. For example, the committee thought that it is often im
possible to distinguish strikes from lockouts. If eligibility for unemploy
ment compensation depended on such distinctions, the committee main
tained, unions and employers would end up blaming each other for the
existence of a labor dispute, and administrators and judges would be
burdened with the task of resolving the parties' competing claims. To
prevent "manipulation" by either employers or unions, the committee
recommended that New York's statute "require no administrative ad
judication as to the cause of the industrial dispute or the nature of the
participants." 26
From the start, the New York law has been the focus of controversy.
Proponents acknowledge that it is "a rough sort of compromise," which
"may have seemed desirable for administrative and social reasons." 27
They argue that when a strike has dragged on for an extended period,
it becomes difficult to determine whether a striker is voluntarily or
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involuntarily unemployed. To retain his or her eligibility for benefits,
a striker in New York is required to seek and accept suitable temporary
jobs and, according to the law's proponents, this requirement has been
strictly enforced. 28 Thus, it is argued, the unemployment of a worker
involved in an extended strike may be more a consequence of the state
of the labor market than of the existence of the labor dispute.
Employers have regularly lobbied for changes in New York's law,
arguing that it encourages unions to strike and prolongs the duration
of existing disputes, violates the principle of state neutrality in labor
disputes, interferes with the federally established policy of "free col
lective bargaining," constitutes an unnecessary drain on the state's
unemployment insurance fund, and, because employer unemployment
insurance taxes are experience rated, forces employers to finance strikes
against themselves. 29 Through the years, numerous amendments to
change the law have been introduced in the New York legislature, but
proponents of the law have always been able to prevent their passage. 30
Rhode Island
Rhode Island's law, passed in 1936, pays benefits to strikers after
seven (rather than eight) weeks. 31 A major difference between the New
York and Rhode Island laws is that the latter pays benefits to innocent
bystanders after a one-week waiting period. Another major difference
is that Rhode Island does not adversely adjust an employer's experience
rating because his or her employees have collected benefits during a
strike. Finally, Rhode Island has a stoppage-of-work provision that
allows strikers to collect jobless pay after a one-week waiting period
if their employer's operations have not been substantially curtailed by
the labor dispute. 32 Under these various qualifying provisions, Rhode
Island potentially allows more workers unemployed because of a labor
dispute to collect benefits than any other state.
In the past, at least five other states (Alabama, Louisiana, Penn
sylvania, Tennessee, and New Jersey) have allowed strikers to collect
unemployment benefits after a waiting period of from three (Penn
sylvania) to eight (Alabama and Louisiana) weeks. 33 All of these laws
were repealed, according to Carney, "as a result of public pressure. " 34
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The question of whether federal labor policy prohibits New York (or
any other state) from paying unemployment compensation to strikers
remained unresolved until the United States Supreme Court issued a
definitive ruling in New York Telephone Co. v. New York Department
of Labor.

The New York Telephone Case
On July 14, 1971, the Communications Workers of America, AFLCIO, launched a nationwide strike against the Bell System. 35 Four days
later the parties reached an agreement in principle, subject to ratifica
tion by the union's members, and the CWA ordered all of its members
to return to work. In New York, however, about 38,000 workers
employed by the New York Telephone Co. (Telco), the Western Elec
tric Co., and AT&T's Long Lines Department defied their union's order
and remained on strike. The New York workers continued to strike
because they objected to their settlement being in line with the pattern
settlement on wages, fringe benefits, and other so-called "national
issues" that applied to Bell System employees throughout the rest of
the country. CWA members in New York wanted to "break the pat
tern" by holding out for a larger settlement. The New York Telephone
Co. resisted its employees' demands because it felt that yielding would
lead to "labor turmoil throughout the Bell System." 36
At first the international union opposed continuation of the strike in
New York, but eventually the union lent its support. 37 After the eightweek waiting period, the New York Telephone workers began to col
lect unemployment compensation and continued to do so until their strike
ended in February 1972. 38 The strike was settled when Telco agreed
to "a modest, but precedentially significant increase in wage benefits"
above the national pattern. 39 For a five-month period, 33,000 New York
Telephone workers collected $49 million in unemployment insurance
benefits; the average benefit paid to a claimant was about $70 per week. 40
At the start of the strike, Telco's unemployment insurance account
had credits of about $40 million. Collection of unemployment benefits
by the striking New York Telephone workers nearly exhausted this ac
count. Moreover, during the two years that followed the settlement of the
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strike, Telco's tax payments to the state were increased by about $16
million over what they would have been had the strike never occurred. 41
Subsequently, Telco brought suit in a federal district court against
the New York Department of Labor, seeking a declaration that the New
York statute authorizing the payment of unemployment compensation
to strikers was invalid because it conflicted with the policy of "free
collective bargaining" established in federal labor laws. The district
court, in its decision in the suit, concluded that the availability of
unemployment compensation was a substantial factor in the workers'
decision to remain on strike and had a "measurable impact on the pro
gress of the strike." 42 Judge Owen, in his decision, wrote
I regard it as a fundamental truism that the availability to,
or expectation of a substantial weekly, tax-free payment of
money by a striker is a substantial factor affecting his will
ingness to strike or, once on strike, to remain on strike, in
the pursuit of desired goals. This being a truism, one therefore
would expect to find confirmation of it everywhere. One
does. 43
On appeal to the circuit court, however, the New York Department
of Labor succeeded in getting the district court's decision overturned.
The Second Circuit considered the issue of whether federal labor policy
had preempted the states from paying unemployment compensation to
strikers. Noting that the question had been a political "hot potato" since
the early 1930s, the circuit court conducted a review of congressional
intent as manifested in the legislative history of the National Labor Rela
tions Act, the Social Security Act, and other relevant statutes, and con
cluded that there was "no clear preemptive intent" on the part of the
Congress. "Indeed, virtually all the evidence is to the contrary."44 Judge
Meskill, writing for the court, said,
The conflict between New York's statute and the broad fed
eral policy of free collective bargaining does not render the
State statute unconstitutional. The conflict is one which Con
gress has decided to tolerate. 45
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The stage was thus set for the Supreme Court's hearing of the case.
The Court, in a six-to-three decision, upheld the constitutionality of
the New York statute, even though it agreed with the district court's
finding that the New York law "altered the economic balance between
labor and management." 46 It quoted with approval its own finding in
an earlier case concerning the payment of welfare benefits to strikers
in New Jersey: ' 'It cannot be doubted that the availability of state welfare
assistance for striking workers in New Jersey pervades every work stop
page, affects every existing collective-bargaining agreement, and is a
factor lurking in the background of every incipient labor contract." 47
Despite its view that the payment of unemployment compensation to
strikers had a deleterious effect on collective bargaining, the Court
declared that the ultimate resolution of the case depended on congres
sional intent. In its examination of the legislative history of the rele
vant federal statutes, the Court found that Congress had been silent on
the issue when it passed the NLRA and Social Security Act in 1935,
but on several subsequent occasions had explicitly addressed the mat
ter. "On none of these occasions," the Court said, had Congress sug
gested that' 'such payments were already prohibited by an implicit federal
rule of law. Nor, on any of these occasions, has it been willing to supply
the prohibition."48 Concluding, Justice Stevens, the author of the plurali
ty opinion, said,
In an area in which Congress has decided to tolerate a sub
stantial measure of diversity, the fact that the implementa
tion of this general state policy affects the relative strength
of the antagonists in a bargaining dispute is not a sufficient
reason for concluding that Congress intended to pre-empt
that exercise of state power. 49
By upholding the constitutionality of the New York statute in the New
York Telephone case, the Supreme Court virtually validated all existing
state laws that pay unemployment benefits to strikers. 50

Innocent Bystanders
"Innocent bystanders" are workers who are not (1) participating
in a labor dispute by picketing or refusing to cross a picket line,
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(2) financing the dispute (e.g., through the payment of union dues that
are used to finance strike benefits), or (3) directly "interested" in the
dispute (in the sense of benefiting from a settlement that grows out of
a dispute). Suppose, for example, that a unionized group of production
workers strike their employer, causing the employer to lay off his non
union office personnel; can the office workers collect unemployment
benefits? Approximately 44 states would consider the office workers
to be innocent bystanders and would therefore allow them to collect
benefits. The remaining states, however, do not distinguish innocent
bystanders from actual strikers, and therefore disqualify both groups. 51
Ohio, for example, is one of a handful of states that denies unemploy
ment benefits to innocent bystanders. The constitutionality of Ohio's
statute was tested in a case that illuminates the anomalous consequences
of state control over these matters. In 1974, the United Mine Workers
union staged a nationwide strike that shut down a large proportion of
the nation's coal mines, including those operated by U.S. Steel and
Republic Steel. Shortages of coal resulting from the UMW's strike caus
ed the two corporations to lay off over 1200 employees at their steel
plants in Ohio. These workers were represented by the United
Steelworkers union. As the district court pointed out, "The steelworkers
were in no way involved in the disqualifying labor dispute between the
coal miners and the steel companies nor did they benefit from that
dispute." 52
In short, the steelworkers were innocent bystanders. Many of the laidoff steelworkers applied for unemployment benefits but were notified
by the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services that their claims were
disallowed. One of the steelworkers, Leonard Hodory, filed a class ac
tion suit on behalf of himself and the other laid-off workers. Hodory
challenged the constitutionality of the Ohio law on the grounds that it
had been preempted by the Social Security Act of 1935, denied him
and his fellow workers equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by
the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and bore "no real and
substantial relation" to the purpose of unemployment insurance legisla
tion. 53
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Hodory pointed out that he was unemployed through no fault of his
own. It was clear that, but for Ohio's labor dispute disqualification pro
visions, he would have been eligible for unemployment benefits. It was
the purpose of unemployment insurance legislation, Hodory argued,
to provide benefits to persons whose unemployment was involuntary.
Since his unemployment was indisputably involuntary, to deny him
benefits, Hodory maintained, frustrated the fundamental purpose of both
Ohio's unemployment compensation statute and the Social Security
Act. 54 Indeed, one of the anomalous consequences of Ohio's statute was
that it allowed employees who were locked out to collect benefits but
it denied benefits to innocent bystanders. Hodory thought that this was
an arbitrary distinction that served to deny him equal protection under
the law.
But the State of Ohio in the Hodory suit argued that denying inno
cent bystanders unemployment benefits was not an arbitrary measure,
but one that did indeed serve a suitable government interest. The state
argued that granting benefits to innocent bystanders would, because of
experience rating, place an added financial burden on the struck
employers. In effect, Ohio argued that if the steel workers were allow
ed to collect benefits that were ultimately financed by the steel com
panies, the companies would be placed at an unfair disadvantage in their
negotiations with the coal miners. Moreover, Ohio argued that paying
innocent bystanders could seriously drain the state's unemployment com
pensation fund, and thus denying such workers benefits was not arbitrary
but helped to achieve a legitimate purpose, namely, protecting the fiscal
integrity of the compensation fund. 55
Although Hodory won his case in the lower courts, the Supreme Court
sided with the State of Ohio, holding that the state's denial of unemploy
ment benefits to innocent bystanders (while granting them to lockedout employees) was not so arbitrary that it violated the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. Nor was the state's policy preempted by the
Social Security Act or other federal legislation, a holding that
foreshadowed the Court's conclusion in the New York Telephone case. 56
In states with innocent bystander provisions, determining which
workers are or are not participating in, financing, or directly interested
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in a labor dispute has often been the source of thorny problems. Once
again it is difficult to find consistent interpretations in the decisions of
the employment security agencies and the courts. Suppose, for exam
ple, that a nonunion, white-collar worker arrives at her place of employ
ment only to find that the unionized production workers have gone on
strike and established a picket line around the establishment. If the whitecollar worker refuses to cross the picket line and report to her job, she
risks the displeasure of her employer. If she crosses the picket line,
she not only risks the displeasure of the strikers but possibly her own
physical safety. In innocent-bystander states, if she crosses the picket
line but finds that the employer has no work for her to perform, she
will probably be able to collect unemployment benefits. If she refuses
to cross the picket line and then discovers that she has been laid off
because of the strike, she will probably be ineligible for benefits. Despite
the layoff, her refusal to cross a picket line will be considered "par
ticipation" in a labor dispute. 57
But suppose further that the white-collar worker genuinely fears that
if she crosses the picket line she will be physically harmed. What if
the picketers are brandishing clubs or making verbal threats or have
actually harmed another worker who attempted to cross the line? If the
white-collar worker refuses to cross the picket line under these condi
tions, will she be ineligible for unemployment benefits?
Only four state statutes specifically deal with the issue of innocent
bystanders who have failed to cross a picket line. Three Colorado,
Kansas, and Texas appear to impose a blanket disqualification on such
workers, regardless of extenuating circumstances. One Illinois takes
a contrary approach, holding that "an individual's failure to cross a
picket line . . . shall not, in itself, be deemed to be participation by
him in the labor dispute." 58 In Illinois, the Bureau of Employment
Security will disqualify innocent bystanders for benefits if they have
refused to cross a picket line and have also engaged in other behavior
the agency believes constitutes participation in the strike, such as "bring
ing food and coffee to the pickets, helping [to] man strike headquarters,
and deciding as a group and not as individuals not to cross the picket
line." 59
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In other jurisdictions, the courts have generally ruled that innocent
bystanders who have refused to cross a picket line "must show a fear
of personal injury" to be eligible for unemployment benefits. 60 The
burden of proof in such cases is placed on the claimants; they must prove
to the court that their fear is "reasonable," "well-founded," or
' 'justifiable. " 61 It has been said that this burden' 'is often very heavy. "62
For example, rumors of picket-line violence, 63 or even a showing that
actual acts of violence occurred64 have not persuaded some state courts
that claimants should be paid benefits. As a result of these and other
decisions, Gross has pointed out, "Many nonstrikers who in fact have
a 'reasonable fear' for their personal safety may be denied benefits unless
they actually suffer bodily injury." 65
How much latitude do states have to disqualify claimants because they
have helped to finance a strike conducted by other workers? The Supreme
Court addressed this question in Baker v. General Motors Corp. 66 In
October, 1967, while the UAW was conducting a national strike against
Ford, the union held a special convention to authorize "adequate strike
funds to meet the challenges of the 1967 and 1968 collective bargain
ing effort." 67 In effect, the convention doubled regular monthly dues
(from $20 to $40 per member) for a two-month period. Shortly thereafter
the strike against Ford was settled, and in December the union reached
a national agreement with General Motors. The emergency dues were
waived by the union in December and January, reverting to the regular
rate.
But in January, three UAW locals went on strike at three GM foun
dries. During these strikes UAW members collected strike benefits from
the fund in which the emergency dues had been deposited. As a conse
quence of the foundry strikes, "operations were temporarily curtailed
at 24 other functionally integrated GM plants, idling more than 19,000
employees." 68 Most of these laid-off employees applied for unemploy
ment benefits, basing their claims, in effect, on the premise that they
were innocent bystanders.
Their claims were denied by the Michigan Supreme Court on the
ground that the emergency dues payments constituted "financing" of
the foundry workers' strikes. The claimants then took their case to the
Supreme Court, where they argued that Michigan's action had to be
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rejected because it infringed on the claimants' federal rights under the
National Labor Relations Act.
The high court did not accept the argument of the claimants, however.
The Court defined the parameters within which the case fell:
New York Telephone Co. makes it clear that a state may, but
need not, compensate actual strikers even though they are
primarily responsible for their own unemployment. And, on
the other hand, Hodory makes it equally clear that a state
may refuse, or provide, compensation to workers laid off
by reason of a labor dispute in which they have no interest
or responsibility whatsoever. In between these opposite ends
of the spectrum are cases in which the furloughed employees
have had some participation in the labor dispute that caused
their unemployment. This is such a case. 69
The Court was troubled by the fact that the claimants' payment of
emergency dues occurred before the foundry workers decided to strike,
raising the question of whether the claimants could have possibly an
ticipated that their dues would be used to finance the strikes. But the
Court was persuaded that there was "a meaningful connection between
the decision to pay the emergency dues, the strikes which ensued, and
ultimately their [i.e., the claimants] own layoffs." 70 The Court main
tained that the claimants' unemployment was not actually involuntary
but was, indeed, entirely foreseeable because of their payment of the
extra dues. Disposing of this issue, it then ruled that Michigan's treat
ment of the laid-off UAW members was not preempted by federal law.
Rather, Michigan had to be accorded the same latitude in these matters
as New York had been in the New York Telephone case and Ohio in
the Hodory case.
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens also noted, "We of course ex
press no opinion concerning the wisdom of one policy choice or
another. " 71 And he added a caveat, "We have no occasion to consider
the circumstances, if any, in which individuals might be disqualified
solely because they paid regular union dues required as a condition of
their employment."72 Many states currently disqualify claimants merely
because their regular dues have been used to finance a strike by their
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fellow union members, but Justice Stevens' caveat suggests that the con
stitutionality of such a practice is still an open question. 73

Grade or Class
Even if an innocent bystander can prove that he did not personally
participate in, finance, or have a direct interest in a labor dispute, he
may still be disqualified for unemployment benefits if he was, at the
time of the commencement of the dispute, a member of a grade or class
of workers any one of whom participated in, financed, or had a direct
interest in the dispute. The "grade or class" disqualification was in
cluded in the Social Security Board's Draft Bill and was subsequently
adopted by approximately 40 states. 74 In these states, a nonstriking clai
mant must not only prove his own "innocence," he must prove the
innocence of all of his nonstriking co-workers who are in the same grade
or class.
Three arguments have been advanced in support of the grade-or-class
disqualification. First, the provision is intended to discourage so-called
"key man" strikes. Suppose a small number of workers strike and shut
down a plant; in some cases, a walkout by one "key man" might be
enough to halt production. In the absence of a grade-or-class provision,
the other workers might be able to collect benefits if they can show
that they were innocent bystanders. But if all workers in the same grade
or class are disqualified for benefits, there is less reason for key-man
strikes to occur. 75
Second, grade-or-class provisions are said to benefit unions "by
discouraging defections from their ranks." 76 According to Ahrens,
"Workers, knowing they would be disqualified on the grounds of par
ticipation or financing if they belonged to a union which called the strike,
would seek to avoid union membership in order to gain unemployment
benefits if a strike were called. Disqualifying the entire grade or class
of workers would destroy this incentive not to join unions." 77
Third, it is said that grade-or-class provisions ease the administrative
burdens of employment security agencies. Whereas the determination
of whether a claimant's participation in, financing of, or direct interest
in a labor dispute must be made on an individual basis, the disqualifica-
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tion of an entire grade or class will follow a showing that a single claim
ant in a grade or class did not have the status of an innocent bystander. 78
According to Ahrens, "The grade or class provision is useful to ad
ministrators, then, because it allows the decision of benefit claims on
a group, rather than individual basis, and because it permits them to
avoid difficult fact determination in some cases." 79
There has been, however, considerable variation in the definition of
grade or class in the decisions of the courts. In some jurisdictions,
membership in a grade or class depends on the type of work perform
ed, e.g., whether it is office work or production work. 80 In other jurisdic
tions, membership in a grade or class depends on whether the type of
work performed is functionally or operationally integrated. 81 In still
other jurisdictions, workers who are members of the same union82 or
the same group of unions negotiating jointly with an employer83 are
considered to be members of the same grade or class.
A court decision in the state of Washington provides an example of
how the definition of grade or class can significantly affect the eligibility
of workers for unemployment benefits. Prior to 1980, the employment
security agency, using the functional integration test, would disqualify
all construction workers at a given site if a strike by one trade caused
the layoff of workers in other trades working at the same site. But in
Abbott v. Employment Security Department, a state court ruled that union
membership, and not the functional integration of work, should be the
primary test in determining the boundary of a grade or class. 84 Since
that decision, according to the Commissioner of Washington's Employ
ment Security Department, "Some trades have struck without posting
pickets, resulting in a job shutdown without requiring participation in
the dispute by other trades. Trades sent home by the employer when
all possible work is completed have been ruled to have met the excep
tion tests of the law since they have not participated in the dispute nor
have they any direct interest in its outcome. This has resulted in pay
ment of benefits to individuals who would have been denied as little
as five years ago." 85
Grade-or-class provisions have been criticized on two grounds. On
the one hand, most of the workers who are disqualified for benefits would
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also be disqualified under innocent bystander provisions. For exam
ple, in the case of key-man strikes it would probably be difficult for
nonstriking workers who are in the same grade or class as the striking
workers to show that they are not directly interested in the outcome
of the strike or, if they are dues-paying members of the same union,
that they are not helping to finance the strike. Thus, in most cases, the
inclusion in a statute of both innocent bystander and grade-or-class pro
visions is a redundancy. On the other hand, in those cases where nonstrik
ing workers are members of the same grade or class as striking workers
but are truly innocent bystanders, it may be inequitable to deny them
benefits. Grade-or-class provisions, then, may be desirable solely because
of their administrative convenience. 86
To clarify the questions that must be answered to determine whether
a claimant will qualify for unemployment benefits, we construct the
flow charts that appear here.
In this and the previous chapter, we discussed a number of court deci
sions affecting the eligibility of employees involved in labor disputes
for unemployment insurance benefits. We conclude this section of our
discussion with a summary of the key cases, which is contained in ex
hibit 3.1.

The Air Traffic Controllers
On August 3, 1981, nearly 12,000 air traffic controllers represented
by the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization ("PATCO")
walked off their jobs. A few hours after the strike began, President
Reagan personally announced that "any striker who was not back on
the job within 48 hours would be discharged and could not be reemployed
by any federal agency." 87 The Federal Aviation Administration con
tinued to operate the nation's air traffic control system, using nonstrik
ing controllers, military personnel, supervisors, controllers brought back
from retirement, and trainees from the FAA's Air Traffic Service
Academy. The President carried out his threat to discharge the striking
controllers, but their replacements managed to return the air traffic con
trol system to near-normal operating levels within the next several
weeks. 88
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Figure 3.2

DOES THE STATE HAVE INNOCENT BYSTANDER PROVISIONS?

Has the claimant participated
in or financed a strike or does
the claimant have a direct
interest in the strike7

Does the state have
a grade - or - class
provision

Is the claimant a
member of the same
grade or class as the
workers on strike7

Claimant is
disqualified

Claimant can collect
if otherwise eligible

Claimant can collect
if otherwise eligible
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In the days and weeks that followed their walkout, many PATCO
members filed claims for unemployment compensation. Although the
majority of states denied the controllers' claims, a handful granted them
benefits. In some of the states with work stoppage provisions, controllers
argued that they were eligible for benefits because the FAA had hired
replacements, the system continued to operate at or close to normal
levels, and—implicitly at least—their strike had failed. In other states
with lockout provisions controllers claimed benefits on the ground that
they had been locked out by their employer, the FAA.
The air traffic controllers' case illustrates the difficulties that arise
when state agencies and courts are faced with the problem of reconcil
ing labor dispute disqualification provisions with other potentially con
flicting disqualification provisions in unemployment insurance statutes.
All statutes contain provisions that require disqualification of claimants
who were terminated by their employer because of misconduct con
nected with their work. Both the definition of misconduct and the period
of disqualification, however, vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Thus,
for example, Pennsylvania only disqualifies claimants if they have been
guilty of' 'willful misconduct.'' Pennsylvania then requires the claimants
to earn six times their weekly unemployment benefit amount on a new
job before they become requalified for benefits; Connecticut, which also
uses a "willful misconduct" standard, requires that claimants earn 10
times their weekly benefit amount on a new job. Most of the remaining
states disqualify claimants for milder forms of misconduct. Many ad
just the period of disqualification on a case-by-case basis, de
pending upon the seriousness of the misconduct; others impose a fixed
period of disqualification; still others disqualify claimants for the dura
tion of their unemployment or longer. The period of disqualification
for misconduct can be as short as three weeks in Alabama, or as long
as 52 weeks in Florida. 89
In most states, the fact that the air traffic controllers had been discharg
ed by the federal government for misconduct (i.e., for their participa
tion in an illegal strike) was deemed to take precedence over the con
trollers' involvement in a labor dispute. These states held that the con
trollers' discharge terminated their employment relationship with the
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FAA and thus their participation in a labor dispute. The issue of whether
there had or had not been a lockout or stoppage of work at the airports
where the controllers worked was accordingly not a matter that affected
the eligibility of the controllers for benefits.
Thus, for example, New Jersey disqualified the controllers for six
weeks, but then permitted them to collect benefits for the duration of
their unemployment. 90 Arkansas disqualified the controllers for eight
weeks. 91 Iowa also disqualified the controllers for misconduct. But a
group of Sioux City controllers appealed the initial determination to
a Hearing Officer. At the hearing, the FAA chose not to appear and
the controllers, who realized that a strike against the federal govern
ment can be considered a felony, pleaded the Fifth Amendment and
refused to testify. Because the burden of proving misconduct in Iowa
falls on the employer, and since neither the FAA nor the controllers
presented any evidence at the hearing, the Hearing Officer had to make
his decision on the presumption that the controllers were innocent of
misconduct, and thus he ruled them eligible for benefits. The case went
to the Iowa Supreme Court, which upheld the Hearing Officer's deci
sion. 92
Michigan, on the other hand, found that the labor dispute provisions
took precedence over the misconduct disqualifier. The Michigan
Employment Security Board of Review refused to disqualify the strikers
for misconduct, saying,
A finding of misconduct necessarily implies an evaluation
of the claimants' behavior. Here, there is no behavior to ex
amine except for the claimants' participation in a peaceful
strike. If that participation was misconduct because it was
allegedly "wrong", then it must be concluded the strike itself
was wrong. However, the Michigan Courts have long em
braced a policy of neutrality in labor dispute situations, a
policy which precludes the Board from examining the merits
of a dispute. 93
Michigan, however, appears to be the only state that qualifed the air
traffic controllers on this basis.
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In Connecticut, the employment security agency found that even
though the controllers had been discharged, they had not been guilty
of either "felonious misconduct" or "repeated willful misconduct,"
which are the kinds of behavior Connecticut required before it would
deny discharged employees their claim for unemployment benefits. 94
Accordingly, Connecticut initially allowed all of the controllers who
filed claims to collect benefits. The FAA, however, appealed the employ
ment security agency's determination, and the Connecticut Supreme
Court overruled the agency's decision in 1985. 95 The Connecticut court
held that the controllers had been guilty of felonious misconduct under
the laws of the United States (but not Connecticut), and therefore should
have been disqualified.
In another case in Montana, the state's Supreme Court held that "the
misconduct provision of Montana's Unemployment Insurance Act ap
plies to the PATCO strike and disqualifies the PATCO members from
benefits because the unemployment resulted from an unlawful strike. "96
The dissenting opinion, however, emphasized that the strikers had
already received unemployment compensation, "and we all recognize
the impossibility of recovering the benefits from the individual air con
trollers." 97
In Hawaii, 135 air traffic controllers filed claims, arguing that they
were eligible for unemployment benefits under the state's work-stoppage
provision. The FAA countered that striking controllers had been pro
perly discharged for misconduct. The state agreed with the FAA, but
allowed the controllers to collect benefits for five weeks. 98
Of all the state courts' decisions, only Louisiana ordered payment
of benefits because the FAA had "failed to sustain its burden of prov
ing that former air traffic controllers were engaged in willful miscon
duct at time of strike.'' The Supreme Court of Louisiana reasoned that
the FAA had allowed the controllers to join a union (PATCO) and to
be represented by PATCO in collective bargaining. The controllers,
therefore, did not commit "willful misconduct" since they "reasonably
believed in the legality of the strike because of representations by the
bargaining agent recognized by the FAA." 99
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At the time of this writing, several states were still wrestling with
the claims of the air traffic controllers. The controllers' cases, however,
clearly illustrate, as one of our respondents noted, the "division of
authority throughout the country" over the treatment of misconduct in
labor disputes. 100 It is unlikely that the resolution of the controllers'
claims by the courts will serve to harmonize the misconduct and labor
dispute disqualification provisions in state unemployment insurance laws.

Conclusion
At this point it should be abundantly clear that state policies regard
ing striker eligibility for unemployment compensation are far from
uniform. Although common patterns of practice are detectable, whether
workers unemployed because of a labor dispute qualify for benefits
depends not only on a state's unemployment compensation statute but
also on the application and interpretation of the statute by the state's
employment security agency and courts. State autonomy in determin
ing whether strikers should or should not receive unemployment pay
was upheld by the Supreme Court in the New York Telephone case.
Although the Court clearly believed that the payment of benefits to
strikers could affect the balance of power in collective bargaining—
and inferentially the incidence and duration of strikes—it decided that
Congress intended to tolerate such practices.
State autonomy has meant that workers unemployed because of a labor
dispute who may be otherwise identical will be eligible for benefits in
some states but denied them in others. Diversity of treatment may result
in anomalies and inequities, but that may be a price worth paying to
enjoy the presumed benefits of state autonomy. One of the benefits,
it can be argued, is that each state has the opportunity to tailor labor
dispute disqualification policies that best meet the needs of its work force
and employers and are consistent with its political philosophy.
Conceptually, states can be ranked on the basis of how generously
they treat workers unemployed because of a labor dispute. It is certain
ly not self-evident, however, that New York should be ranked at the
top of the list. Only a small proportion of strikes in New York last longer
than eight weeks. The New York Department of Labor estimated that
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over the period 1947-78 about 13 percent of all strikers were involved
in disputes lasting more than eight weeks. These strikers collected
unemployment benefits amounting to less than 1 percent of the total
benefits paid to all unemployed beneficiaries. Although the average dura
tion of strikes lasting longer than eight weeks in New York was 14.8
weeks, the average duration of the payment of benefits to strikers was
only 4.4 weeks. 101 Clearly, only a small minority of strikers in New
York ever become eligible for benefits and the cost of the benefits
disbursed to strikers is nominal. In other respects, New York has more
restrictive policies regarding the payment of benefits to workers involved
in labor disputes than do most other states. It does not have a stoppageof-work provision, it does not have a lockout provision, and it only
pays benefits to innocent bystanders after the eight-week waiting period.
In a later chapter we will present empirical tests that show that the ef
fect of New York's law on strike activity is statistically insignificant.
Recognition that New York's law is actually more restrictive than the
laws of most other states may help explain this result.
In contrast, strikers in stoppage-of-work states can collect unemploy
ment benefits virtually from the outset of a strike. Given the increasing
number of employers who are choosing to operate during a strike, it
is likely that the number of strikers who are taking advantage of stoppageof-work provisions is growing. Arguably, those states with stoppageof-work provisions are more "generous" than those states without them,
including New York.
The most generous states may be those that have stoppage-of-work,
lockout, and innocent bystander provisions. In 1984, there were nine
states that had all three of these provisions. 102
Curiously, most of the states falling into this category do not have
strong labor movements (Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and West Virginia
are the exceptions). In a later chapter, we will test the proposition that
a state's generosity is related to its level of strike activity. We will show
that lockout provisions have no discernible effect on a state's level of
strike activity, perhaps because lockouts are a relatively rare
phenomenon. But we will also show that states with comparatively high
benefit levels and both stoppage-of-work and innocent bystander pro
visions have significantly higher levels of strike activity than states
without those provisions.
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Welfare in Labor Disputes
Before the depression of the 1930s, the welfare system in the United
States was financed and administered by state and local governments.
As Carney notes, "The federal government had no role in public
assistance except to provide veterans' pensions and disaster relief." 1
State and local welfare agencies provided relief to needy persons unable
to work because of physical or mental disabilities, to victims of disasters,
and to the blind, the aged, and dependent children.
Mass unemployment during the depression, however, caused the ex
isting welfare system to collapse. According to Schlesinger, a quarter
of the labor force in 1933 was "subsisting wanly and desperately on
relief on an average stipend of about 50 cents per day per family. 2
State and local governments simply lacked the resources to meet the
needs of the millions of able-bodied workers who, unable to find work,
coped with destitution.
Within the first month of taking office, President Roosevelt sent a
message to Congress requesting the establishment of the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). By the end of that first
month, Congress had complied with his request, establishing FERA
and authorizing it to distribute $500 million to bankrupt state and local
relief agencies. Roosevelt then picked Harry Hopkins to be FERA's
administrator. Hopkins—who would become one of Roosevelt's chief
advisors and closest confidantes—moved quickly to disburse FERA's
funds to local agencies. 3
In May 1933, Hopkins received a letter from the executive director
of the Pennsylvania State Emergency Relief Board asking for instruc
tion on whether FERA would permit certain strikers in Montgomery
County to receive federal relief payments. Hopkins issued the follow
ing statement:
The Federal Emergency Relief Administration is concerned
with administering relief to the needy unemployed and their
77
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families. Each case applying for relief to the local emergen
cy relief agencies should be treated on its merits as a relief
case wholly apart from a controversy in which the wage earn
ed may be involved.
The FERA will not attempt to judge the merits of any labor
dispute. State and Federal agencies, as well as courts, exist
which are duly qualified to act as arbiters and adjusters in
such disputes.
Unless it be determined by the Department of Labor that
the basis for relief is unreasonable and unjustified, the FERA
authorizes local/relief agencies to furnish relief to the families
of striking wage earners after careful investigation has shown
that their resources are not sufficient to meet emergency
needs. 4
Although Hopkins said that FERA would not authorize public
assistance for strikers if the Department of Labor found that the basis
for a strike was "unreasonable and unjustified," in fact the Depart
ment of Labor never developed a means of making such a determina
tion. 5 Nevertheless, Hopkins's policy was subsequently reaffirmed in
statements issued by FERA in October 1933, and again in September
1934. 6
Thus, when 12,000 agricultural workers went on strike in October
1933 against cotton growers in California's San Joaquin Valley, the
federal government authorized relief to all needy strikers. The 1933
cotton strike, which Daniel has called "the zenith of the New Deal's
larger program of permanently altering the economic power relation
ship between government and farm employers," was marked by violent
confrontations between growers and workers. 7 The federal administrator
of the National Recovery Act in California, George Creel, acting without
formal authority, intervened in the strike in an attempt to stem the
violence and bring about a settlement. When the growers attempted to
"starve out" the strikers, California Governor James Rolph, after receiv
ing approval from FERA officials, authorized the state's Emergency
Relief Administration to provide food and other supplies to all needy
strikers. Creel then threatened to exclude the growers from the New
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Deal's farm support programs unless they agreed to submit their dispute
to a fact-finding commission. At the same time, the strikers were told
by state officials that federal relief would be denied them unless they,
too, agreed to fact-finding and returned to work. 8
The state's plan to condition the distribution of federal relief
on the strikers' return to work failed miserably. When strikers
learned that strings were attached to the relief supplies of
fered to them, they refused to accept them. . . . Finally, when
several strikers' children died of malnutrition and a public
scandal seemed imminent, state officials relented. ... By
October 21 [the seventeenth day of the strike] the strikers
were receiving relief without conditions attached. The sud
den shift in the state's policy prompted angry growers to com
plain that relief workers were now dispensing aid to strikers
on condition that they remain off the job. 9
In the event, both sides agreed to Creel's fact-finding proposal. The
fact-finding commission, after two days of hearings, produced a recom
mendation for settling the strike. When both sides denounced the recom
mendation, Creel once again used the lever of relief payments to force
them to change their minds. On the one hand, he promised the growers
that if they accepted the fact-finders' recommendation, all federal relief
to the strikers would be terminated. On the other hand, he warned the
workers that if they did not accept the recommendation and return to
work, they would no longer receive federal relief. Still the strikers did
not yield. 10 According to Daniel, "The stalemate was finally broken
not by strikers clamoring to return to work . . . but by [their] union's
Communist leaders, who concluded that the strike had caused enough
suffering and that neither the strikers nor the union could gain anything
by prolonging it further. 11
Bernstein has said that the San Joaquin Valley strike was "perhaps
the first time in American history that strikers were fed at public ex
pense, the cause of bitter criticism." 12 Moreover, the authors know
of no instance in later years of a public official using welfare assistance
in such a direct and aggressive manner to coerce striking workers and
their employers to accept a settlement.
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Criticism of FERA's policy of authorizing relief for needy strikers
intensified in 1934. In late August, newspapers across the country
reported that members of the United Textile Workers, who were set
to begin a strike the following month, would receive public relief. These
reports "raised a storm of protest." 13 An attorney representing textile
manufacturers in Georgia wrote to President Roosevelt, saying that "the
strike never would have been called . . . without the financial support
from the Federal Government." 14 Bowing to pressure, the Alabama
Relief Administrator ordered relief payments to the strikers to be ter
minated, a move that "apparently contributed to the defeat of the
union." 15
The arguments surrounding FERA's policy of authorizing public aid
to strikers have persisted to this day. Hopkins contended that providing
public subsidies to strikers would not affect the number or duration of
strikes and would cost the government very little. Moreover, Hopkins
believed public subsidies to strikers would reduce the potential for
violence during strikes, thus contributing to law and order, and would
be consistent with the New Deal philosophy of encouraging collective
bargaining through the enhancement of union bargaining power. 16
Those opposing FERA's policy generally disagreed with the New
Deal's prounion philosophy and also maintained that public subsidies
would increase the incidence and duration of strikes. The strikes by
the agricultural workers and the textile workers provided evidence, op
ponents believed, of the pivotal role that public relief could play in af
fecting a union's propensity to strike. In both cases, the threat or actual
termination of relief seemed to lead to the capitulation of the union. 17
Despite the controversy, FERA's policy, as Brown pointed out, "had
a strong influence on the position of the officials in the later permanent
state and local welfare agencies when it became necessary for them to
deal with similar situations." 18

Aid to Families with Dependent Children
The Social Security Act, passed in 1935, established two categories
of income maintenance programs. In one category are social insurance
programs, such as old age insurance and unemployment compensation.
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These programs base benefit payments on an individual's past earn
ings and on tax contributions. In the other category are public assistance
programs, which provide aid to the elderly, the blind and the disabled,
and to families with dependent children. These are based on need alone.
The program now called Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) was established by the Social Security Act to provide assistance
to children in need because of the death, incapacity, or continued absence
of a parent. Congress has given the states considerable discretion in
setting AFDC benefit levels. Each state determines its own standard
of need and then the family's income and resources are compared to
this standard. In principle, "the monthly AFDC cash payment is the
difference between the family's standard of need and the amount of fami
ly income and other resources. However, in most states, the actual cash
benefit paid is below the state's standard of need because of statutory
and administrative limits on maximum benefits and the failure of many
states to keep their need standards up-to-date based on current living
costs." 19 There has always been considerable variation across states
in the amount of monthly benefits paid. For example, in 1983, the max
imum monthly benefit for a family with three children ranged from $120
in Mississippi to $751 in Alaska. 20
It was not originally the purpose of AFDC to assist needy children
simply because of the unemployment of a parent. AFDC's aim was to
assist female-headed households with no other means of support. As
the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, "The original conception of AFDC
was to allow widows and divorced mothers to care for their children
at home without having to go to work, thus eliminating the practice
of removing needy children in situations of that kind to institutions." 21
When the program was established, "female household heads with small
children were usually considered to be unemployable." 22 In practical
terms, given the chronic job shortage that existed during the depres
sion years, AFDC mothers were unlikely to be able to find jobs even
if they made an effort to do so. In addition, it was assumed that
unemployment compensation would be the principal means of support
ing those with a labor market attachment who were without work. 23
Consequently, in the early years of the Social Security Act, Congress
never considered the issue of whether needy strikers should receive
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AFDC benefits. The matter was left to the states to decide. 24 Thieblot
and Cowin assert that many state welfare officials "were not only guided
by the precedents established by Harry Hopkins and the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration, but were themselves sympathetic to
unions and their aims. In the absence of congressional direction to the
contrary, welfare aid to strikers was not only assured in most states,
but on some occasions even promised beforehand." 25 As an illustra
tion, Theiblot and Cowin note that in 1936, the secretary-treasurer of
the United Mine Workers told a meeting of the Steel Workers Organizing
Committee that workers employed by U.S. Steel could "count on public
relief if S.W.O.C. called a strike." 26
Even though the Social Security Act did not prohibit the payment of
AFDC to needy strikers, it is unlikely that, prior to the 1960s, many
strikers ever received such benefits. In previous research on this topic,
it is reported that strikers received welfare assistance in the 1940s and
1950s in a number of noteworthy labor disputes. But in almost all of
these reported cases, strikers received general assistance under state
programs, rather than AFDC. For example, some auto workers in
Michigan received welfare assistance during the UAW's strike against
General Motors in 1945; steel workers received assistance during a strike
against the basic steel companies in 1946; and electrical workers on
strike against a General Electric plant in Erie, Pennsylvania received
assistance in 1948. 27 According to Chamberlain and Kuhn, "in the long
steel strike of 1959, federal, state, and local benefits and relief provid
ed the striking steelworkers with at least $22,750,000 worth of aid. " 28
I.W. Abel, then the secretary-treasurer of the United Steel Workers,
estimated that the total amount of public aid received by steelworkers
during the 1959 strike was $45 million. 29 Whichever estimate is closer
to the truth, it is clear that most of the public aid was in the form of
unemployment compensation and general assistance, rather than
AFDC. 30
In the majority of cases, needy strikers did not receive AFDC during
the 1940s and 1950s simply because they did not meet the program's
strict eligibility criteria. Almost all AFDC recipients during this period
were needy families in which a female head was unlikely to have had

Welfare in Labor Disputes 83

any work experience at all. It is true that if a striker "deserted" his
family, his children could obtain AFDC assistance, provided his fami
ly met the other eligibility requirements. But there is no evidence that
many strikers were willing to leave their homes to achieve this result.
As long as the focus of the AFDC program was the needy children of
"unemployable" mothers, the issue of paying AFDC to strikers had
no practical significance. 31
As early as World War II, the labor movement began to establish
ties with public relief organizations. The Congress of Industrial Organiza
tions (CIO) established the Community Services Program in 1946, head
ed by Leo Perlis, to further this effort. "It was the CIO that first of
ficially adopted the Community Services program, and it was CIO af
filiated unions which Leo Perlis described as being the first to approach
the use of public aid during a strike in an organized manner." 32 In 1956,
shortly after the merger of the AFL and CIO, the AFL-CIO Depart
ment of Community Services was established. Perlis became the direc
tor of the new department, which was charged with promoting the union
movement's involvement in local agencies, such as the united fund, local
community chests, and other charitable organizations. Through the ac
tivities of the Community Services Department, "unions have become
active participants in community welfare organizations and, accordingly,
have become knowledgeable of the services and policies of these agen
cies. As a result, the availability of public funds as strike benefits has
become an integral part of organized labor's strike planning." 33
Over the years, AFDC eligibility criteria were significantly broadened,
leading to a growing number of recipients. In 1937, for example, about
half a million children were receiving AFDC; by 1960 the number had
grown to 2.4 million. The cause of their dependency also changed: in
the late 1930s about 40 percent of the dependent children received
assistance because of the death of the father, 25 percent because the
father was incapacitated, and 35 percent because the father was absent
from the home. By the early 1960s, however, only 6 percent received
assistance because of the death of the father, 20 percent because of the
incapacity of the father, and 65 percent because of the father's absence.
The remaining 9 percent were in a new category: they received AFDC
because of the unemployment of the father. 34
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As the nature of the AFDC population changed through these years,
new concerns were voiced about the program's operation. In the years
after World War n, the number of female labor force participants grew
dramatically. The belief that "a woman's place is in the home" was
called into question, no less for welfare mothers than for other women.
The growing number of job opportunities for women constituted a
challenge to the original premise of the AFDC program: that women
with needy children should not work and were, in any event,
unemployable. Yet welfare mothers were positively discouraged from
working because any dollar a woman earned from work would be sub
tracted from her family's benefit. As the role of women in American
society changed, this "100 percent tax" on benefits was increasingly
criticized. 35
In addition, the growing number of AFDC recipients who qualified
for benefits because of the father's absence drew attention to the possibili
ty that the AFDC program was contributing to the breakup of the fami
ly. Most state programs during this period disqualified a family from
receiving AFDC if an able-bodied man was living in the house, even
if he was unemployed. This rule encouraged fathers who were unable
to support their families to leave home so that their wives and dependents
might qualify for AFDC. "Proponents of welfare reform claimed that
this eligibility requirement forced many fathers into real or pretended
abandonment of their families." 36 Many critics charged that the grow
ing rate of divorce, separation, and desertion was at least partly at
tributable to AFDC eligibility rules. 37
Moreover, renewed concern in the 1960s with the problem of pover
ty in America further fueled criticism of the adequacy and effectiveness
of the AFDC program. 38 As a consequence, the AFDC program was
significantly restructured and liberalized during the 1960s. In the wake
of these changes, strikers in large numbers became eligible for benefits
under the AFDC program for the first time.

AFDC-U 1961-1981
To remedy the possibility that AFDC eligibility criteria were caus
ing fathers to abandon their families, Congress amended the program in
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1961 to provide assistance to the needy children of unemployed parents
(AFDC-U). 39 Although it is not clear that Congress intended to create
a new source of public assistance for strikers when it established the
AFDC-U program, by its action Congress opened the door for states
to provide AFDC-U benefits to strikers' families. 40 The new program
made it possible for strikers and their families to qualify for AFDC
assistance without the necessity of the striker "deserting" his spouse
and children. 41
Accordingly, the AFDC-U program quickly became a possible source
of support for workers on strike. It is well to keep in mind, however,
that to receive AFDC-U assistance, a striker had to meet all of the AFDC
eligibility requirements. Although Congress changed these requirements
from time to time, generally they consisted of the following:
• A striker had to have one or more dependent children living in his
household.
• The children had to be under a certain age. For example, in 1981,
just prior to the passage of the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act,
states had the option of paying benefits to children through the age of
18 or to children through the age of 21 if the children were regularly
attending a school, college or university or a vocational or technical
training course.
• The striker and his family had to meet a strict needs test. In 1981,
before the passage of the OBRA, a family was ineligible for benefits
if it had property or financial assets in excess of $2,000. The value of
the family's home, personal effects, and one automobile was excluded
from this calculation.
• The striker had to have been unemployed for at least 30 days prior
to the receipt of benefits. A striker was considered unemployed if he
or she had worked less than 100 hours in the preceding month. The
striker could not have refused without good cause, within that 30-day
period, a "bona fide" offer of employment or training. Of course, states
that allowed strikers to collect AFDC-U did not consider the availability
of work at a struck establishment a "bona fide" offer of employment.
• If the striker was eligible for unemployment compensation, he or
she had to apply for and accept such benefits. The unemployment com
pensation benefits were then counted as part of the striker's income. 42
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Congress gave the states the option of participating in the AFDC-U
program. The number of states participating in the program has varied
but is usually around 25. States that elect to participate must operate
their programs under federal standards and regulations, but otherwise
have considerable administrative control and discretion.
Strikers receipt of AFDC-U benefits was a source of considerable
litigation throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In general the courts found
that in the absence of an explicit legislative or regulatory prohibition
otherwise eligible strikers could receive AFDC-U. Of course, the
relevance of this litigation is currently in abeyance because Congress
provided an explicit prohibition on strikers receiving AFDC-U in 1981.
Nevertheless, a review of the litigation is useful because the issues ad
dressed in these cases are fundamental in any consideration of appropriate
policy in this area.
It should also be noted that many of the court cases that dealt with
striker receipt of AFDC-U also dealt with striker receipt of General
Assistance (GA). In part this is because strikes that lead to the receipt
of AFDC-U also often lead to the receipt of GA. Moreover, although
the AFDC-U and GA programs differ in their administrative structures
(the former is administered jointly by the federal government and the
states, while the latter is administered strictly by the states), the legal
issues associated with the payment of program benefits to strikers are
quite similar. For the sake of simplicity of exposition, however, we
focus here on litigation involving payment of AFDC-U to strikers. In
doing so, however, we discuss some themes that have also emerged
in GA litigation.
Legal debates over the payment of AFDC-U to strikers largely dealt
with three issues. First, did states have the option, under the Social
Security Act or regulations issued by the Secretary of Health, Educa
tion, and Welfare, to grant (or deny) AFDC-U benefits to strikers? Sec
ond, was the granting of such benefits violative of the public policy
of state neutrality in labor disputes? Third, in the absence of an explicit
prohibition in federal or state statutes on the payment or welfare benefits
to strikers, did other provisions in those statutes imply a prohibition?
Of particular concern in this regard were the provisions in the Social
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Security Act stating that an individual is ineligible for AFDC-U if he
is out of work "without good cause" or if he has refused a "bona fide
offer of suitable employment." Parallel or related provisions in state
welfare codes have also been the centerpiece of litigation over the pay
ment of general assistance to strikers.
The first question was considered in a series of cases that culminated
in the Supreme Court's decision in Batterton v. Francis in 1977. 43 Un
til 1968, the definition of "unemployment" under the AFDC-U pro
gram was left to the states, which meant that the states had the option
of deciding whether strikers did or did not fall within the definition of
an unemployed parent.44 In 1968, however, Congress amended the Social
Security Act, withdrawing "some of the definitional authority delegated
to the States."45 The 1968 amendments required a participating state
to provide AFDC-U where a needy child "has been deprived of paren
tal support or care by reason of the unemployment (as determined in
accordance with standards prescribed by the secretary) of his father."46
Accordingly, in 1969 the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
promulgated a regulation that included a definition of unemployment,
but was silent on the issue of whether strikers fell within the defini
tion. 47 Acting under this regulation, Maryland's Department of Employ
ment and Social Services issued a rule that denied AFDC-U benefits
to families in which the father was out of work for reasons that dis
qualified him for unemployment compensation. Grounds for disqualifica
tion for unemployment compensation in Maryland included voluntari
ly leaving work without good cause, gross misconduct, and participa
tion in a labor dispute (other than a lockout).
In Francis v. Davidson (referred to as Francis I), a federal district
court held that the Maryland rule was invalid. 48 The case arose out of
a class action suit brought by two subclasses: fathers who had been denied
AFDC-U benefits in Maryland because they had been on strike, and
fathers who had been denied benefits because they had been discharg
ed for misconduct. The district court found that the Maryland rule was
invalid because it clearly went beyond the HEW regulation, which had
defined unemployment strictly in terms of hours worked. The court main
tained, "A man out of work because he was discharged for cause by
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his employer is unemployed. There can be no two ways about that con
clusion." 49 The court also believed that a man out of work because of
a labor dispute was also "unemployed," and therefore held that the
Maryland rule was in conflict with the HEW regulation.
Reacting to the decision in Francis I, the Secretary of Health, Educa
tion, and Welfare issued a new regulation in 1973 that, for the first
time, explicitly gave the option to the states to exclude from eligibility
for AFDC-U fathers whose unemployment resulted from their participa
tion in a labor dispute. 50 Francis I had focused significant attention on
the issue of striker eligibility for AFDC-U. For example, the Senate
Finance Committee, in considering 1972 welfare reform proposals,
specifically proposed overturning Francis I and eliminating striker
eligibility by federal statute. 51 Business opposition to welfare for strikers
was also mounting, fueled in part by the publication of the book by
Thieblot and Co win in 1972. 52 Moreover, the Nixon administration had
come into office in 1973, determined to implement a "New Federalism,"
under which states would have more discretion to administer a large
number of joint federal/state social programs. 53 It was in this atmosphere
that Nixon's Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare sought to over
turn Francis I by issuing a new regulation.
After the 1973 regulation was issued, Maryland again tried to imple
ment its rule, petitioning the district court to dissolve the injunction that
had been issued as a result of Francis I. But Maryland officials were
again frustrated when the court refused to dissolve the injunction. That
Court, in a case that is known as Francis II, recognized that "the con
flict between the federal and the Maryland regulation ended after the
former was amended," but continued the injunction on the grounds that
giving states the option of denying benefits to strikers and their families
violated the statutory requirement that the Secretary of Health, Educa
tion, and Welfare had to establish the standards concerning the defini
tion of unemployment. Francis II held that the Secretary did not have
the authority to delegate this responsibility to the states. 54
Francis II was then consolidated on appeal with a similar case and
the circuit court affirmed the decisions of the two district courts in an
unpublished per curiam decision. 55 The Supreme Court then granted
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certiorari. In Batterton v. Francis, the court overturned Francis I and
//by holding that the 1973 HEW regulation and, by inference, the con
tested Maryland rule were valid. The court did not agree with the district
court's view on Francis //that the term "unemployment" was unam
biguous. The Supreme Court said that "Congress itself must have ap
preciated that the meaning of the statutory term was not self-evident,
or it would not have given the Secretary the power to prescribe stan
dards." 56 The Court acknowledged that the Secretary "could
not . . . adopt a regulation that bears no relationship to any recogniz
ed concept of unemployment or that would defeat the purpose of the
[AFDC-U] program. But the regulation here at issue does not even ap
proach these limits of delegated authority." 57 The Court stressed that
it had been the intent of Congress to aid the families of the involuntari
ly unemployed, and that it was perfectly consistent with that intent for
the Secretary to permit the states to deny benefits to strikers, whose
unemployment arguably was involuntary. 58
In Francis II the district court had invalidated the HEW regulation
in part because the court believed the regulation did not serve the pur
pose of providing a uniform national standard for determining AFDCU eligibility of those participating in labor disputes. But the Supreme
Court held that, even though one purpose of the 1968 amendments to
the Social Security Act was to foster uniform national standards of
eligibility, this purpose did not preclude the Secretary of HEW from
recognizing local policies. The Court said that "the goal of greater
uniformity can be met without imposing identical standards on each
State." 59 The Court therefore held that the 1973 HEW regulation "ade
quately promotes the statutory goal of reducing interstate variations in
the [AFDC-U] program. In this respect, the regulation is both reasonable
and within the authority delegated to the Secretary." 60 The issue of
whether states participating in the AFDC-U program could be given
the option of denying benefits to strikers' families was thus settled. By
1980, eight of the 26 states participating in the program had chosen
to deny benefits to strikers. 61
The second issue addressed in AFDC-U and GA cases was whether
the payment of welfare benefits to strikers violated the principle of state
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neutrality in labor relations and, especially, in labor disputes. The issue
of state neutrality has always been a central concern in the debate over
whether strikers should be eligible for government transfer payments. 62
The debate sharpened after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,
a statute that made the policy of state neutrality in labor relations much
more explicit than it had ever been before. During the debate in the
Senate that preceded passage of the Act, Senator Taft explained the pur
pose of the legislation of which he was cosponsor:
Our aim should be to get back to the point where, when an
employer meets with his employees, they have substantially
equal bargaining power so that neither side feels it can make
unreasonable demands and get away with it. 63
The philosophy of the Taft-Hartley Act was to establish a statutory
framework for collective bargaining that favored neither employers nor
unions. Within that framework the parties would be free to fashion the
precise terms of their relationship through collective bargaining. Nothing
in that framework dictated that the parties had to reach agreement. They
were, within broad limits, free to disagree and to use economic weapons
(strikes, lockouts, and other forms of concerted activity) against one
another. 64 In the larger debate over striker eligibility for public assistance,
and in a number of court cases dealing with that issue, the question
of whether the eligibility for and receipt of AFDC-U and GA benefits
by strikers upset the balance of bargaining power between the unions
and employers and placed the government squarely on the side of the
strikers was a central concern.
For example, in the 1972 Senate debate over a proposed amendment
to the Social Security Act to eliminate striker eligibility for AFDC-U,
Senator Russell Long (Dem., La.) said. "The Senator from Louisiana
feels that the Government should be neutral between labor and manage
ment in a labor dispute, and to pay welfare benefits to people who are
on strike is not being neutral." 65 Senator Jacob Javits (Rep., N.Y.)
responded, "One thing the Senator from Louisiana has said is quite
proper: The Government should be neutral. But the Government should
not hurt children whose father happens to be on strike. That is not be
ing neutral either." 66
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A leading case in which the court's decision hinged in part on its view
of whether the payment of AFDC-U and GA to strikers violated the
policy of state neutrality in labor disputes is Strat-O-Seal Manufactur
ing Co. v. Scott. 67 Strat-O-Seal sought to enjoin the Illinois Depart
ment of Public Aid from paying welfare benefits to strikers. The com
pany contended that the payment of AFDC-U and GA benefits "is con
trary to the announced policy of our State to remain neutral in labor
disputes. " 68 Because of a desire to maintain neutrality in labor disputes,
Strat-O-Seal argued, Illinois had a policy of refusing to pay unemploy
ment compensation to strikers. 69 It would be inconsistent, Strat-O-Seal
argued, for Illinois to refuse to pay strikers unemployment compensa
tion, but not AFDC-U and GA.
But the Illinois court disagreed, rejecting the analogy between
unemployment compensation and public assistance. The court pointed
out that strikers in Illinois had been paid public assistance for 16 years.
The Illinois legislature certainly knew about this practice, but had chosen
to do nothing about it. The court was not prepared to overturn an ex
isting practice, an action it thought was more properly the prerogative
of the legislature. 70
. Moreover, the court did not agree that the payment of welfare benefits
to strikers violated the principle of state neutrality in labor disputes.
On the contrary, the court expressed the following view:
Labor union membership or activity and the right to strike
in proper cases and under proper circumstances is an accepted
fact in our industrial community. Plaintiffs would ask us to
exact by judicial interpretation as the price of exercising that
right a forfeiture of the benefits available to others under the
Public Assistance Code. By so doing, we exact a quid pro
quo and impose economic sanctions not specifically required
by the code. The strong arm of the State is thus employed
to strangle authorized activity and State neutrality ends. 71
Other state courts, following the lead of the Illinois court in Strat-OSeal, also found that the payment of welfare benefits to strikers did not
violate the policy of state neutrality in labor disputes. For example, one
series of cases in New York State grew out of the efforts of the Social
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Services Commissioner in Onondaga County (in which the city of
Syracuse is located) to prevent strikers in the county from receiving
GA. In the first case in this series, Lascaris v. Wyman (known as Lascaris
I), County Commissioner Lascaris brought an action for a declaratory
judgment against the State Commissioner of Social Services seeking
a judicial interpretation of the state's social welfare law as it applied
to striking employees. At the time the case arose, in 1969, New York
counties had been paying general assistance to needy strikers for at least
17 years, even though there had never been an explicit provision in
the state welfare law that either forbade or required such payment. Coun
ty Commissioner Lascaris accordingly sought judicial approval of his
intention to deny benefits to strikers in his county. But the court in
Lascaris I was no more anxious to overturn a long-standing practice
in the state than the court in Strat-O-Seal had been. 72 Closely follow
ing the reasoning in the Strat-O-Seal case, the Lascaris I court held
that denying welfare benefits to strikers would amount to a forfeiture
of the employees' right to strike, which was guaranteed by New York's
labor law. 73
After Lascaris I, the New York legislature, in 1971, passed an amend
ment to the Social Services Law elaborating on the circumstances in
which a person would be deemed "employable" and therefore ineligi
ble for GA. Employees participating in a labor dispute were not in
cluded in the amendment's definition of an employable person. 74 Then,
in the summer of 1971, the Communication Workers of America began
the strike against the New York Telephone Company that, as we have
seen, resulted in the company challenging the payment of unemploy
ment compensation to strikers under New York's unemployment in
surance statute. 75 Some of the striking telephone workers in Onondaga
County applied for welfare benefits under New York's Social Services
Law, but once again County Commissioner Lascaris sought judicial ap
proval of his determination that the telephone workers were ineligible
for GA.
Lascaris brought an action in the State's Supreme Court (the lower
court in New York) seeking declaratory judgment to confirm his deter
mination. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the plain
tiff, 76 but the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed. 77
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Lascaris then appealed to New York's highest court, the Court of Ap
peals. In this case, known as Lascaris 7/, 78 the Court of Appeals held
that strikers were eligible to receive GA, provided they registered with
the state employment office and did not refuse suitable employment.
The court said that "a person on strike does not, simply because he
is on strike, 'refuse' to accept employment." 79 In the court's view, the
1971 amendment to the Social Services Law had not affected striker
eligibility for GA. In fact, the court believed that the amendment should
be regarded as legislative approval of New York's long-standing prac
tice of paying GA to otherwise eligible strikers. 80
But did the payment of welfare benefits to strikers violate the state's
policy of neutrality in labor disputes? The court, in strongly worded
language, held that it did not:
It may be fairly said that in cases such as this the policy of
government neutrality in labor controversies is, in reality,
little more than an admirable fiction. Although, on the one
hand, the State may not be acting in a strictly neutral fashion
if it allows strikers to obtain public assistance, it may not,
on the other hand, be seriously maintained that the State
adopts a neutral policy if it renders strikers helpless by de
nying them the public assistance or welfare benefits to which
they would otherwise be entitled. Indeed, it seems manifest
that public assistance serves a purpose different from and,
by that token, not in conflict with that which underlies the
State's policy of neutrality. 81
Quoting the decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in ITT v.
Minter, the court in Lascaris //pointed out that "welfare programs,
supplying unmet subsistence needs to families without time limitation,
address a more basic social need then does unemployment compensa
tion," which is based on prior earnings and not on demonstrated need. 82
Given its view that the 1971 amendment had not affected striker eligibility
for GA and that payment of GA did not violate the policy of state neutrali
ty in labor disputes, the court in Lascaris II ruled that public assistance
should be paid to otherwise eligible strikers. 83
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Thus, attempts to deny strikers either state general assistance or (before
1981) AFDC-U on the grounds that such assistance should be regard
ed as state subsidization of strikes in violation of the public policy of
government neutrality in labor disputes have not found favor in the
courts. Some scholars have criticized the courts on this point. For ex
ample, Carney has written, "Although the claim that inaction, as well
as action, affects the fortunes of the combatants has a certain
philosophical merit, it tends to obscure the fact that provision, rather
than denial, of subsidies to strikers represents a change in the status
quo and thus, from an historical standpoint, constitutes a governmen
tal intervention. " 84 The courts have acknowledged that paying welfare
benefits to strikers constitutes a form of government intervention in labor
disputes, but they have rejected the argument that paying benefits in
terferes with the policy of "free collective bargaining," not only for
the reasons previously discussed but also because the claim was not
supported by empirical evidence. As the court in Lascaris II put it, "It
is not at all clear—there is no evidence in the record on the point—
exactly what impact public assistance grants have on the system of col
lective bargaining." 85 Arguably the Lascaris //court would have taken
a dimmer view of paying public assistance to strikers if it had been possi
ble to show that such payments increased the frequency and duration
of strikes.
The third question addressed by the courts was whether, in the absence
of an explicit statutory ban on the payment of welfare benefits to strikers,
other provisions in federal and state statutes implied a prohibition. For
example, the Social Security Act, as noted, denied AFDC-U to applicants
who had refused without good cause a bona fide offer of employment.
Similarly, most state codes require that an applicant for general assistance
register for employment at a state employment agency and accept of
fers of suitable employment or training. In some welfare cases it was
contended that, by participating in a labor dispute, strikers had left their
jobs without good cause and, by not returning to their jobs at the struck
establishment, strikers were refusing offers of suitable employment.
Courts have rejected such arguments, recognizing that the imposition
of such strictures on strikers would be tantamount to denying them the
right to strike.
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In other cases it was contended that, even though strikers should not
be forced by statutory work requirements to abdicate their right to strike,
strikers who registered for employment were not truly interested in ac
cepting jobs offered by other employers, and their lack of interest in
alternative jobs amounted to a refusal to accept suitable employment.
In general courts have rejected this contention as well.
For example, in Strat-O-Seal the court dealt with the claim that merely
participating in a strike constituted a refusal to accept suitable employ
ment. Provisions in the Illinois Public Assistance Code made benefits
available to "persons who for unavoidable causes are unable to main
tain a decent and healthful standard of living" and denied benefits to
"any employable person who refuses suitable employment or training
for self-support work." 86 The plaintiff in Strat-O-Seal argued, first,
that the strikers' need arose from an avoidable cause—namely, the strike
itself—and that, second, their unwillingness to return to their jobs con
stituted a refusal to accept suitable employment. The Illinois court re
jected both arguments. In the court's view, "The need for aid does not
arise solely and initially from participation in a strike. It arises either
from the refusal to help oneself or the inability to do so." 87 Refusal
to help oneself, the court pointed out, is an avoidable cause of need
and therefore a bar to public assistance. The inability to help oneself
is an unavoidable cause and therefore qualifies applicants for public
assistance. Some strikers had the economic resources to help themselves,
could not refuse to use their resources, and were therefore ineligible
for public assistance. But other strikers had exhausted their resources
and could help themselves only "by abdicating the right to participate
in a proper strike or by remaining on the job in the struck plant." 88
But, the court held, to require needy strikers to abandon their strike
"is to place the hangman's noose over an existing right when the
legislature has not specifically done so." 89 Thus, need that arises out
of an employee's participation in a bona fide strike and his refusal to
return to his employer was not held by the Strat-O-Seal court to be a
bar to public assistance.
In Lascaris I striking General Electric employees in Onondaga County
had applied for general assistance. The company remained open during
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the strike for those employees who desired to work. The county com
missioner contended that by refusing to return to their jobs the strikers
had refused to accept suitable employment and should therefore be denied
general assistance. The court had to interpret provisions of the New
York Social Services Law that required an applicant for benefits to
register with the nearest employment agency, report for interviews at
the agency when requested to do so, accept referrals to jobs, and report
for employment when a suitable job was available. But the statute was
silent on whether a striking employee could qualify for benefits if he
refused to go back to work for his employer. The court held, "Where
an employee loses employment by reason of a bona fide strike, lockout
or other industrial controversy, this will not be a bar to the employee
in obtaining welfare assistance if he otherwise qualifies. Strict and nar
row application of [the statutory requirements] cannot be used to force
the employee back to work and forfeit his rights under the Labor Law.' '90
Not content with the decision in Lascaris I, the county commissioner
raised the same argument in Lascaris II (which, of course, arose after
the Social Services Law had been amended). Again the court had to
rule on whether a striking employee's refusal to work for his employer
during the strike constituted a refusal to accept suitable employment.
The Appellate Division pointed out that a union member who returns
to work for his employer during an authorized strike could be fined,
or even expelled, by his union. Therefore, the Appellate Division said,
"A refusal by a union member to work for his employer can hardly
be viewed as a 'voluntary act,'" 91 and accordingly the court conclud
ed that mere participation in a strike did not constitute a refusal to ac
cept suitable employment and thus was not a bar to public assistance.
But, although the issue was raised, the Appellate Division did not ad
dress directly the contention that strikers should be disqualified because
they had also refused suitable jobs offered by other employers. 92
When the case was heard by the Court of Appeals, the plaintiff more
forcefully pressed the argument that the strikers were not willing to ac
cept alternative employment during the strike and were thus disqualified
from receiving welfare assistance. The plaintiffs claim, however, was
based on inference rather than on direct evidence. The plaintiff merely
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asserted that since the strikers were likely to return to work at the struck
employer at the conclusion of the strike, they had "in effect refused
to accept any other employment.' '93 But the Court of Appeals said, ' 'The
short answer to the plaintiffs argument is that applicants for assistance
in the present case have—and this is conceded—registered for other
employment . . . and there is no 'evidence whatever in the record that
they have either failed to attend job 'interviews' or refused 'referrals'
or that they have refused to accept an offer of such employment." 94
The issue of striker eligibility for welfare benefits reached the federal
courts for the first time in ITT Lamp Division v. Minter in 1970. 95 The
principal question the court had to decide in this case was whether pay
ing strikers welfare benefits amounted to state interference with the
employer's right under federal labor law to engage freely in collective
bargaining and was therefore barred under the doctrine of federal
preemption. Recall that we analyzed the question of federal preemp
tion in our discussion of the New York Telephone case. At this point
we deal only with ITT's claim that granting AFDC-U to strikers violated
the provisions of the Social Security Act that prohibit the payment of
benefits to persons who "without good cause . . . refused a bona fide
offer of employment." 96
The Minter case arose out of a strike by a teamsters local against ITT's
lamp division plant in Lynn, Massachusetts. Some of the striking workers
applied for and received both AFDC-U and general assistance. 97 ITT
sought a temporary restraining order in the district court to stop the
payment of benefits to its striking employees. The district court denied
ITT's motion and the corporation appealed. The first circuit affirmed
the lower court's denial of injunctive relief. 98
Although ITT's principal argument was based on the preemption doc
trine, it also maintained that strikers should not be eligible for welfare
benefits because by striking they had voluntarily left their jobs and hence
were persons who "without good cause" had refused a "bona fide of
fer of employment." The district court rejected the corporation's argu
ment, pointing out that the strikers were engaged in a "rightful activi
ty" that was protected by federal labor statutes. Moreover, the court
said, "the possible consequences to a union member of returning to
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work as a strike breaker may well constitute good cause for failing to
return to work." 99
In its consideration of the same point of law, the first circuit court
declared that equating a refusal to work at a struck establishment with
a refusal to accept a bonafide offer of employment "is no less circular
or more persuasive than the contrary assumption," namely that exer
cising one's federally protected right to strike always constitutes "good
cause" to refuse employment. 10° The correct approach, in the first cir
cuit court's view, was to allow the state, without deciding the merits
of a particular dispute, "to make the determination of what is covered
by 'good cause' and what constitutes a 'bona fide' offer of employ
ment." 101 Since the strikers in the ITT case had registered for employ
ment and (presumably) would be required to accept suitable alternative
employment if it became available, the court held that the state welfare
commissioner's determination that the strikers were eligible for benefits
had not been precluded by either federal or state statutes. 102
In summary, efforts to prohibit or restrict the payment of welfare
benefits to strikers through the courts were generally unsuccessful in
the 1960s and 1970s. Those who sought to restrict striker eligibility
for welfare benefits won only one major court victory, and that came
in the Supreme Court's decision in Batterton v. Francis. The Court
upheld the prerogative of a state participating in the AFDC-U program
to deny benefits to strikers, but its ruling in no way disturbed the op
posite choice that had been made by the majority of states in the program.
Otherwise federal and state courts did not accept the argument that
the payment of welfare benefits to strikers violated the public policy
principle of state neutrality in labor relations. Most courts simply did
not believe that the payment of welfare benefits to strikers had a
demonstrable effect on collective bargaining. The first circuit court in
Minter, however, maintained that a court should engage in a balancing
test, weighing "the impact on the state of declaring needy strikers and
their families ineligible for welfare against the extent to which making
them eligible stripped state government of its neutrality in a labormanagement dispute.'' 103 The impact on collective bargaining, the Minter
court said, was in effect an empirical matter, depending in part on
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"whether or not strikes tend to be of longer duration where welfare
is received." 104 Such empirical evidence was lacking in Minter, but
even if a court had evidence suggesting that welfare payments did have
a discernible effect on collective bargaining, it was still necessary, ac
cording to the Minter court, to weigh that impact against the state's
legitimate interest in "minimizing hardships to families of strikers who
have no other resources than the weekly pay check." 105 Clearly, the
court believed that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to muster
enough evidence on the impact of welfare payments on collective
bargaining to overcome the presumption that needy strikers deserved
state support.
The courts also refused to accept the proposition that strikers should
be ineligible for welfare because, by striking, they had without good
cause refused to accept suitable or "bona fide" employment. In StratO-Seal, Lascaris I and //, and Minter, the courts recognized that adopt
ing such a view would, in the words of Strat-O-Seal, place "a hangman's
noose" over the right to strike. 106 On the other hand, the courts have
held that to be eligible for welfare strikers had to register for employ
ment, accept referrals to jobs, and accept alternative employment, if
suitable work was available. In Minter the court said it would be in
terested in knowing whether strikers actually did accept alternative
employment, 107 but direct knowledge on this factual matter was absent
in Minter and in other cases as well. It is possible that some courts would
have denied welfare benefits to strikers if they had had direct evidence
that otherwise eligible strikers had been offered suitable, bona fide jobs
by other employers and had refused to accept them. But to date no court
has been offered such evidence. 108
Courts have typically heard cases in which there was no explicit
statutory ban on the payment of welfare to strikers and the state had
a long history of paying benefits to strikers. 109 Under these circumstances
courts have been unwilling to prohibit the payment of benefits to strikers
and their families. As the court said in Lascaris II, "In light of this
State's long-standing administrative policy sanctioning assistance
payments to strikers, the Legislature, if it considers such a policy im-
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permissible, should manifest its design in clear and unmistakable
terms." 110 The Minter court expressed essentially the same view with
respect to the payment of AFDC-U to strikers, declaring that Congress
was "the preferable forum" for resolving the issue. 111 Of course, in
1981, Congress did speak clearly on this issue, eliminating striker
eligibility for both AFDC-U benefits and food stamps. 112
Although the issue of striker eligibility for AFDC-U generated in
tense political controversy and a substantial amount of litigation, it is
not likely that program benefits played a major role in the vast majori
ty of labor disputes in the 1960s and 1970s. It must be remembered
that only a subset of states participate in the AFDC-U program and,
before 1981, not all of the participating states granted benefits to strikers.
Moreover, program rules effectively limited eligibility to the most im
poverished strikers with dependent children. Furthermore, although some
strikers might have qualified for emergency assistance, most strikers
had to wait 30 days before they could attain eligibility—and, of course,
the majority of strikes are settled well within 30 days. 113 Finally, ap
plicants for AFDC-U only become eligible for benefits when they have
exhausted their eligibility for unemployment compensation; strikers
receiving unemployment benefits, therefore, would not also receive
AFDC-U. 114
Given these restrictions, it is not surprising that relatively few strikers
ever received AFDC-U benefits, despite claims to the contrary. Thieblot
and Cowin, in their 1972 book, tried to estimate the annual cost of paying
eligible strikers AFDC-U. The case studies they had conducted sug
gested to them that 15 percent of all strikers would receive AFDC-U
benefits in a "normal" year. Using this assumption, Thieblot and Cowin
estimated that paying AFDC-U to strikers carried an annual price tag
of $62.6 million. 115 There is reason to believe, however, that Thieblot
and Cowin's figure is grossly exaggerated. In its consideration of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation bill in 1981, the Senate Budget Com
mittee received a staff report suggesting that the elimination of AFDC-U
for strikers would save about $5 million in a year. 116 If credence is given
to the Senate estimate, then only .6 of 1 percent of total AFDC-U
payments went to strikers in 1980. 117
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The Senate cost estimate can also be used to generate an estimate
of the number of strikers who received assistance in 1980. Suppose we
assume, for the sake of argument, that every striker received just one
month of AFDC-U benefits. Since the average AFDC-U payment per
family was about $400 a month in 1980, then at most 12,500 strikers
received assistance during that year. 118 This is obviously an upper-bound
estimate, since eligible strikers would have received two or more months
of benefits if they were involved in strikes lasting longer than 60 days.
(In the next chapter we present data showing that 14 percent of all strikes
last longer than 56 days.) Nevertheless, our estimate suggests that in
1980 less than .7 of 1 percent of AFDC-U families included a striker
and less than 1 percent of all strikers received benefits. 119
These estimates present a very different picture from the one painted
by Thieblot and Cowin. 120 The estimates are not intended, of course,
to refute evidence that in some long strikes the AFDC-U program was
a major source of support for strikers' families. m But they cast doubt
on the perception, certainly widespread in the business community, that
welfare benefits were commonly available to strikers. This perception
was fostered by media coverage of some of the court cases discussed
here as well as the extensive publicity given certain protracted strikes
(such as the coal strikes of 1978 and 1981) in which large numbers of
workers were reported to have received welfare and food stamps. 122
For more than a decade employers and their allies waged a campaign
against the use of welfare assistance in labor disputes. As we have seen,
their efforts to achieve their objective in the courts were largely unavail
ing. Similarly, until 1981 efforts to ban payment of AFDC-U to strikers
through Congressional action were also unsuccessful. But when Presi
dent Reagan came into office and control of the Senate passed to the
Republicans in 1981, the stage was set for major alterations in the na
tion's social legislation. One of the principal targets of the Reagan ad
ministration was the AFDC program. Under the leadership of Budget
Director David Stockman, the administration sought amendments to the
Social Security Act designed to cut $1.2 billion from federal expen
ditures for AFDC (and therefore the same amount from State expen
ditures). All of the changes proposed by the administration were
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incorporated into the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which was
enacted into law on August 13, 1981. 123 Included in OBRA was an
amendment to the Social Security Act that prohibited the payment of
AFDC-U benefits to strikers and their families. 124

Food Stamps
The food stamp program has several features that distinguish it from
other welfare programs. Most obvious is the fact that instead of pro
viding cash to needy recipients, the program provides coupons or
"stamps" that can only be used to purchase food. Less obvious, but
perhaps substantially more important, the program operates under
uniform federal rules. Unlike the AFDC program, the rules governing
food stamp eligibility and benefit determination are the same throughout
the United States. Moreover, the federal government pays the full cost
of the stamps and half of the administrative costs. Although the states
are responsible for the day-to-day administration of the program and
the other half of the administrative costs, they have no control over
policy. Essentially the states implement rules that are written in
Washington. 125 By contrast, eligibility and benefit determination under
the AFDC program are substantially in the hands of the states.
In addition, the food stamp program covers a broader population than
the AFDC program. Whereas the AFDC-U program is restricted to
families with dependent children, the food stamp population encom
passes AFDC-U eligibles, single individuals, couples with children, and
even communes. 126 Thus, in 1981, at the time OBRA was passed, there
were 23 million food stamp recipients but only 2 million families receiv
ing AFDC-U. 127
To be eligible for food stamp assistance, a household must qualify
under a federal standard of need, below which a household's resources
must fall for it to be eligible for benefits. The standard of need under
the food stamp program has generally been more liberal than the stan
dard of need established by most states under the AFDC-U program.
For example, in 1975 most four-person families would qualify for
assistance if the household's liquid assets did not exceed $1,500 and
its annualized net income did not exceed $6,480. 128 Essentially, a
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household qualified for assistance if its net income was at or below the
federal poverty line.
In 1981, however, OBRA changed the eligibility test from one bas
ed on net income to one based on gross income. Households without
an elderly or disabled member were required to have gross income,
before any deductions for expenses, below 130 percent of the federal
poverty level of income. Net income was to be used only to determine
benefits. For example, a working family of four with a monthly in
come of $1,191 (30 percent more than the poverty level of $916) became
ineligible for benefits. The shift to a gross-income eligibility test was
designed to remove from the program nearly one million recipients who
were on the high end of the low-income population. 129
Whereas in the case of the AFDC-U program, an unemployed spouse
must wait 30 days before becoming eligible for benefits, food stamp
assistance is provided without a waiting period. This feature of the food
stamp program was particularly significant for strikers, who until 1981
could potentially become eligible for food stamp assistance on the first
day of a strike. In addition, a household's receipt of food stamps did
not decrease the welfare grants that may have been available to it under
other federal and state laws. Thus, until 1981 strikers could potentially
qualify for both food stamps and state general assistance on the first
day of a strike, and for both food stamps and AFDC-U if the strike
lasted longer than 30 days. 130
The food stamp program also contains a work requirement not unlike
the one contained in the AFDC-U program. A "physically and men
tally fit" adult loses eligibility for food stamps if he refuses to register
for employment, voluntarily quits his job without good cause, or refuses
to accept a suitable offer of employment. Before 1981 the Food Stamp
Act specifically allowed an applicant to refuse employment at a plant
or site because of a strike or lockout. OBRA, however, altered this pro
viso so that now an applicant can refuse employment at a struck plant
only if the household does not contain a member on strike. 131
When a household is deemed to be eligible for food stamps, it receives
a monthly allotment of free stamps. A benefit schedule, which varies
according to the size and net income of the household, is used to
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determine the allotment. A Thrifty Food Plan, which is based on recom
mended daily allowances of nutrients for persons in various age/sex
categories, is used to calculate the maximum food stamp benefit payable
to a household of a particular size. A household's monthly allotment
is the Thrifty Food Plan amount, reduced by 30 percent of a household's
net income. Historically, the allotment for a family of four has generally
been about 25 percent of its net income. 132
The origins of the food stamp program date to the Great Depression
of the 1930s. At a time when farmers produced food they could not
sell while thousands of unemployed workers stood in bread lines, the
federal government began to distribute surplus food to the hungry. The
first food stamp program was established in 1939. Needy households
purchased stamps at their face value and also received free stamps as
well. The stamps could be used to buy surplus food available at retail
stores. The plan, however, was discontinued in 1943, at a time when
the booming wartime economy had virtually eliminated both the
unemployment and surplus food problems. 133
There were sporadic experiments with surplus commodity programs
throughout the postwar period. In 1961 President Kennedy launched
the immediate predecessor of the current program when he issued an
executive order establishing pilot food stamp programs in seven states.
The number of participating states had grown to 43 by 1964 when Con
gress passed the Food Stamp Act, which remains the statutory framework
for the current program. 134
The initial program under the Food Stamp Act was modest in scale.
Much like the AFDC-U program, a state could choose not to participate
in the program, and states that did choose to participate exercised substan
tial control over eligibility criteria and allotment levels. In 1965 the
program provided benefits to only 632,000 people at a cost of $32.5
million to the federal government. 135 In the late 1960s several public
interest groups focused national attention on the problem of hunger in
America. 136 This attention caused Congress to increase substantially
federal outlays for the food stamp program. In 1971 Congress established
uniform national income and resource eligibility standards and again
increased benefits available under the program. Then in 1973 Congress
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required that all counties in the nation offer food stamps by July 1974.
By 1975 the food stamp program provided benefits to 19.2 million people
at a cost of $4.4 billion. 137
The Food Stamp Act of 1964 did not speak to the issue of whether
strikers should receive food stamps. Rather the issue arose only when
reports began to surface that strikers were receiving stamps. Carney
reports that in the fall of 1965, "lumberers in the Northwest became
the first group of strikers to find in the Act a source of public subsidy." 138
In 1967 strikers used food stamps during the UAW's strike against Ford,
and later that year striking copper workers also received food stamps.
These strikes generated considerable publicity over the issue of food
stamps for strikers, leading representatives of the business community
to voice opposition to the practice. 139
In 1968 the House of Representatives passed a food stamp bill pro
hibiting strikers from receiving assistance. Senate opposition to the House
measure resulted in the striker disqualification being removed from the
final legislation. In 1970 Congress again confronted the issue. A mo
tion in the House to prohibit strikers from receiving food stamps was
defeated. Instead, Congress included language in the Act that explicit
ly permitted strikers to receive food stamps: "Refusal to work at a plant
or site subject to a strike or a lockout for the duration of such strike
or lockout shall not be deemed refusal to accept employment." 140 The
House Agricultural Committee's report on the 1970 amendments to the
Food Stamp Act noted that it had adopted the striker provision because
it did "not wish to take sides in labor disputes and does not believe
this bill is the proper place to solve labor-management problems." 141
The controversy, however, raged on. Throughout the 1970s repeated
attempts were made in Congress to curtail striker participation in the
food stamp program, but all such efforts failed. In 1971, for example,
the House Agricultural Committee voted to eliminate striker eligibility
for food stamps but the committee's bill never reached the House floor
for debate. The following year, the committee reversed its position,
voting to allow strikers to continue to receive food stamps. 142 In 1974,
the Ford administration attempted to overturn the existing policy, but
the Senate voted against an administration-backed proposal. 143

106 Welfare in Labor Disputes

Congress again considered the issue in 1977. This time new language
was added to the Food Stamp Act that reflected the political pressure
on Congressional supporters of food stamps for strikers:
No household that contains a person involved in a labormanagement dispute shall be eligible to participate in the food
stamp program unless the household meets the income
guidelines, asset requirements, and work registration re
quirements of this Act. 144
By emphasizing that only strikers who were otherwise eligible could
receive food stamps, the supporters hoped to eliminate the perception
that strikers were somehow treated differently from other food stamp
recipients. In discussing this provision, the House Agricultural Com
mittee said in 1979:
[We] have constantly grappled with the issue of providing
food stamp benefits to strikers. In the 1977 Act, we refused
to eliminate them and the members of their households from
consideration for participation simply because they were on
strike, since such an automatic exclusion seemed unfair and
inequitable and would have involved the government in the
non-neutral act of pressuring the worker to abandon the
strike. . . .
The Committee wishes to reiterate its intention that the food
stamp program be limited to the truly needy as defined by
the existing eligibility criteria. . . . Accordingly, the Com
mittee has determined to add an amendment that makes crystal
clear that it does not countenance making any striker or the
striker's household eligible for food stamps by virtue solely
of the existence of the strike and that [it] in no way condones
strikers viewing being on strike as the sole qualifying criterion
enabling them to receive food stamps. That is not the way
the program works now. That is not the way the program
ought to work ever. 145
But the committee then acknowledged that the amendment had not
in any way changed existing policy; it had merely altered the emphasis. 146
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The effort made by congressional supporters in 1977 to deflect
criticism of the policy did not succeed. Congressional opponents and
their business allies continued to press their efforts to remove the striker
qualification provision from the Food Stamp Act. Their efforts were
fueled by reports that thousands of miners collected food stamps dur
ing the 111-day coal strike of 1977-78. When coal miners again went
on strike in March 1981, the press reported that food stamp ad
ministrators in the coal states were preparing for an onslaught of ap
plications from the striking miners. Later reports suggest that the ad
ministrators overestimated the number of strikers who would qualify
for assistance. 147
Shortly after Congress convened in January 1981, Senator Strom Thurmond introduced legislation to bar food stamps for strikers. Thurmond
cited the coal strike of 1977-78 as evidence of the need for the legisla
tion. In offering the bill, Senator Thurmond said that the federal govern
ment, by providing food stamps to strikers, was "injecting itself into
the dispute.'' He maintained that providing food stamps in such a situa
tion merely prolonged a strike and worsened the damage to the
economy. 148 By June, the Senate had voted to adopt the Thurmond bill
as part of legislation reauthorizing the food stamp program for four years.
In the meantime, the House Agricultural Committee approved a com
parable prohibition as part of a broad farm bill. 149
It was at this point that most of the pending 1981 social legislation
was incorporated into the OBRA. In its final form, the OBRA contain
ed the ban on food stamps for strikers that Senator Thurmond and his
conservative allies had long sought. 15° Actually, the new legislation did
not ban all strikers from receiving food stamps. One proviso permits
strikers to continue to receive food stamps (/"the strikers' household
had been eligible for assistance immediately prior to the commence
ment of the strike. (Another proviso allows a household that does not
contain a member on strike to maintain its eligibility for food stamps
when any of its members refuses to accept employment at a struck plant
or site.) Thus, even if a strike causes household income to fall to the
point where the household satisfies the food stamp program's income
and asset requirements, if the household had not been eligible for stamps
prior to the beginning of a strike the household does not become eligi-
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ble for stamps during the strike. In any event, it is clear that the 1981
legislation makes the great majority of strikers ineligible for food stamp
assistance. 151
How much did this prohibition save the federal treasury? In February
1981 Senators Helms and Thurmond, joined by Congressmen E. Thomas
Coleman and William L. Dickinson, asked the General Accounting Of
fice to gather "available data on participation in the Food Stamp Pro
gram by households with members involved in labor-management
disputes.'' 152 In a report submitted in March 1981, the GAO examined
the food stamp caseload in five separate one-month periods during the
interval 1976-79. The GAO review revealed the following:
"... The percentage of food stamp households containing a striker
ranged from 0.29 percent to 2.1 percent of total food stamp
households.
". . . Of all persons on strike, the percentage of strikers who par
ticipated in the Food Stamp Program ranged from 3.6 percent to
36.4 percent.
"... Food Stamp benefits provided to strikers' households may
have amounted to $37 million in fiscal year 1980. " 153
The $37 million figure implies that less than .5 of 1 percent of fiscal
1980 food stamp expenditures took the form of benefits to strikers.
Moreover, the percentage of food stamp households containing a striker
reached an abnormally high level of 2.1 percent and the percentage of
strikers participating in the food stamp program reached an equally ab
normal level of 36.5 percent only in February 1978, in the middle of
the 1977-78 coal strike. In each of the four other months examined by
the GAO, the percent of food stamp households containing a striker
never exceeded .4 of 1 percent of the total number of households receiv
ing assistance and the number of strikers receiving food stamps never
exceeded 11 percent of the number of workers on strike. 154
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that eliminating food
stamps for strikers would result in savings of $50 million in 1982, $55
million in 1983, and $60 million in 1984. 155 Note that these estimates
mesh with the estimate of $37 million produced by the GAO for 1980. 156
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Again, it is important to contrast the GAO and CBO numbers with
those contained in Thieblot and Co win. Their influential 1972 book
claimed that in a typical year (which they called "1973") 60 percent
of all strikers "would be expected to receive food stamps." 157 Recall
that in 1972 many counties did not even have a food stamp program.
Contrast their claim with the GAO finding that for the period 1976-79
between 3.6 and 36.4 percent of all strikers received food stamps.
Thieblot and Cowin also maintained that providing food stamps to
strikers would cost $239 million a year in 1973. l58 The Thieblot and
Cowin estimates were widely cited, especially by those seeking a ban
on food stamps for strikers, but the estimates produced 10 years later
by the GAO and the CBO demonstrate that Thieblot and Cowin's
numbers were again grossly exaggerated. 159
In contrast to unemployment compensation, AFDC-U, and general
assistance, there was very little litigation over the issue of food stamps
for strikers prior to the 1981 legislation. Most of the issues that were
subjected to judicial scrutiny in cases dealing with the payment of benefits
to strikers under other government transfer programs had little or no
relevance to the food stamp program. For example, because the pro
gram operates under a federal statute and uniform federal standards,
and states lacked the discretion—and apparently never attempted—to
set their own rules, the doctrine of federal preemption clearly had no
relevance to the policy. In Congressional debates, as we have seen, both
proponents and opponents of the policy claimed that the principle of
government neutrality in labor disputes required the adoption of the posi
tion they advocated. Whether government neutrality was or was not
violated by the payment of food stamps to strikers was, however, an
issue that was never tested in the courts.
On the other hand, one federal district court had occasion to con
sider, in Jaramillo v. County of Santa Clara, whether a regulation issued
by the Department of Agriculture was in conflict with the plain language
of the Food Stamp Act. 16° The Department had issued a regulation that
prohibited the payments of food stamps to applicants who were par
ticipating in a strike "which has pursuant to a court decision currently
in force been determined to be unlawful.'' 161 When employees of Santa
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Clara County, California, planned to go on strike in 1975, the county
obtained a temporary restraining order which enjoined the strike. Never
theless, the employees did strike and, subsequently, some of them ap
plied for food stamps. The county, which had the responsibility of ad
ministering the food stamp program, denied food stamps to the strikers
on the grounds that they were participating in an unlawful strike. 162
Plaintiffs in Jaramillo contended that the denial of food stamps to
strikers because they were participating in an unlawful strike violated
the Food Stamp Act, which, plaintiffs argued, made food stamps
available to strikers regardless of whether a strike was lawful or unlawful.
The court agreed with the plaintiffs. "By adopting regulations which
in effect rule that food stamps shall be denied to participants in strikes
judicially determined to be unlawful, the Department of Agriculture
presumes to make a distinction not made by Congress and is engaging
in legislation beyond its powers,'' the court said. 163 The court therefore
held that the Department's regulation was void. 164 Apart from this case,
however, the courts have had very few opportunities to rule on the pay
ment of stamps to strikers. 165
In 1986, however, the UAW challenged the constitutionality of the
1981 amendment banning food stamps for strikers in UAWv. Lyng. 166
The UAW argued that the 1981 amendment "impairs the constitutional
rights of the individual plaintiffs to associate with their families and
unions in violation of the First Amendment" and "impairs these rights
without rationally furthering a legitimate governmental purpose in viola
tion of the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 167 Judge Oberdorfer of the District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with
the UAW. He argued that the statute infringes upon individuals' First
Amendment rights to free speech and free association, since it forces
strikers experiencing economic hardship either to quit their jobs, cross
the picket line and return to work, leave their families so that they may
qualify for food stamps, or put pressure on their union to end the strike.
Furthermore, the Court found that it violates the equal protection clause
of the Fifth Amendment, by singling out striking employees for punitive
treatment, treating them worse than individuals who voluntarily quit
their jobs, and by directing "the 'onus' of the striker's exercise of his
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associational rights" as much "on the innocent members of the family
as ... on the striker himself." 168
The district court's view in UAW v. Lyng differs from the second
circuit court's view in Russo v. Kirby, decided 15 years earlier. In the
earlier case, Judge Hays said the argument that denying welfare benefits
and food stamps to strikers infringes their first amendment rights
' 'borders on the frivolous." 169 He added, ' 'The equal protection claim
is almost as insubstantial since the basis of classification is clearly not
unreasonable." 170 In 1987 two federal courts specifically rejected the
conclusions reached by the UAW court. In Eaton v. Lyng, the constitu
tionality of the 1981 amendment was challenged by two strikers and
members of their households. 171 In this case, a federal district court
in Iowa ruled that the amendment did not interfere with plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights, since it did not create a "genuine incentive to choose
any of the alternatives which would require a waiver of a constitutional
right" outlined by the UAW court. 172 The incentive "is created by the
strike, and Congress has simply refused to use the food stamp program
to solve the problem." 173 Rejecting the UAW court's argument that
a "heightened level of scrutiny" should be applied to the law since it
affected a group which has historically been discriminated against, the
Court held that it was rationally related to legitimate government ob
jectives and did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 174
Similar issues were addressed by the U.S. Court of Appeals in
Ledesma v. Block. 175 As in the Eaton case, the Court rejected the
heightened scrutiny test and instead used a rational basis test to deter
mine whether the statutory classification of strikers violates the equal
protection clause. The Court held that the amendments "were rationally
related to goals of government neutrality in labor disputes and concen
trating benefits on people who are unable to work, and thus do not violate
equal protection." 176
The courtroom battle over food stamps for strikers was ended in
March, 1988, when the Supreme Court reversed the district court's UAW
decision. 177 The Supreme Court ruled that the 1981 amendment does
not "directly and substantially" interfere with strikers' rights to freely
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associate with their families and their unions. 178 Delivering the opinion
of the majority, Justice Byron White wrote: "Exercising the right to
strike inevitably risks economic hardship, but we are not inclined to
hold that the right of association requires the government to minimize
that result by qualifying the striker for food stamps." 179 For similar
reasons, the Court held that the amendment does not infringe upon the
right to freedom of expression: "it does not 'coerce' belief; and it does
not require appellees to participate in political activities or support
political views with which they disagree." 180 Finally, the Supreme Court
ruled that, since the statute "has no substantial impact on any fundamen
tal interest and does not 'affect with particularity any protected class,'"
the proper level of scrutiny under the equal protection clause is the ra
tional basis test. 181 Relying on the findings in the Hodory case, the Court
ruled that the 1981 Amendment does not violate the Fifth Amendment
since it is rationally related to legitimate legislative objectives of neutrality
in labor disputes and protecting the government's fiscal integrity.

General Assistance
The General Assistance program is the nation's oldest assistance pro
gram. Its roots stretch back to the nineteenth century. The program pro
vides cash and in-kind benefits to impoverished people that fall outside
the federal-state public assistance programs (e.g., Aid to Families with
Dependent Children and Supplemental Security Income). For exam
ple, it might provide emergency assistance to an able bodied single male
who is without money and is unable to find work. It is distinguished
from both AFDC-U and food stamps by the absence of a federal role.
General Assistance is a state and local program. In some states, e.g.,
Georgia, it is funded and administered by counties, with county level
administrators having substantial say over who receives benefits and
how much they receive.
Since the federal government does not play a role in this program,
General Assistance benefits are still available to strikers. The 1981
OBRA legislation, which effectively cut off AFDC-U and Food Stamp
benefits to strikers, did not touch the General Assistance program.
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Of course, whether a striker is eligible for GA benefits and the level
of benefits received depends upon where the striker lives. Another im
plication of the absence of a federal role is incredible diversity in GA
programs across states. New York State runs a GA program that in
August, 1974 provided an average monthly benefit of $98.85 to 164,000
recipients. The corresponding numbers for Alabama's GA program were
a benefit of $12.50 to 42 recipients. 182 In general, GA programs are
much less generous and exhibit greater interstate variation than federalstate programs like AFDC.
Since GA eligibility rules are written by either states or counties, it
is not surprising that there have been several instances where strikers
received GA benefits. Indeed, the earliest U.S. litigation over strikes
and transfers occurred in 1904 when striking coal miners in Illinois ob
tained General Assistance benefits. 183 As noted above, the 1940s and
1950s saw strikers receive GA benefits in several important labor disputes
including the 1945 UAW strike against General Motors, and the 1946
and 1959 steel strikes. Furthermore, as indicated by the litigation over
AFDC-U, we know that many strikes involving receipt of AFDC-U
also involved receipt of GA. Unfortunately, however, our knowledge
in this area is largely anecdotal. We cannot answer such basic ques
tions as, what fraction of strikers receive GA? or what fraction of GA
benefits go to strikers? Moreover, we cannot answer these questions
for the current year, for any earlier year, for the nation, or for any state.
Litigation over GA has largely followed the same paths as that over
AFDC-U. Two themes are central. First, does payment of GA benefits
to strikers violate federal labor law in that it compromises the principle
of state neutrality in labor disputes? Second, in the absence of an ex
plicit legislative prohibition against striker receipt of GA, do other seem
ingly applicable provisions in the state's statutes imply a prohibition?
The cases addressing these questions are largely the same as those for
AFDC-U. 184 Moreover, the answers are basically the same for the two
programs.
With regard to the first question, the courts have not viewed pay
ment of GA to strikers as inconsistent with the public policy standard of
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neutrality. As for the second question, a state may choose to prohibit
strikers from receiving GA. Like AFDC-U, however, the state's legisla
tion must be explicit on the matter.
The major difference between GA and AFDC-U litigation lies in its
relevance to the present. Given the 1981 OBRA legislation, past litiga
tion over AFDC-U is legally irrelevant. That is not true for GA. Since
strikers can still receive GA, past litigation influences the interpreta
tion of laws governing that receipt.
Before proceeding to the next chapter, the reader may find it useful
to refer to exhibits 4.1 and 4.2 for summaries of the legislative history
and judicial decisions pertaining to the provision of public assistance
to strikers.

Conclusion
Because welfare is quite distinct from unemployment insurance, the
issues raised in this chapter are in some ways quite distinct from those
raised in the previous two chapters. Welfare assistance is targeted on
families with very low incomes; families with greater need (more
dependents and lower incomes) generally receive larger welfare benefits.
Unemployment insurance is paid to eligibles irrespective of family in
come. Here the level of benefits primarily depends on the individual's
past earnings record rather than on current needs. Whereas welfare
assistance is targeted on the poor, unemployment insurance is targeted
on the middle class. 185
This difference in the nature of the programs creates a subtle dif
ference in the nature of the controversy surrounding payment of transfers
to strikers. It is one thing to say that a striker with a private home and
a working spouse should be denied unemployment insurance. It is quite
another to say that a striker with no assets and children on the edge
of starvation should be denied public assistance. The latter raises a ten
sion between the government's role in labor disputes and its role in
alleviating poverty—a role that governments have played since the middle
ages. While that tension may also arise in unemployment insurance,
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Exhibit 4.1
Legislative History of AFDC and Food Stamp Regulations
Pertaining to Strikers
Prevalence
Provisions
Date Program
All jurisdictions
1935 AFDC The Social Security Act established
the program to provide assistance to
children in need because of the death,
incapacity, or continued absence of a
parent. In most states, a family was
disqualified from receiving benefits if
an able-bodied man was living in the
house. The Act did not prohibit the
payment of AFDC to needy strikers;
the matter was left to the states to
decide.
Approximately
1961 AFDC-U Congress amended the program to
25 states
provide assistance to the needy
children of unemployed parents. Pro
visions in the Act state mat an in
dividual is ineligible for AFDC-U if
he is out of work "without good
cause" or if he has refused a "bona
fide offer of suitable employment."
States electing to participate in the
program had the option of deciding
whether strikers did or did not fall
within the definition of an
unemployed parent. Applicants must
be unemployed 30 days before becom
ing eligible.
All jurisdictions
The Food Stamp Act established the
1964 Food
Stamps program to provide needy individuals
with coupons that could be used sole
ly for the purchase of food. Uniform
federal rules govern eligibility in all
states. A work requirement provides
that an employable recipient loses
eligibility if he refuses to register for
employment, voluntarily quits his job
without good cause or refuses to ac
cept a suitable offer of employment.
The issue of striker eligibility was not
specifically addressed. There is no
waiting period.
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Date Program

Provisions

1968 AFDC-U Congress amended the Social Security
Act, withdrawing some of the States'
authority to define an unemployed
parent. Participating states were re
quired to provide AFDC-U where a
needy child "has been deprived of
parental support or care by reason of
the unemployment (as determined in
accordance with standards prescribed
by the Secretary) of his father." The
definition of unemployment subse
quently issued by the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare did
not address the issue of strikers.
1970 Food
Congress included language in the
Stamps Act that explicitly permitted strikers
to receive food stamps.
1973 AFDC-U The Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare issued a new regulation
that explicitly gave states the option
to deny benefits where the parent's
unemployment resulted from participa
tion in a labor dispute.
1973 Food
Congress required all counties in the
Stamps country to offer food stamps by July
1974.
1981 Food
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
Stamps prohibited the provision of AFDC-U
&
and Food Stamp benefits to strikers
AFDC-U and their families. Those strikers who
had been eligible for food stamps just
prior to the commencement of the
strike may continue to receive them,
however the allotment cannot be ad
justed to compensate for the striker's
lost income.

Prevalence

Approximately
25 states

All jurisdictions
Eight states
denied benefits
to strikers
prior to 1981
All jurisdictions
All jurisdictions
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Exhibit 4.2
Principal Judicial Decisions Pertaining to the
Provision of Public Assistance to Strikers
Case

Strat-O-Seal Mfe. Co.
v. Scott

72 111. App. 2d 480
(1966)

Lascaris v. Wyman
305 N.Y.S. 2d 212
(1969)

m Lamp Division v.
Minter
318 F.Supp. 364
(1970), 435 F.2d
989 (1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S.
933 (1971)

Russo v. Kirby
453 F.2d 548 (1971)

Issue

Findings

Whether the payment
of welfare benefits to
strikers violates the
principle of state
neutrality in labor
disputes.

The Circuit Court of Illinois
upheld the State's long-standing
policy of paying welfare benefits to
strikers who were otherwise qualified.
The Court held that need arising out
of an employee's participation in a
bona fide strike and his refusal to
return to his employer is not a bar to
public assistance.
The New York Supreme Court held
that striking GE employees who
refused available work from their
employer were not barred from
receiving welfare assistance if they
were otherwise qualified.
The First Circuit Court held that
payment of welfare benefits to
teamsters on strike against ITT
was not preempted by either
federal or state law.

Whether the payment
of welfare benefits to
strikers violates the
principle of state
neutrality in labor
disputes.
Whether paying strikers
welfare benefits vio
lates federal law by
compromising the prin
ciple of state neutral
ity in labor disputes.
Whether granting
AFDC-U to strikers
violates provisions of
the Social Security Act.

Whether the denial of
welfare benefits to
strikers infringed
upon rights guaranteed
by the First and Fifth
Amendments.

Provisions of the Social Security
Act that prohibit the payment of
benefits to persons who "without
good cause...refused a bona fide
offer of employment" do not
necessarily apply to strikers.
States should be allowed "to make
the determination of what is
covered by 'good cause' and what
constitutes a 'bona fide' offer of
employment."
The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed
a lower court decision requiring pay
ment of welfare benefits to all
strikers. The court held that federal
courts did not have jurisdiction.
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Case

Issue

Whether a Maryland
rule denying AFDC-U
benefits to families
in which the father
was unemployed as a
result of partici
pation in a labor
dispute was in conflict
with federal regulations.
Lascaris v. Wyman
Whether striking
340 N.Y.S. 2d 397 employees were pre
(1972)
cluded from receiving
public assistance under
a New York statute
that disqualified
employable persons
who have refused to
accept employment.
Whether payment of
welfare benefits to
strikers violates the
State's policy of
neutrality in labor
disputes.
Francis v. Davidson Whether a Maryland
379 F.Supp. 78
rule denying AFDC-U
(D.Md. 1974)
benefits to children
whose fathers are
unemployed because
of labor disputes, and
the 1973 HEW
regulation that ex
pressly permits the
rule, are valid.
Jaramitto v. County
Whether a Department
of Santa Clara
of Agriculture
91 LRRM 2755
regulation prohibiting
(1976)
payment of food stamps
to applicants who
were participating in
an unlawful strike
violated the Food
Stamp Act.
Francis v. Davidson
340 F.Supp. 351
(1972), summarily
aff d 409 U.S. 904
(1972)

Findings
The federal District Court held that
the Maryland rule was invalid. The
Court found that a man out of work
because of a labor dispute was "un
employed," as defined by HEW reg
ulations, and therefore eligible for
benefits as prescribed by the Social
Security Act.
The New York Court of Appeals
held that strikers were eligible to
receive general assistance, provided
they registered with the state em
ployment office and did not refuse
suitable employment. Going out
on strike does not, by itself,
constitute refusing employment.
The Court held that payment of
benefits does not violate the
State's policy of neutrality.

The District Court held that the
HEW regulation is incompatible
with the federal AFDC-U statute,
and is thus invalid. Accordingly,
the Maryland regulation is also
invalid.

The federal District Court held that
the regulation was void since
Congress in passing the Food Stamp
Act had not intended to make a
distinction between lawful and
unlawful strikes.

Welfare in Labor Disputes 119
Case

Issue

Batterton v. Francis Whether states partici432 U.S. 426 (1977) paring in the AFDC-U
program could be given
the option of denying
benefits to strikers'
families.

UAW v. Lyng
648 F.Supp. 1234
(1986)

Eaton v. Lyng
669 F.Supp. 266
(N.D. Iowa 1987)

Ledesma v. Block
825 F.2d 1046
(6th Cir. 1987)

Lyng v. UAW
108 S.Ct. 1184
(1988)

Constitutionality of
the 1981 amendment
to the Food Stamp Act
banning the provision
of benefits to
strikers and their
families.
Constitutionality of
the 1981 amendment
to the Food Stamp Act
banning the provision
of benefits to
strikers and their
families.
Constitutionality of
the 1981 amendment
to the Food Stamp Act
banning the provision
of benefits to
strikers and their
families.
Constitutionality of
the 1981 amendment
to the Food Stamp Act
banning the provision
of benefits to
strikers and their
families.

Findings
The Supreme Court overturned the
lower court ruling that states did not
have the authority to deny AFDC-U
benefit to strikers. The Court held
that a regulation issued by HEW in
1973 explicitly giving states the
option of disqualifying AFDC-U
fathers whose unemployment
resulted from participation in a
labor dispute was valid.
The District Court held that the
amendment is unconstitutional, since
it interferes with individuals' First
Amendment rights to free speech
and free association, and violates
the equal protection clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
The District Court held that the
1981 amendment violates neither
the First nor the Fifth Amendment,
and is rationally related to a
legitimate government objective of
neutrality in labor disputes.
The U.S. Court of Appeals held
that the striker amendment is
rationally related to government
goals of neutrality in labor disputes
and concentrating benefits on
individuals who are unable to
work and therefore does not
violate the equal protection clause.
The Supreme Court reversed the
the District Court's ruling that the
striker amendment is unconstitutional.
The Court held that the statute does
not interfere with strikers' rights
to freely associate with their
families and their unions, nor with
their right to freely express
themselves about union matters.
The Court also held that the
amendment does not violate the
equal protection clause, since it is
rationally related to the legitimate
government objective of neutrality
in labor disputes. The decision
essentially ended the legal battle
over the constitutionality of the
OBRA.
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it is attenuated by the fact that alleviation of poverty is not the primary
purpose of the unemployment insurance program.
Despite this difference, however, the issues raised in this chapter are
in some ways quite similar to those raised in chapters 2 and 3. In par
ticular, like unemployment insurance, there is significant diversity in
welfare assistance to strikers over time and space. With regard to time,
the introduction of AFDC-U and food stamps in the 1960s increased
the availability of welfare aid to strikers, while the 1981 OBRA legisla
tion sharply restricted that availability. With regard to space, some states
provided AFDC-U to strikers and some did not. This diversity has been
a major issue in the litigation over strikes and transfers. An anomaly
in the pattern should, however, be noted. The FERA program of the
1930s and the food stamp program of the 1970s are instances of a uniform
national policy under which strikers receive government transfers. Both
policies were controversial and short-lived.
Another common theme of this and previous chapters is the issue of
state neutrality in labor disputes. State neutrality lies at the center of
federal labor law, and any government policy that aids or hinders strikers
must address it. The courts have generally found that neither a policy
of providing nor denying transfers to strikers infringes on state neutrality
to the extent that it must be prohibited. This is true for both welfare
and unemployment insurance.
A final common theme of the chapters is the question of the effect
of government transfers on strike behavior. That question has been raised
by legislators and judges in the most "practical" of settings. It was
raised in reference to unemployment insurance during the New York
Telephone strike. It was raised in ITT v. Minter when the court ruled
that "there is no evidence to show that the payment of AFDC-U and
General Assistance benefits to eligible strikers in any way prolonged
the strike." It is a question with implications that extend well beyond
the "academic." The next several chapters seek to answer that question.
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5
Government Transfer Programs
and Strike Theories
Designing an Empirical Test

The task of this chapter is to develop a theory and set of hypotheses
that explain the effect of government transfer policies on strike activi
ty. We begin the chapter with a brief review of previous strike research,
noting the disparate theories and models that researchers have used.
We then propose a formulation that we believe serves as a useful basis
for understanding the link between transfer policies and strikes. Using
this formulation, we are able to generate a set of hypotheses that can
be tested in econometric models. The chapter concludes with a discus
sion of the principal dependent, policy, and control variables that we
used in our statistical tests.
The long history of research on strike activity 1 contains analysis of
strikes over time2 and across industries, 3 economies,4 bargaining rela
tionships,5 and other units of analysis. 6 But to our knowledge no research
er has ever used the state as the unit of analysis, partly because bargaining
relationships are not ordinarily based on state-level units. For purposes
of analyzing the effects of transfer policies, however, the state is an
appropriate unit of analysis. This is because transfer policies affecting
strikers (with the exception of food stamps) vary across states but not
within states. If transfer policies affect strike behavior, then that should
be revealed through differences in strike behavior across states. In
discussing the specification of our model, we consider the problem of
reconciling the inconsistency between the level of the problem we wanted
to address and the level at which previous theory and research on strikes
exists.
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Models of Strike Activity
Distinct analytical models of industrial conflict have been developed
from two perspectives. The dominant school of thought originates in eco
nomic models and their explanations of strikes. The alternative perspec
tive, while acknowledging the importance of economic factors, concen
trates on the influence of political, social, and organizational conditions.
Hicks introduced the earliest economic model in his discussion of wage
determination.7 In this model employers choose between granting higher
wages or accepting the costs of a strike, and workers choose between
continuing a strike or taking lower wages. He argues that rational ac
tors can always avoid a strike if each actor knows the tradeoffs for each
side. Knowing the tradeoffs allows the actors to reach a settlement, the
cost of which each side prefers to the cost of a strike. Strikes, accord
ing to Hicks, occur only when one actor has imperfect information about
the other side's preferences or when the union wishes to maintain the
credibility of its strike threat. In the latter case, Hicks acknowledges
that the union may wish to keep its "weapon" from getting "rusty."
Under this scenario, most strikes are accidental, based on ignorance,
and might be viewed as mistakes. The implication is that environmen
tal conditions should not affect strike activity except to the extent that
they block the free flow of information.
Mauro begins with Hicks's formulation in his analysis of strikes and
imperfect information. 8 He argues that misinformation producing strikes
may arise from the use by each side of different variables to assess its
own position. The source of misinformation is the assumption by one
party that its opponent actually uses the same variables it does. Examining
strike frequency only, he finds that a strike at the expiration of the
previous contract decreases the probability of a current strike, as do
recent increases in productivity and high unemployment rates. He con
cludes that strikes are a means of transmitting information that corrects
the parties' misperceptions about one another. His data also suggest
that relative wage changes have a more important influence on strike
frequency than do absolute wage levels. Work in this tradition by Singh
et al. 9 and Gartner10 examines the predictors of real wages in an at
tempt to explain the concession and strike costs that face unions and
management.
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Although the Mauro analysis moves research in Hicks' tradition toward
a recognition of the role of environmental forces on strike decisions,
such research still gives little emphasis to their systematic nature. Yet
empirical evidence consistently demonstrates that the assumption that
there is no systematic environmental effect is incorrect.
A second class of economic models is based on the assumption that
bargaining involves three parties, rather than two. Ashenfelter and
Johnson changed the direction of much succeeding strike research by
developing a model based on certain assumptions about "union
politics." 11 In this model, Ashenfelter and Johnson assume that union
leaders and rank-and-file members have different interests and goals.
Union leaders want to stay in office, while the rank and file want highwage settlements. Union leaders and company representatives have
perfect information about the market and the firm's financial condition,
but the rank and file do not. Rank-and-file myopia often causes them
to have unrealistic expectations about wage settlements, given market
and firm conditions. Strikes occur because union leaders stay in office
by managing the level of expectations of their members. When union
members raise the level of their wage demands, leaders permit strikes
to take place to lower their members' expectations. Thus, it is argued,
a growing economy, inflation, low unemployment, high profits, and
other economic factors should increase strikes because worker wage
expectations are raised.
Research based in the Ashenfelter-Johnson tradition is plentiful. Both
Flaherty 12 and Kaufman13 support the general findings of the model,
but suggest that it applies to strikes over contract renegotiation and not
over intracontractual disputes. They find that changes in the consumer
price index are associated with increased strike frequency while real
wage changes are associated with lower frequencies. However, another
longitudinal study, which also takes a cross-national perspective, finds
that, over time periods similar to those examined by Flaherty and Kauf
man, the negative coefficients for unemployment and wage changes are
only stable in the U.S. 14 Another qualification is offered by Moore and
Pearce, who find that wage and cost expectations are most likely to
influence strikes only during periods of rapid inflation. 15 Researchers
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in this tradition often examine profit rates as an indicator of worker
expectations. Results have been inconsistent, with the weight of evidence
suggesting that firm or industry profit rates have no effect on strike
activity. 16 Firm inventories have also failed to show significant rela
tionships with strikes in these studies. 17
The recent work that uses the Ashenfelter-Johnson frame of reference
is ordinarily done at the economic-system and interindustry level. Un
fortunately, such levels of analysis restrict the range of variables available
to test the theory, and movement to a more appropriate unit of analysis,
such as firms or bargaining units, always suggests the importance of
other variables that change the analysis considerably. The theories
developed both by Hicks and by Ashenfelter and Johnson were originally
presented at the level of the bargaining relationship, but they have always
been tested at a substantially more abstract level. A further problem
is that the Ashenfelter-Johnson model places the entire blame for strikes
on workers or more precisely on union leaders who manipulate worker
expectations. Aside from the problem of ignoring the role of manage
ment in instigating strikes, the model assumes that union leaders have
control over their members and can actually manipulate their expecta
tions very well.
Yet a third class of models is based on a bargaining-power theory
of strikes. Factors that give resources or opportunity to one side or the
other, it is maintained, alter the frequency, size (number of participants),
and duration of strikes. Such models have tried to integrate the economic,
sociological, and organizational analysis of strikes. Empirical research
in this tradition spans the range of units of analysis from the
economy wide 18 to interindustry level. 19
Power models also use economic variables in predicting strike ac
tivity. For example, bargaining-power theory suggests that unemploy
ment rates should affect strikes. Low unemployment gives an advan
tage to workers because a tight labor market limits the ability of
employers to easily replace them and increases the availability of alter
native job income; high unemployment gives advantage to management
by making the replacement of strikers relatively easy. These models,
however, also give prominence to noneconomic factors, particularly
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the size and strength of the unionized sector in an industry. Also, at
tention is given to the legal structure, which affects the strength of par
ties in collective bargaining relationships.
Much of the work on strikes by Kaufman is exemplary. 20 Kaufman
tries to show that in some periods, particularly 1945-77, economic ex
planations of strike activity are sufficient because of the enormous stabili
ty of the U.S. economy and of the institutional framework of collective
bargaining. In earlier periods, when union organization and the legal
structure of bargaining were less settled, political and organizational
elements were more influential. A number of researchers would inter
pret such results as reflecting the joint determination of both strikes
and the strength of unions as a function of similar economic conditions
in the post-World War H period. 21 Before World War H, the effect of
union density and union size on strikes seems to have been more im
portant than the influence of economic factors. This issue is particular
ly important in designing research on strikes because underspecified
models have often led to conflicting interpretations of the importance
of the degree of unionization. 22
When the bargaining-power model is applied at the firm or industry
level, the predominance of organizational and bargaining relationship
factors over purely economic explanations of strikes emerges. Edwards,
for example, emphasizes the importance of plant size and union densi
ty in explaining strike activity;23 Leigh adds workers' risk preference
as a factor predicting strikes; 24 Siebert et al., add the size of union fund
balances. 25
The bargaining-power approach to strike analysis has its basis in what
is currently referred to as the "resource mobilization theory of collec
tive behavior. " 26 Whether labor unions are social-movement organiza
tions or institutionalized parts of the economic system does not matter,
according to this theory. The critical factor in explaining the power of
labor and management is the ability of each to mobilize people, money,
political power, sentiment, and other resources in its behalf. Strikes
and management countermovements against strikes require organiza
tion and resources. An elaboration of this perspective leads to models
that include elements of the legal structure presumed to affect bargain
ing and strikes, firm characteristics that affect the ability of each side
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to mobilize participants, i.e., ease of communication and coordination,
characteristics of the labor force that inhibit or enhance the chances
that someone will join in opposition to or support of a strike, and en
vironmental forces. 27 Less developed forms of this type of analysis ap
pear in early works on strikes such as the classic argument by Kerr
and Siegel that isolated living arrangements and physically demanding
work combine to make some industries strike prone. Under such con
ditions, workers develop common lifestyles and close communication
with one another. Close living arrangements and difficult work are
capable of increasing the salience of an issue and allowing workers to
more easily coordinate their activities against an employer. 28 These fac
tors increase the union's mobilization potential. Though the analysis
of mobilization on the employer side has been absent from research
using the resource perspective, Griffith et al., have demonstrated the
importance of employer resistance to labor militancy. 29
Modified Model
Some economists and collective bargaining researchers have proposed
a number of modifications of the economic and bargaining-power
models. Of particular concern in these modifications is the inability of
previous theory to specify the manner in which each side estimates the
other's intentions or chooses its own criteria for strike decisions. One
such variation is termed a joint-choice model and posits that strike ac
tivity is a function of the joint (union and management) cost of strikes
relative to other mechanisms for reaching a settlement. 30 The most
elaborated version of this perspective was developed by Reder and
Neumann. 31
Reder and Neumann argue that bargainers usually become involved
in continuing relationships. When continuing relationships are establish
ed, the frequency and duration of strikes is a decreasing function of
the combined (union plus management) cost of strikes. They propose
that as combined strike costs rise, bargainers develop protocols that make
reaching an agreement easier. Protocols specify the procedures for
negotiations, what topics will be covered, how to know when a settle
ment is reached, what tactics are expected, and how each side will behave
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in the face of given variable states and constraints. Protocols are "the
rules or conventions governing the procedure for negotiating collectivebargaining agreements." 32
A protocol might specify that in a particular bargaining relationship
each side will submit a written proposal to the other before face-toface negotiations begin, or that meetings will always be held away from
the work location. More important, however, are portions of protocols
that govern the actual basis of settling wage and benefit differences.
For example, the parties might develop the practice of "imitating'' the
settlement of another firm in the industry—pattern bargaining. It is well
known that the wage pattern established by the United Auto Workers
and the major automobile producers is closely followed by the UAW
and employers in other UAW jurisdictions (such as auto supplies,
aerospace, and agricultural implements). Acceptance of the auto pat
tern in these other industries serves as a protocol that facilitates set
tlements. Similarly, many municipal fire departments and firelighter
unions abide by the protocol that their salary settlements should exact
ly equal the salary settlements reached by the municipalities and their
police unions. The "wage parity" protocol clearly makes it easier for
cities to reach agreement with then* firefighters, although the agreements
may be quite costly.
Reder and Neumann argue that such protocols will cover as many
contingencies as are effective in making settlement costs lower than they
would be given a strike. However, exceptional circumstances will arise
that are not covered by the protocol and will increase conflict. They
suggest that such a circumstance might be one in which product price
is falling at the same tune that living costs rise.
Bargainers are thought to choose among alternative protocols, with
each protocol associated with a different expected cost of strike activi
ty. The objective of the parties is to minimize the expected costs of
negotiating contracts. The costs consist of two parts. One part is the
actual cost of strikes, and the other is the cost of making more and more
elaborate specification of negotiating procedures. That is, protocols may
reduce the probability of strikes but there is a cost attached to specify
ing the protocol. The more contingencies and procedures that are figured
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into the protocol, the more costly is its specification. "In selecting a
protocol, bargainers balance the cost reduction from reduced strike ac
tivity against the increased cost of specifying a more detailed pro
tocol. . . .""
Bargainers who face higher costs per strike will then "choose more
comprehensive protocols that are associated with a smaller expected
quantity of strike activity, and larger costs of protocol specification than
those pairs which are faced with lower unit costs of strike activity." 34
Thus, factors that increase the combined cost of striking should lead
to more elaborate procedural protocols and a reduction in strike activi
ty. Likewise, factors in the bargaining environment that reduce the com
bined cost will lead to increases in strike activity. In the Reder-Neumann
model, neither side is necessarily responsible for strike activity. Allowing
both sides to determine the decision to strike or avoid a strike, we sub
mit, provides a more realistic model for estimating the effects of fac
tors such as the payment of unemployment insurance to strikers on strike
activity.
There is an interesting connection between the ideas of Reder and
Neumann and the work of Ronald Coase. Coase argued that even in
the absence of well-defined property rights, voluntary bargaining can
lead to efficient outcomes. 35 He illustrated his analysis with a discus
sion of a problem confronting two neighbors: a rancher and a farmer.
On occasion, the rancher's cattle stray onto the farmer's property and
destroy some of his crops. According to Coase, even if property rights
are ill-defined (i.e., even if it is not clear who is liable), the two can
reach an efficient solution through voluntary bargaining. For example,
if the straying cattle cost the farmer $25 in lost crops, and if it costs
either the rancher or the farmer $20 to build a fence, then it would be
efficient to spend the $20.
Coase argued that voluntary bargaining will tend to yield this effi
cient outcome irrespective of how the parties share the costs. If the
rancher is liable for the lost crops then he will build a $20.00 fence
to avoid $25.00 in damages. If the rancher is not liable, then the farmer
will build the fence. If the cost of lost crops is shared, then the two
parties will bargain their way to building a fence. Thus, according to
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Coase the two parties reach an efficient outcome—building a fenceirrespective of how the costs are shared. Moreover, one might expect
that the greater the cost of crop damage, the more resources will be
devoted to building fences.
It is but a small leap from the Coase Theorem to the ideas of Reder
and Neumann. Much like straying cattle, strikes use up resources. Pro
tocols can reduce the frequency and duration of strikes, but, like building
fences, protocols are costly to implement. The Coase Theorem would
suggest that irrespective of the division of strike and protocol costs be
tween union and management, the parties will arrive at an efficient level
of protocols and strikes. Moreover, the more costly the damage of the
strike to the two parties combined, the more resources will be devoted
to establishing protocols that prevent or attenuate strikes. 36
Interpreting Transfer Payment Effects on Strikes
The ideas of Reder and Neumann are particularly attractive from our
perspective. Not only does their theory encompass both parties in the
bargaining relationship, it also yields interesting hypotheses on the link
between transfer payments and strike behavior. We hesitate to embrace
their theory with too much fervor; it has many worthy competitors and
it is largely untested. We use it here, not because we think it is the domi
nant theory, but, rather, because it yields intellectually interesting
hypotheses that are helpful in organizing our analysis.
Transfer payments such as unemployment insurance, food stamps,
or AFDC can alter the combined (employer/employee) costs of strikes.
These payments can obviously reduce the cost of strikes to strikers.
If there is not an offsetting effect on employer costs, then they unam
biguously reduce the combined cost of strikes. By the logic of Reder
and Neumann, that implies increased strike activity. If, however, the
transfer payments are wholly financed out of taxes on the struck
employer, then they will not alter the combined costs of strikes. In this
case, although transfer payments reduce the cost of strikes to strikers,
they increase the cost of strikes to the employer by an equal amount.
Since the combined cost of strikes is not altered, by the logic of Reder
and Neumann, strike activity remains unchanged.
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Once again, note the links to the Coase Theorem. In Cease's exam
ple the fence was built irrespective of whether the farmer or the ran
cher bore the cost of the crop damage. "The rule of liability does not
affect efficiency." 37 In the present case, a rule of law that requires
employers to finance strike benefits for their employees (e.g., through
the unemployment insurance payroll tax) should similarly not affect ef
ficiency; it should not affect the amount of resources devoted to
establishing protocols that prevent or attenuate strikes. The probability
of a strike occurring, however, increases to the extent that the cost of
the strike benefits are not borne by the parties themselves—that is, to,
the extent that the grant of benefits represents a pure subsidy to the parties
provided by the government.
The key to understanding the effect of transfer payments on strike
behavior then lies in understanding how the transfers are financed.
Welfare benefits are financed out of general revenues. A struck employer
does not have to bear the cost of welfare benefits received by the strikers.
In this case, the ideas of Reder and Neumann lead to an unambiguous
conclusion: when welfare benefits are paid to strikers, strike activity
(both frequency and duration) should increase. Unemployment insurance
benefits pose a different problem in that they are financed out of taxes
on employers. Employers pay "experience rated" taxes; when a worker
receives $1.00 in unemployment insurance benefits, the employer is
supposed to pay $1.00 in taxes. Yet experience rating is not perfect.
In all states there are firms that pay taxes that are not commensurate
with benefits received by their workers. Moreover, it was once the case
that unemployment insurance benefits were not subject to the federal
income tax. Such "tax preferences" are a form of subsidy to the recip
ient from the rest of society. Although experience rating usually in
sures that the struck employer will bear some of the cost of unemploy
ment insurance benefits to strikers, imperfect experience rating and tax
preferences insure that the employer will generally not pay the full cost.
Under these conditions Reder and Neumann's model implies that when
unemployment insurance benefits are paid to strikers, strike activity will
increase.
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State unemployment insurance law is directly interpretable in these
terms. Our discussion in chapters 2 and 3 makes it clear that a majority
of states permit strikers to collect unemployment insurance during a
strike if their employer continues to operate. These states, termed "workstoppage" states, are identified in table 5.1, and changes in such pro
visions during the period covered by this study are shown in table 5.2.
The tables show that 34 states had this provision in 1961 and that 6
states dropped the provision during the next 13 years. New Jersey drop
ped, then reinstated the provision during this time. Let us consider the
effect of this provision on strike activity.
Table 5.1
Existence of Work-Stoppage and Innocent Bystander Provisions
of State Unemployment Insurance Laws Regarding Strikers, 1961
Yes

No

Workstoppage
provision

AK, CO, DE, GA, HA, ID,
IL, IN, IW, KN, ME, MD,
MA, MI, MS, MO, MT, NE,
NH, NJ, NM, NC, ND, OH,
OK, PA, SD, TX, UT, VT,
VA, WA, WV, WY

AL,
DC,
NV,
TN,

Innocent
bystander
provision

AK, AZ, AR, CO, CT, DC,
FL, GA, HA, ID, IL, IN,
IA, KN, LA, ME, MD, MA,
MI, MS, MO, MT, NE, NV,
NH, NJ, NM, NC, ND, OH,
OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, SD,
TN, TX, VT, VA, WA, WV,
WY

AL, CA, DE, KT, MN,
NY, UT, WI

AZ, AR, CA, CT,
FL, KT, LA, MN,
NY, OR, RI, SC,
WI

If payments to strikers under this provision are not fully financed out
of taxes on the struck employer, then the provision reduces the expected
total cost of strike activity. As such, the model would predict less com
prehensive protocols and more strike activity. We hypothesize then that
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states with a work-stoppage provision should have higher rates ofstrike
activity than states without such a provision. Such increases should oc
cur for strike frequency and duration, but not for strike size (number
of workers involved). Unemployment insurance provisions should not
affect the size of units on strike, but will permit strikers to maintain
a strike over a longer period. This effect should be ever greater as
unemployment benefits increase because the cost of striking, given im
perfect experience rating, is further reduced. Thus, we hypothesize that
in states with a work-stoppage provision, strike frequency and dura
tion will increase as the level of unemployment benefits increase, ceteris
paribus. The importance of such increases lies in their interaction with
the work-stoppage provision.
Table 5.2
Changes in Unemployment Disqualification of Strikers, 1961-1974

Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

Start
workstoppage

Stop
workstoppage

Start
innocent
bystanders

NC
OH

NC
MI, OH
CO
ID
NJ
NJ

Stop
innocent
bystanders

NJ
NJ

VA
MN

Similar logic applies to other unemployment insurance rules that allow
strikers to collect benefits. Thus, we hypothesize that a lockout rule,
an interim employment rule, or a rule whereby strikers receive benefits
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after a period of disqualification (as in New York or Rhode Island) will
increase the frequency and duration of strikes. Once again, there should
be an interaction with benefit levels.
The "innocent bystander" provision raises a more complex problem.
As discussed in chapter 3, the innocent bystander provision permits
workers who are not strikers but who are out of work because of a strike
to collect unemployment benefits. The effects of such a provision on
the total cost of strikes is difficult to predict. On the one hand, it could
be argued that strikers get nothing from this provision and the firm pays
for it through higher experience rated taxes. The result would be an
increase in the total cost of strikes and a reduction in strike activity.
On the other hand, one could argue that firms benefit from this provi
sion because even in its absence firms would have to compensate inno
cent bystanders.
To elaborate the last point, note that in the absence of the innocent
bystander provision, individuals may hesitate to accept jobs in a strikeprone firm. Given a choice between two jobs at the same wage, one
with a strike-prone firm and the other not, a rational individual would
presumably prefer to avoid the strike-prone firm. In consequence to
draw a workforce a strike-prone firm would have to compensate potential
"innocent bystanders" through compensating wage differentials. (The
situation is the same as that which produces such differentials for in
dividuals in layoff-prone firms.)38 Alternatively, innocent bystanders
may be compensated through prestrike inventory buildup or poststrike
catch-up. In either case, the innocent bystander provision could lead
to lower employer cost resulting from a strike. Without the provision,
employers bear the full cost of compensating innocent bystanders. With
the provision, employers bear only part of this cost. The remainder is
financed by the rest of society through imperfect experience rating and
less-than-comprehensive taxation. The logic leads to the hypothesis that
states that have an innocent bystander provision will haved higher strike
frequencies and strikes of longer duration, ceteris paribus. As before,
there should be an interaction with benefit levels.
Welfare benefits in the form of food stamps, general assistance, or
AFDC-U (Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed
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Parent) are similarly interpretable in terms of the Reder-Neumann model.
Both of these programs reduce the cost of striking for those strikers
who are sufficiently poor to be eligible. Since they are not financed
out of taxes on a struck employer, they should decrease the total cost
of strikes. Our last hypothesis, therefore, states that an increase in the
amount of welfare benefits available to strikers in a given state will lead
to increased strike frequency and duration, ceteris paribus. Note,
however, a key caveat to this hypothesis: welfare will only have this
effect if strikers are sufficiently poor to be eligible for the benefits. One
would be surprised, for example, if strikes by skilled craftsmen, e.g.,
printers, were affected by welfare programs. Since organized workers
are usually skilled workers, organized workers are often not sufficiently
poor to be eligible for welfare payments.
It is important to note that our hypotheses focus on the probability
of reaching agreements, and not on the terms of the agreements. For
example, the prospective grant of unemployment benefits to employees,
which are entirely financed by the parties themselves, may not affect
the probability of a strike occurring, but may affect the parties' wage
agreement. Wage agreements may be higher, lower, or unchanged com
pared to what they would have been in the absence of strike benefits.
Once again, note the link to the Coase Theorem. The Coase Theorem
deals only with the efficiency of agreements, and not with the distribu
tion of rewards available to the parties through bargaining. Similarly,
our hypotheses deal only with the level of strike activity, and not with
the rewards that arise out of bargaining.
Empirical Implementation
Our approach to testing these hypotheses is a standard one. We specify
a model of the form:
n
m
(1) y = ao + E bj X, + £ Cj Tj + u
i=l
J=1 J
We estimate the effect of transfer policies on strike activity by using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, supplementing traditional
models of strike activity with measures of transfer program
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characteristics. In this model y represents a measure of strike activity,
the Xj's are a set of n control variables, the Tj's are a set of m transfer
policy variables, and u is the error term; also a$ is the constant term,
the bj's are the coefficients of the control variables, and the Cj's, of
course, provide an estimate of the effect of the transfer policies on strike
activity.
As noted above, we used the state as the unit of analysis. In particular,
we obtained data on the y, X , and T variables for 50 states and the
District of Columbia over the period 1960-1974. We restrict our analysis
to this period for several reasons. First, prior to 1960 (and the 1960
census), it is difficult to obtain measures of some of our control variables.
Second, the government stopped collecting comprehensive strike data
in 1981, making it impossible to extend our analysis to the present. Third,
during the period 1960-1974 one observes across-state variation in all
of the programs we analyze. In particular, prior to 1974 there was
substantial interstate variation in the food stamp program, and after
wards the program was the same in all states.
It is eminently reasonable to use state-level data for purposes of ex
amining links between transfer policy and strike activity. This is because
unemployment insurance and AFDC policies vary across but not within
states. If transfer policies affect strike activity, then, holding other fac
tors constant, one should observe predictable patterns of strike activity
across states and over time. Yet, while it makes sense to use state-level
data, as discussed below, these data are not without complications.

Dependent Variables
Comprehensive time series data on work stoppages are available in
the Work Stoppage Historical File, which we obtained from the U.S.
Department of Labor. This data base provides information on all work
stoppages in the U.S., between 1953 and 1974, involving six workers
or more for one day or more. Table 5.3 lists the variables available
for each strike observation.
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Table 5.3
Work-Stoppage Historical Files, 1953-1974
Variables Available for Each Strike Observation
Duration of strike
Workers involved
State
SIC code
Total work days lost

Contract status
Beginning date
Ending date
Major issue

A variety of measures of three basic dimensions of strike activity—
frequency (number of work stoppages), size (number of workers in
volved), and duration (average length of strikes)—were derived for each
state from the basic data. For example, with these data we were able
to compute the measures of strike frequency in table 5.4 for each state
and year.
Table 5.4
Measures of Strike Frequency
No. of strikes over the negotiation of new contracts
No. of strikes during negotiation of a new contract over economic issues
No. of strikes during negotiations that are single state-single industry strikes
No. of strikes over the negotiation of economic issues
No. of strikes in manufacturing
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

of strikes
of strikes
of strikes
of strikes
of strikes
of strikes

in nonmanufacturing
in construction
which are single state-single issue strikes
with duration under 30 days
with duration over 30 days
with duration under 56 days

No. of strikes with duration over 56 days
No. of strikes with duration over 80 days
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In using states as the unit of analysis, it is necessary to standardize
for population size. One would, for example, expect to observe a greater
number of strikes in New York than in Nevada simply because of popula
tion differences. Even if other determinants of strike activity were the
same in the two states, New York would have the greater number of
strikes. Ideally, the table 5.4 frequency measures would be standardiz
ed for the number of bargaining units with the given characteristic. For
example, an ideal dependent variable would be the number of strikes
over the negotiation of new contracts divided by the number of bargaining
units that were negotiating new contracts. Unfortunately, there do not
exist state-level data on numbers of bargaining units. As such, we had
to develop alternative ways to standardize measures of strike frequen
cy. In particular, we used number of labor force participants, number
of union members, and number of establishments in the state.
The result is a plethora of measures of the dependent variable. Table
5.4 contains 13 measures of strike frequency, and each measure can
be standardized with three variables: labor force participants, union
members, and establishments. That means 39 measures of strike fre
quency! And which of these is the "correct" measure for our purposes?
Our theory does not really speak to that issue.
In order to deal with the plethora of measures, we used 1970 data
as a laboratory. We regressed different measures of the dependent
variable on the same vectors of X and T variables. We did this to assess
whether results were sensitive to choice of dependent variable. As detail
ed in chapter 6, in general the results were not sensitive to this change
in specification. This is because the different measures of the depen
dent variable are highly correlated. Of course, that simplifies the analysis;
in that case the analysis can simply focus on a small subset of the many
measures.
Our approach to measuring the average duration and average size
of strikes was similar to our treatment of strike frequency. The average
duration of strikes within a state in a given year is computed by adding
up the duration of strikes for the state and year and dividing by the cor
responding number of strikes. The average size of strikes is similarly
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computed by adding up the number of workers involved in strikes for
the state and year and dividing by the corresponding number of strikes.
Once again the Work Stoppage Historical File yields a long list of
possible measures. The average duration and average size of strikes
can be computed for all strikes, for strikes concerned with the negotia
tion of new contracts, for strikes concerned with economic issues, and
so forth. Indeed, one could construct tables for duration and size that
are every bit as lengthy as table 5.4. 39 Once again, to deal with this
plethora of measures, we used 1970 data as a laboratory for assessing
whether results are sensitive to choice of dependent variable. As discuss
ed in chapter 6, in general results were not sensitive to this change in
specification.
Several alternative measures were created using combinations of the
frequency, breadth and duration measures because combined measures
such as "work days idle" appear in the literature. However, these com
posite measures were dropped from the analysis because they are prod
ucts of other dependent variables, and because our theoretical framework
yields no direct predictions on how transfer programs will affect such
variables. The fundamental variables have straight forward
interpretations.
Table 5.5 presents descriptive data on a subset of our dependent
variables. The data include state-level observations across all years from
1960 through 1974. (Since there are 51 jurisdictions and 15 years in
our data base, the sample size is 765.) The data in table 5.5, therefore,
provide a profile of the nature of strike activity in the United States
during the period 1960-74.
A few aspects of this profile are worth noting. For example, about
51 percent of all strikes were strikes over economic issues. (This pro
portion can be derived by dividing FREQLAB2 by FREQLAF.) FREQUM implies that there was one strike for every 3,000 union members
during this period. FREQEST shows that there was only one strike for
every 1000 establishments. This number would be substantially higher,
of course, if we had data on the number of unionized establishments.
The average duration (AVDUR) of all strikes during this period was
26 days. Strikes over economic issues were slightly longer
(AVDUR2=30 days). The 30-day cutoff is significant because needy
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strikers in two-parent families only became eligible for AFDC-U benefits
after a 30-day waiting period. Only about one-quarter of all strikes that
occurred during the 1960-74 period exceeded the 30 day limit. Of course,
we know from other evidence that only a small proportion of the workers
involved in such strikes would have qualified for benefits.
About 14 percent of all strikes lasted longer than 56 days. The 56-day
cutoff is significant because of the New York law, which qualifies strikers
to collect benefits after eight weeks. As we noted in chapter 3, the New
York State Department of Labor estimated that about 13 percent of all
strikers in the state were involved in strikes lasting longer than eight
weeks during the period 1947-78.
The average strike during the 1960-74 period involved 356 workers
(WORKSTRK). This statistic reflects the fact that unions are concen
trated in larger plants and establishments. WORKLAB implies that there
was a little more than a 2 percent probability that a member of the labor
force would be involved in a strike in a given year. But WORKUM
suggests the probability that a union member would go on strike in any
given year in this period was close to 12 percent.
The standard deviations listed in table 5.5 show that there was con
siderable variation in these strike measures across years and across states.
It is, of course, this variation that we seek to analyze in our regression
analysis.
Measures of Transfer Program Characteristics
The initial problem of data collection was the identification of the
important dimensions of the three public policy areas. Food stamps,
AFDC-U, general assistance, and unemployment compensation are com
plex programs that use multiple criteria for eligibility and have a varie
ty of benefit levels. Translating complex programs into variables suitable
for testing was no easy task.
For the unemployment insurance program, our initial approach was
to use a series of dummy variables to indicate whether a state allowed
workers involved in a labor dispute to collect unemployment benefits
under one of the several provisions previously discussed. For exam
ple, the unique approach taken by New York and Rhode Island made it
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Table 5.5
Means and Standard Deviations of Strike Measures
Over All States and All Years, 1960-74
(n=765)
Strike measure

Symbol

Mean

Standard
deviation

Number of strikes/labor force
(X1000)

FREQLAF

.068

.074

Number of strikes over
economic issues/labor force
(X1000)

FREQLAB2

.035

.022

Number of strikes/union
members (X1000)

FREQUM

.337

.221

Number of strikes over
economic issues/union
members (X1000)

FREQUM2

.175

.088

Number of strikes/
establishments

FREQEST

.001

.002

Average duration in days

AVDUR

26.235

9.676

Average duration of
strikes over economic
issues in days

AVDUR2

30.401

12.616

Number of workers
involved in strikes/strikes

WORKSTRK

355.866

204.399

Number of workers
involved in strikes over
economic issues/strikes

WORKSTRK2

221.056

171.597

Number of workers
involved in strikes/
labor force (X1000)

WORKLAB

24.444

29.121

Number of workers
involved in strikes over
economic issues/labor force
(X1000)

WORKLAB2

14.277

14.645
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Table 5.5 (continued)
Strike measure

Symbol

Mean

Standard
deviation

Number of workers
involved in strikes/union
members (X1000)

WORKUM

115.863

95.466

Number of workers
involved in strikes over
economic issues/union
members (X1000)

WORKUM2

68.624

59.059

Percentage of strikes
lasting longer than 30 days

FDUR30

.249

.010

Percentage of strikes
lasting longer than 56 days

FDUR56

.136

.078

Percentage of strikes
lasting longer than 84 days

FDUR84

.079

.060

obvious that a dummy variable representing those two states should be
included in the analysis. Our legal and institutional research on the opera
tion of the unemployment insurance system made it apparent that we
also needed to specify variables for four other "UI Rules:" stoppageof-work, innocent bystander, interim employment, and lockout. We
therefore constructed dummy variables for each of these rules; in each
case, the dummy variable indicates whether the state used the rule in
a particular year.
Our theory and hypotheses suggested that the effect of these rules
on strike activity would depend on (1) the "generosity" of the state's
unemployment insurance system, and (2) the tax and experience rating
practices used by a state to finance benefits. We measured the generosity
of the state's system by using various measures of a state's benefit levels
(e.g., the maximum benefit in the state, benefits as a percentage of week
ly covered earnings, the average weekly benefit in the state), and also
by the maximum weeks of benefit eligibility for claimants in a state.
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The exceptional complexity of state practices regarding the financ
ing of unemployment benefits made it particularly difficult to capture
this dimension of the unemployment insurance system in a parsimonious
manner. We included five variables in our data base that we hoped would
adequately describe a state's financing arrangements: the taxable wage
base for employers in the state, the minimum tax rate in the state, the
ratio of the taxable wage base to average yearly earnings in the state,
and an experience rating index for the state (developed in work by
Becker). 40 We also included a variable denoting the percent of workers
in a state covered by the state's unemployment insurance law. Table
5.6 lists the principal policy variables that we included in our analysis.
For welfare programs, we collected data, first, on whether a state
had the AFDC-U program in a particular year and, second, on whether
the state allowed strikers to collect AFDC-U benefits. These were coded
as dummy variables. We also collected data on the maximum weekly
benefit that a state paid to a family of four under its AFDC-U program,
and we interacted the maximum benefit with the AFDC-U dummies.
Specifying variables for the food stamp program presented another
set of difficulties. Since food stamps are provided under federal law,
program characteristics (eligibility, benefit levels, etc.) are uniform
across all states. Obviously, the invariance of these program
characteristics made it impossible to test the effect of food stamps on
strike activity in a given year. Prior to 1974 there was substantial varia
tion in the availability of food stamps within states. Some counties had
food stamp programs and some did not. Thus, we constructed a measure
of the percent of the poverty population in the state residing in counties
that operated a food stamp program, for each state and every year in
our data base. Although this variable is an imperfect proxy, it was the
only recourse open to us.
Finally, we constructed a dummy variable indicating whether strikers
were eligible for general assistance in a particular state in a given year.
Eligibility criteria and benefit levels under general assistance programs
vary greatly from state to state, and even from county to county within
a state, and comprehensive data on the characteristics of these programs
are not available. We were able to collect enough information on state
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practices to use the variable in our analysis, but we acknowledge that
the variable is subject to considerable measurement error.
Our interviews with individuals in the Unemployment Insurance Ser
vice and other agencies helped us to identify the precise policy variables
we needed to include in our analysis. Our surveys of state employment
security agencies also helped. In these surveys, for example, we were
alerted to the importance of the stoppage-of-work provision. We were
also told by several of these respondents that unemployment insurance
provisions that require payment of benefits to strikers when their
employer has violated either the collective bargaining agreement or one
of the labor laws were trivial and we should ignore them. Our reading
of the case law confirmed this belief, and we followed this advice.
There is an interesting statistical problem associated with these
variables. The specification in equation (1) implies that the vector of
policy variables (T) is exogenous to strike activity. That means that the
policies affect strike activity, but strike activity does not affect the ex
istence of the policies. Is this a defensible position? On the one hand,
it can be argued that the policies we are dealing with were put in place,
in the vast majority of states, in the 1930s and 1940s and were not chang
ed thereafter. It is unlikely that such longstanding policies are somehow
endogenous. On the other hand, table 5.2 shows that eight states changed
their policies regarding the work-stoppage and innocent bystander rules
during the 1961-74 period, and we have anecdotal evidence suggesting
that, in at least a few of these cases, the policies were changed because
of increased use by strikers. In that sense, the change in the policy was
a function of the state's (recent) strike activity. Moreover, there is no
question that Congress' decision to change the AFDC-U and food stamp
policies in 1981 was motivated, at least in part, by the perception that
the availability of these benefits had increased strike activity. Thus, endogeneity is conceivable.
Note, however, the form of that endogeneity. Increased strike ac
tivity is associated with a decreased propensity for states to provide
transfers to strikers. That is a negative relationship. Our principal
hypothesis concerns a positive relationship, i.e., increased government
transfers to strikers are associated with increased strike activity. That
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Table 5.6
Variables Measuring Characteristics of Transfer Programs
(Data Sources Appear in Appendix B)
Unemployment Insurance Program Variables:
UI RULE 1

=

1 if strikers receive benefits when employer continues
to operate; else = 0

UI RULE 2

=

1 if New York and Rhode Island; else = 0

UI RULE 3

=1 if "innocent by slanders" receive benefits; else = 0

UI RULE 4

=

UI RULE 5

=1 if workers receive benefits during a lockout; else = 0

UIMAX

=

UIMETH1

=

AVEBEN1

=

maximum weekly UI benefit in state
benefits as a percent of weekly covered earnings for
benefits below the maximum in state
UIMETH1 *AHEMAN (see table 5.7 for AHEMAN)

UITAX
TAXEMAN

=
=

taxable wage base for employers in state
UITAX / (AHEMAN * 2000)

UIMAXRAT

=

UIMINRAT

=

maximum UI tax rate in state
minimum UI tax rate in state

UIPIST
COVPC

=
=

DURAT

=

1 if strikers laid off from "interim employment" job
receive benefits; else = 0

Experience Rating Index from Becker (see footnote 41)
percent of workers in state covered by state UI laws
maximum number of weeks of benefits in state

Welfare Program Variables:
PCTPOOR
percent of state's poverty population residing in coun
ties that participate in food stamp program
AFDCAID
1 if state allows strikers to receive AFDC-U payments;
else = 0
1 if state has an AFDC-U program; else = 0
AFDCPROG
AFDCMAX

AFDC maximum weekly payment for a family of four
in state

ADCBEN

AFDCMAX * AFDCAID

GENAID

1 if state provides general assistance to strikers;
else = 0
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means that the form of endogeneity described above will impart a
negative bias to a coefficient on a transfer policy variable. Alternative
ly stated, if transfer policy exhibits this kind of endogeneity, then we
are less likely to find a positive relationship between transfer policy
and strike activity. We will return to this issue in chapter 6.
The Control Variables
Finally, to test our hypotheses we needed a vector of control variables,
X. All of our hypotheses posit a relationship between transfers and strikes
holding other factors constant. That raises the vexing problem of what
should be held constant. The standard social science approach to this
problem is to let the theory dictate the vector of control variables. Yet,
available theories of strike activity, including that of Reder and
Neumann, focus on the bargaining unit. For good reason, the present
work takes the state as the unit of analysis. Clearly, variables that are
appropriate controls for an analysis of bargaining unit strike activity
may not be appropriate (or, if appropriate, may not be available) for
an analysis of state-level strike activity.
As an illustration of this point, consider the empirical specification
employed by Reder and Neumann. 41 They argue that two key deter
minants of strike activity are the within-year coefficient of variation
of finished good inventories and the within-year coefficient of varia
tion of shipments. Other things equal, a larger coefficient of variation
of inventories reveals firms that can buffer output streams from shocks
to the flow of inputs, and ' 'the greater the extent to which a firm engages
in such buffering, the lower is the incremental cost of a unit of strike
activity."42 Thus a larger coefficient of variation of finished good in
ventories should be negatively associated with strike activity. A parallel
argument yields the prediction that a larger coefficient of variation in
shipments should be positively associated with strike activity. Since our
research assesses hypotheses linked to the Reder and Neumann theory,
one could argue that these coefficients of variation should be included
as control variables in our specification. But that does not make sense
when the state is the unit of observation. Even if data were available
on within-year variation in finished good inventories by state (and they
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are not), the variable would be of doubtful value. If a state has large
inventory variation, that does not necessarily imply that unionized firms
within the state have large inventory variation. And for purposes of
understanding strike activity, it is the unionized firms that are important.
Moreover, there is a philosophical problem here. As indicated above,
we do not view the Reder and Neumann theory as the dominant theory
of strike activity. We rely upon it because it yields intellectually in
teresting hypotheses that are helpful in organizing our analysis. Given
that, we hesitate to formulate a vector of control variables from their
theory alone. Previous research, which was motivated by other theories,
yields important insights into potential control variables.
Of course, previous research does not solve our problem. For exam
ple, previous research suggests that the unemployment rate influences
the propensity to strike. But is it true that state-level unemployment
rates influence state-level strike activity? When strike activity is ag
gregated to the state level, it encompasses many different types of
bargaining relationships. Some of them are plant-level relationships,
others are multiplant, multistate, industrywide, or national relationships.
Conceptually, one might expect the state unemployment rate to be the
relevant measure for some of the relationships, particularly those at the
plant or establishment level. But it is hardly likely that the state
unemployment rate is the relevant measure for industrywide or national
relationships. This illustrates our quandary: when the state is the unit
of analysis, it is difficult to formulate a vector of conceptually "cor
rect" control variables.
We resolved our quandary by collecting data on a long list of control
variables. Table 5.7 presents the list.
Previous strikes research had shown that these variables influence
strike activity. Since we did not have a clear basis for claiming that
one control variable was preferable to another, we sought to examine
whether results on the transfer policy variables (T) were robust to dif
ferent vectors of control variables. After all, our goal was to obtain
meaningful estimates of the influence of transfer policies on strikes—
we were not concerned about the robustness or reliability of the results
for the control variables. Thus, we constructed a series of tests in which

Government Transfer Programs 159

combinations of the table 5.7 variables were substituted for one another.
Robust findings occur when the relationships between transfer policy
measures and strike measures are maintained regardless of the control
variables employed. It should, perhaps, be noted that our approach is
not a new one. It is in part derived from the ideas of Learner. 43
Data were coded by a group of students who were trained and super
vised by the authors. We collected data for all states and the District
of Columbia for all dependent and policy variables from 1960 through
1974. We begin with 1960 because, with minor exceptions, our data
for these variables are complete. We end with 1974 because that is the
last year of the Work Stoppage Historical File. Data for our control
variables, however, are complete only for the two census years, 1960
and 1970. There are complete data for most of the other control variables
(including several of particular interest, such as the unemployment rate
in the state, the number of union members in the state, average hourly
earnings in the state for production workers, etc.), but there are miss
ing values for certain others (particularly those denoting the composi
tion of the labor force in the state). Where there were missing data for
certain key variables, we estimated the values by means of interpola
tion, using the closest years for which we did have data.

Conclusion
This chapter began with a discussion of models other researchers have
used to analyze strike activity. On the basis of this discussion, it is clear
that there is no general consensus in the literature on the "right*' theory
of strikes. Rather, there are competing, and often contradictory, theories.
Fortunately, we did not require a general theory of strike activity in
this study. What we required was a theory that would specifically link
transfer policies with strike activity. That theory was found in the work
of Reder and Neumann, who used a joint-cost model of strike activity.
The fundamental proposition in this theory is that strike activity is a
decreasing function of the combined (union plus management) cost of
strikes. As the potential cost of a strike increases, according to Reder
and Neumann, the parties have a greater incentive to develop protocols
that allow them to reach peaceful settlements. On the basis of the
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Table 5.7
Control Variables Employed in the Analysis
(Data Sources Appear in Appendix B)
UNMEMLAB
MINELAB
CONSTLAB
MANULAB
TRANLAB
TRADELAB
FINLAB
SERVLAB
PCTURB
PCTPHMALE
PCTFEM
AFLMEMLAB
PCTMIG

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

SOUTH
RTTOWORK
VALADPC

=
=
=

ESIZE100

=

ESIZE 20

=

AVESIZE
AHEMAN

=
=

WCH6970
WCH6870
MEDINC
POVRTY

=
=
=
=

URAT
INDUST
AFFLUENC

=
=
=

No. of union members / LFTOT3
No. of workers in mining / LFTOT
No. of workers in construction / LFTOT
No. of workers in manufacturing / LFTOT
No. of workers in transportation / LFTOT
No. of workers in trade / LFTOT
No. of workers in finance / LFTOT
No. of workers in services / LFTOT
LFTOT in urban areas / LFTOT
males between age 25 and 55 / LFTOT
No. females in labor force / LFTOT
No. AFL-CIO members / LFTOT
net civilian migration 1960-1970 / civilian resident
population 1970
1 if state is in South Census Division; else = 0
1 if state has right to work law; else = 0
value added by manufacturing / total no. of employees
in manufacturing
No. establishments with 100+ employees / no.
establishments
No. establishments with 20+ employees / no.
establishments
No. employees in state / no. establishments
average hourly earnings of production workers on
manufacturing payrolls in state
percent change in AHEMAN between 1969 and 1970
percent change in AHEMAN between 1968 and 1970
median income of families in state in 1969
percent of families with money income below poverty
line in state
unemployment rate in state
State Industrialization Index
Affluence Index

a. LFTOT = number of people in state's labor force.
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Reder-Neumann model, we argue that transfer payments will increase
strike activity only if they reduce the total cost of a strike to the parties.
Since the cost of transfer payments are not fully borne by the parties
to the dispute, we argue that transfer policies generally reduce the joint
cost of strikes to the parties and therefore increase strike activity. On
the basis of this premise, we then developed a set of specific hypotheses
linking transfer policies to strike activity.
The policy variables of principal interest in this study are well defin
ed for the unemployment insurance and AFDC-U programs. We
acknowledge, however, that the policy variables are less well-defined
for the food stamp and general assistance programs and may suffer from
measurement error. We therefore have more confidence in our results
for the two former programs than we do for the two latter programs.
The next chapter discusses the results of our econometric tests.
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6
An Empirical Analysis
of the
Effect of Government Transfer Programs
on Strike Activity
As detailed in the previous chapter, we approached the empirical work
with a small set of hypotheses linking government transfer programs
to strike behavior. Because the proper specification of a model estimated
with state-level data was in doubt, we used 1970 data as a "laboratory"
for developing a model. Thus, our strategy was first to estimate the
model with 1970 data and then to examine whether the 1970 results
were robust to alternative model specifications and alternative years of
data. We used 1970 for this purpose because the 1970 Census provides
a wealth of state-level data for control variables.
The organization of this chapter reflects that strategy. The chapter
begins with our findings on the relationship between unemployment in
surance and strike behavior. That work can be broken into three phases.
In the first we sought to test whether state labor dispute disqualifica
tion policies were related to strike behavior. The second phase examined
whether disqualification policies affected strike behavior through an in
teraction with other unemployment insurance program characteristics.
Finally, we sought to test whether the 1970 results could be replicated
in other years. Most of this chapter focuses on these three phases of
our unemployment insurance research. It ends with a brief discussion
of our findings on the effects of AFDC, food stamps, and general
assistance on strike activity.
Labor Dispute Disqualification Policies and Strike Behavior
As indicated previously, we had reason to expect several types of
state labor dispute disqualification policies to affect strike behavior. With
51 observations in 1970, we could not include all of the table 5.6 UI
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variables in one model. To resolve this, we focused on the three UI
rules that unemployment insurance administrators had viewed as poten
tially important. These were the "stoppage-of-work" rule (UI Rule 1),
the "New York-Rhode Island" rule (UI Rule 2), and the "innocent
bystander" rule (UI Rule 3). 1 We hypothesized that these rules would
tend to increase activity along several dimensions. As argued in chapter
5, such rules tend to decrease the total cost of strikes, thereby leading
to less comprehensive protocols and increased strike activity. The first
phase of the unemployment insurance research sought to test these
hypotheses with 1970 data. Although some of the regression coefficients
for these rules proved to be statistically significant, in general the data
did not support the hypotheses.
Table 1 illustrates the point. The dependent variables in the three
regressions are the natural logarithm of strike frequency (number of
strikes per labor force participant), average duration of strikes, and
average size of strikes (number of workers involved per strike). 2 One
can, of course, claim that these are imperfect measures of the theoretical
ly appropriate dependent variables (e.g., one can argue that the analysis
should focus only on strikes dealing with economic issues rather than
on all strikes). As indicated in chapter 5, to address this argument we
ran the same regressions for several alternative measures of strike fre
quency, duration, and size. In addition, we estimated the model for
specific industries, e.g., construction and manufacturing. Our results
were remarkably insensitive to redefinitions of the dependent variable.
The key results in table 6.1 concern UI Rules 1, 2, and 3. Our
hypotheses led us to expect statistically significant positive coefficients.
The results for strike frequency in the first column, for example, show
that UI Rules 1 and 2 have positive coefficients, but neither coefficient
is statistically different from zero at conventional significance levels.
The other two models are thoroughly inconsistent with our hypotheses.
To our surprise, for example, UI Rules 1 and 2 have significantly
negative effects on strike duration. That is, New York and Rhode Island
as well as states with the work-stoppage rule appear to have experienc
ed significantly shorter strikes than other states in 1970. Later we will
examine whether the negative effects of these rules on strike duration
are found in other years and when other specifications are tested.
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Table 6.1
Regressions on the Frequency, Duration, and Size of Strikes
(/-statistics in parentheses)

Independent variable
UI Rule 1 = 1
UI Rule 2 = 1
UI Rule 3 = 1
Unemployment Rate
% establishments with
1004- employees
% of labor force in unions
% females in labor force
% urban in labor force
% of population in poverty
Intercept
N
R Square
F

Frequency
.251
(1.8)
.454
(1.4)
.000
(0.0)
-.036
(.8)
17.729
(1.3)
4.052
(5.2)
-11.098
(3.1)
-.998
(1.8)
.001
(0.0)
.988
(0.8)
50
.559
5.638

Duration

Size

.230
(2-6)
-.066
(3-3)
.058
(.6)
.039
(1.3)
-4.171
(0.5)
-.400
(0.8)
4.760
(2.1)
-.730
(2.0)
-.007
(0-8)
2.154
(2.7)
50
.300
1.908

-.174
(1.4)

.031
(0.1)
-.080
(0.5)
-.067
(1.5)
20.724
(1.6)
.813
(1.1)
-9.563
(2.8)
1.112
(2.1)
1.014
(1.1)
8.525
(7.4)
50
.392
2.670

Definition of variables:
Frequency = In [# strikes in a state in 1970/labor force size in state in 1970]
Duration = In [average duration of strikes in the state in 1970]
Size = In [# workers involved in strikes in the state in 1970/# strikes in the state in 1970]
—UI Rule 1 = 1 if strikers collect benefits when employers continue to operate during the strike.
—UI Rule 2 — 1 in New York and Rhode Island, otherwise zero.
—UI Rule 3 = 1 if "innocent bystanders" are permitted to collect benefits.

Of course, such results in part depend upon the other independent
variables in the model. The table 6.1 models include six control variables.
They are intended as proxies for the complex web of social and economic
forces that shape strike activity within a geographic unit. As noted in
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chapter 5, a review of past theoretical and empirical work on strike
behavior yields a wealth of additional possible control variables. We
therefore estimated the table 6.1 models with several different com
binations of control variables; all of the control variables we tested are
listed in table 5.7. None of the alternative specifications yielded mean
ingful results for the various labor dispute disqualification policies.
It is tempting to seek "explanations" for the coefficients on the con
trol variables in table 6.1. Such temptation should, however, be resisted.
Consider, for example, the results on the variable, "Percent
Establishments with 100+ Employees." None of the table 6.1 coeffi
cients on this variable are statistically significant at conventional levels.
Does one then conclude that establishment size has little effect on strike
activity? Probably not. An assessment of the relationship between
establishment size and strike activity should ideally use plant or bargain
ing unit data. 3 State-level data are inappropriate for this purpose. The
state is, however, an appropriate unit of observation in an analysis of
the relationship between strike activity and the characteristics of state
unemployment insurance programs. Moreover, in such an analysis it
is appropriate to control for the complex web of forces outside the
unemployment insurance program that influence strike activity in a state.
The establishment size variable simply plays this role, as do the other
control variables in table 6.1.
In summary, the first phase of our research indicated no statistically
significant relationship between labor dispute qualification policies and
strike frequency and size; the results for strike duration were contrary
to our expectations. It appeared that either our hypotheses were incor
rect or that "noise" in the data made it impossible to discern the ef
fects of the disqualification policies. We could not, however, draw a
firm conclusion without examining whether the disqualification policies
interact with other program characteristics to influence strike behavior.
The second phase of the research focused on this interaction.
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The Interaction of Labor Dispute Disqualification Policies
and Program Generosity
As argued in chapter 5, the strike effects of UI Rules 1,2, and 3
may in part depend upon program generosity. Given imperfect ex
perience rating and the tax treatment of unemployment benefits, a more
generous program in states with these UI rules should lead to lower
total strike costs, less comprehensive protocols, and increased strike
activity. We therefore tested several models that interact measures of
program generosity with two of the disqualification rules, UI Rule 1
and UI Rule 3. (UI Rule 2 was not included in this work because only
two states—New York and Rhode Island used the rule, and the estimated
coefficient would in consequence be meaningless.)4 Here we found an
interesting relationship between strike frequency and interactions in
volving a state's maximum unemployment benefit. Table 6.2 presents
the evidence.
For purposes of comparison, the first regression in table 6.2 is the
strike frequency regression from table 6.1. The second regression in
dicates the effect of interacting the maximum unemployment benefit
with UI Rule 1. Since the coefficient on this interaction is positive and
statistically significant, the results indicate that a higher maximum benefit
in states with UI Rule 1 is associated with higher strike frequency.
Although similar results obtain when UI Rule 3 is interacted with the
maximum benefit, if both the UI Rule 1 interaction and UI Rule 3 in
teraction are included in the same regression, neither is statistically
significant. (See column 3.) Of course the reason for this is that the
two interaction terms are highly correlated. Accordingly, this evidence
indicates that either the UI Rule 1 interaction or the UI Rule 3 interac
tion is associated with higher strike frequencies. It provides, however,
no basis for claiming that one of the interactions is the principal source
of the association. Thus, we ran a fourth regression with an interaction
between the maximum UI benefit and a variable indicating states that
use either UI Rule 1 or UI Rule 3. The coefficient on this interaction
term was positive and statistically significant. We believe this is a plausi
ble result. It indicates that for states with UI Rule 1 or UI Rule 3, an
increase in program generosity, as proxied by the maximum benefit,
is associated with more strikes. 5
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Table 6.2
Strike Frequency Regressions That Include Interaction Variables
(/-statistics in parentheses)
Independent variable
UI Rule 1 = 1
UI Rule 2 = 1
UI Rule 3 = 1
[UI Rule 1] x max. UI benefit

1
.251
(1.8)
.454
(1.4)
.000
(0.0)

[UI Rule 3] x max. UI benefit
[Either UI Rule 1 = 1 or
UI Rule 3 = 1] x max. UI benefit
-.036
Unemployment rate
(-8)
17.729
% establishment with
(1.3)
100+ employees
% of labor force in unions
4.052
(5.2)
-11.098
% females in labor force
(3.1)
% urban in labor force
-.998
(1.8)
.001
% of population in poverty
(0.0)
.988
Intercept
(.8)
N
50
R Square
.559
5.638
F

2
-.651
(1.6)
.522
(1.7)
-.034
(.2)
.015
(2.3)

-.064
(1.4)
5.261
(.4)
4.363
(5.9)
-11.150
(3.3)
-1.240
(2.5)
.009
(.6)
1.453
(1.2)
51
.6161
6.420

3
-.190
(.4)
.494
(1.7)
-.668
(1.6)
.008
(1.0)
.010
(1.6)
-.079
(1.7)
2.488
(.2)
4.355
(6.0)
-11.589
(3.5)
-1.254
(2.5)
.017
(1.2)
1.655
(1.4)
51
.6411
6.332

4
.192
(1.5)
.508
(1.7)
-.470
(1.9)

.010
(2.4)
-.074
(1.6)
10.502
(.8)
4.349
(5.8)
-11.940
(3.5)
-1.287
(2.4)
.014
(1.0)
1.540
(1.3)
50
.6178
6.303

See bottom of table 6.1 for variable definitions.

This result led us to test models that included not only an interaction
with the maximum benefit but other interactions as well. For example,
we tested models with measures of unemployment insurance taxes
interacted with UI Rule 1 and UI Rule 3 (see table 5.6 for the full
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list). In general, either this type of interaction variable had no effect
on the regression or it was so highly correlated with the maximum benefit
interaction variable that both coefficients had low f-statistics. Evident
ly, 50 observations are insufficient to distinguish the effect of a state's
maximum benefit from other characteristics of the state program (e.g.,
the minimum tax rate, the maximum tax rate, maximum duration of
benefit receipt, coverage, etc.). Thus, we chose to represent program
generosity with a single proxy—the maximum benefit.
If one must choose a single proxy for unemployment insurance
generosity, the maximum benefit is an attractive choice. For purposes
of this work, a proxy for program generosity should reflect the workers'
and firms' perceptions of generosity at the time they decide to initiate
or continue a strike. Given their comparatively high earnings, union
members are likely to receive unemployment benefits that are at or near
the maximum. This is one reason why the maximum benefit is a better
proxy for program generosity than the average benefit. Moreover, a
good proxy for program generosity should not be affected by factors
that have nothing to do with legislative decisions regarding generosity.
A proxy like the average benefit level depends not only on state policy
but also on demographic factors (e.g., the average wage in the state
or the state's ratio of part-time to full-time workers), while the max
imum benefit is an instrument of and depends only on state policy. Thus,
for purposes of analyzing interactions between UI Rules 1 and 3 and
program generosity, we focused on their interaction with the maximum
benefit.
Our next step was to examine whether results on the interaction
variable were sensitive to the set of independent variables included in
the model. As in the first phase of the research, we tested a long list
of alternative independent variables (see table 5.7 for the list). The result
obtained on the interaction variable was remarkably insensitive to such
changes in specification. Table 6.3 illustrates this point. The first model
in table 6.3 includes measures of industry composition, and the second
includes two dummy variables standing for states with right-to-work
laws and southern states—variables that may reflect community attitudes
toward strikes. Although neither of these dummy variables has a
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significant effect on the dependent variable, the proportion of a state's
labor force employed in the construction industry is associated with a
significantly higher level of strike frequency. 6 Nevertheless, the inclu
sion or exclusion of such variables has little effect on the magnitude
or statistical significance of the interaction variable.
Table 6.3
Strike Frequency Regressions with Alternative Control Variables
(^-statistics in parentheses)
Independent variable
UI Rule 1 = 1
UI Rule 2 = 1
UI Rule 3 = 1
[Either UI Rule 1 = 1 or

UI Rule 3 = 1] x max. UI benefit
Unemployment rate
% establishment with 100+ employees
% of labor force in unions
% females in labor force
% urban in labor force
% population in poverty
South = 1

1
.2215
(1.6)
.6628
(2.1)
-.4941
(2.0)

2
.2045
(1.4)
.5869
(1.7)
-.4613
(1.8)

.0088
(2.1)
-.1310
(2.1)
-1.0784
(1.1)
5.0981
(4.4)
-11.1873
(2.4)
-.4457
(.6)
.0103
(.7)

.0101
(2.4)
-.0900
(1.5)
10.5060
(.6)
3.8847
(3.3)
-11.9525
(3.4)
-1.3087
(2.3)
.0150
(.6)
.0871
(.4)
-.0626
(.4)
.1292
(.4)

Right-to-work law = 1
Average hourly earnings
% of labor force in mining
% of labor force in construction
% of labor force in transportation

.1407
(.0)
16.2212
(2.0)
-1.4436
(.2)
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Table 6.3 (continued)
Independent variable
% of labor force in trade
% of labor force in finance
% of labor force in services
Intercept
N
R Square
F

1
-5.9277
(.9)
-11.4634
(1.1)
.8072
(.5)
1.9141
(1.0)
50
.7026
4.872

2

1.2701
(.8)
50
.6241
4.597

See bottom of table 6.1 for variable definition.

The last step in this phase of the work was to include the interaction
variable in regressions that use the size of strikes (average number of
workers involved per strike) and average duration of strikes as depen
dent variables. Although we had no hypothesis on strike size, given
our theoretical framework and the strike frequency results, we anticipated
a positive relationship between the interaction and strike duration. But
that is not what we found. In models using strike size as the dependent
variable, the coefficient on the interaction variable was usually negative
but not. statistically significant. In models using strike duration as the
dependent variable, however, the coefficient on the interaction variable
was usually both negative and statistically significant at conventional
levels. Thus, it appears that states with a high maximum unemploy
ment benefit and either an innocent bystander or work-stoppage rule
had shorter strikes than other states. Once again, this result contradicted
our expectations.
Thus, our results at the end of the second phase of the research were
rather confusing. We had found a statistically significant relationship
between strike frequency and an interaction variable, and that relation
ship was insensitive to changes in model specification. Although the
positive sign accorded with our theoretical framework and hypotheses,
the result was suspect for two reasons. First, the interaction variable
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took an opposite sign in the strike duration model—a result that did not
accord with our theory. That was a surprise, but perhaps not indicative
of a serious problem; it could simply mean, for example, that our
theoretical framework was wrong. Moreover, as developed below, there
was reason to believe the duration regression suffered a selection bias
and that, in consequence, the model provided an inadequate test of the
theoretical hypotheses. Second, and perhaps more important, the in
teraction result was based on 1970 data, and we had already tested
numerous models with these data. The more models one tests on a given
data set, the greater the probability of finding a statistically significant
coefficient. We thus had good reason to suspect that the interaction result
would not hold in a different data set. That possibility led to the third
phase of the work, in which we used data from different years to test
the models developed in the first two phases of our testing procedures.
Replicating the Results
Accordingly, in the third phase we sought to replicate the frequency
and duration results using cross-section data from different years. As
indicated in tables 6.4 and 6.5, we took the table 6.2, column 4 model
and applied it to 1960, 1966, and 1974 data. 7 The results were an un
qualified surprise. In table 6.4, the relationship between the interac
tion variable and strike frequency is thoroughly robust across the dif
ferent samples. 8 These results led us to believe that the 1970 frequency
result was not a statistical artifact. States that have a high maximum
unemployment benefit and either the innocent bystander or workstoppage rule consistently have significantly more strikes than other
states. On the other hand, the results shown in table 6.5, where strike
duration is used as the dependent variable, are not nearly so impressive.
They show that the coefficients for the interaction variable are negative
but statistically insignificant in all years except 1970. Thus it appears
that the negative relation between the interaction variable and strike dura
tion in 1970 is merely a statistical artifact.

An Empirical Analysis 175

Table 6.4
Strike Frequency Regressions for Different Years
(/-statistics in parentheses)

Independent variable

1960

1966

1970

1974

UI Rule 1 = 1

.247
(1.2)
.106
(.2)
-.790
(2.3)
.019
(2.3)

.018
(.1)
.390
(1.4)
-.350
(1.5)
.017
(2.4)

.192
(1.5)
.508
(1.7)
-.470
(1.9)
.010
(2.4)

.008
(-1)
-.074
(.2)
-.583
(2.3)
.008
(2.6)

.112
(1.8)
-32.509
(1.4)
1.977
(1.7)
-2.262
(.6)
.550
(.6)
-.003
(.2)
-3.359
(2.5)
50
.4753
3.533

.056
(1.1)
19.187
(1.4)
2.576
(3.7)
-10.832
(3.9)
-.606
(1.2)
.002
(.2)
.114
(.1)
50
.5840
5.471

-.074
(1-6)
10.502
(.8)
4.349
(5.8)
-11.940
(3.5)
-1.287
(2.4)
.014
(1.0)
1.540
(1.3)
50
.6178
6.303

-.014
(.3)
-.909
CD
5.711
(7.2)
-14.298
(4.3)
-.586
(1.1)
.037
(2.5)
1.434
(1.3)
50
.6899
8.678

UI Rule 2 = 1
UI Rule 3 = 1
[Either UI Rule 1 = 1 or
UI Rule 3 = 1] x max.
UI benefit
Unemployment rate
% establishment with
100+ employees
% of labor force in unions
% females in labor force
% urban in labor force
% of population in poverty
Intercept
N
R Square
F

See bottom of table 6.1 for variable definitions.

176 An Empirical Analysis

Table 6.5
Strike Duration Regressions for Different Years
(^-statistics in parentheses)
Independent variable
UI Rule 1 = 1
UI Rule 2 = 1
UI Rule 3 = 1
[Either UI Rule 1 = 1 or
UI Rule 3 = 1] x max.
UI benefit
Unemployment rate
% establishment with
100+ employees
% of labor force in unions
% females in labor force
% urban in labor force
% of population in poverty
Intercept
N
R Square
F

1960

1966

1970

1974

-.136
(1.0)
-.131
(.5)
.297
(1.4)
-.006
(1.1)

-.156
(1.7)
-.466
(2.2)
.187
(1.1)
-.001
(.4)

-.1991
(2.3)
-.0939
(.5)
.3028
(1.9)
-.0052
(1.9)

-.065
(.5)
-.137
(.5)
.214
(.9)
-.004
(1.3)

.051
(1.2)
-10.706
(.7)
-.303
(.4)
-1.569
(.7)
.478
(.8)
-.009
(.9)
3.511
(4.0)
50
.1436
.654

-.056
(1.5)
4.780
(.5)
.685
(1.3)
-.547
(.3)
.462
(1.2)
.001
CD
2.894
(4.2)
50
.3461
2.064

.0589
(1.9)
-.4169
(.0)
-.5540
(1.1)
5.1973
(2.3)
-.5799
(1.6)
-.0135
(1.5)
1.8667
(2.4)
50
.3615
2.207

.018
(.4)
-5.230
(.4)
-1.232
(1.7)
1.652
(.6)
1.125
(2.2)
.002
(.2)
2.282
(2.2)
50
.2111
1.044

See bottom of table 6.1 for variable definitions.

Although the table 6.4 results are more persuasive than those for 1970
alone, there are still legitimate reasons to question them. In particular,
one could argue that there exist unobserved determinants of strike fre
quency in different states and that these unobserved variables are cor
related with the interaction variable. The argument implies that the table
6.4 results do not address the issue of whether the unemployment
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insurance system actually leads to more strikes; the results may simply
reveal that the interaction variable is correlated with some unobserved
state-specific determinant of strike frequency that persists over time.
In order to examine this possibility, we ran a fixed-effects version
of the model. 9 In essence we pooled together 15 years of data on the
51 jurisdictions and estimated the table 6.2, column 4 model with a
separate intercept for each jurisdiction. 10 Since separate intercepts control
for time-invariant (fixed) unobserved state characteristics, the fixedeffects model allows us to test whether the interaction result in table
6.4 is due to state-specific fixed effects that have nothing to do with
the unemployment insurance system.
Before discussing our results, two data issues should be noted. First,
state-specific time-invariant observed variables must be excluded from
a fixed-effects model. For this reason the New York and Rhode Island
dummy variable (UI Rule 2) was excluded from the model. The variable
equals "1" in New York and Rhode Island and zero in all other states
for the entire 15-year sample period. As such, it is perfectly correlated
with the state-specific intercepts and must be excluded to avoid collinearity. The second data issue concerns the measurement of the in
dependent variables. Although we had data on strike frequency and dura
tion for all states and all years, that was not the case for the indepen
dent variables. For example, data on UI Rules 1 and 3 are not available
for 1961, 1963, 1965, and 1969. In such cases we used interpolation
to impute the missing data. 11
As indicated in table 6.6, the fixed-effect results were quite similar
to the tables 6.4 and 6.5 cross-section results. The interaction variable
([Either UI Rule 1 or 3 = 1] x max. UI benefit) is positive and statistically
significant in the frequency model and negative and not statistically
significant in the duration model. These findings imply that the results
for the interaction variable are not attributable to unobserved statespecific fixed effects. Moreover, since we only tested one model with
this pooled data set, the table 6.6 results are statistically meaningful
in the sense that they are not a consequence of testing numerous models
in the same data set. 12

178 An Empirical Analysis

Table 6.6
Fixed-Effects Regressions on the Frequency and Duration
of Strikes, 1960-1974
(/-statistics in parentheses)
Independent variable
UI Rule 1 = 1
UI Rule 3 = 1
[Either UI Rule 1 or UI Rule
3 = 1] x max. UI benefit
Unemployment rate
% establishments with 100+ employees
% labor force in unions
% females in labor force
% urban in labor force
% of population in poverty
Intercept
N
R Square
F

Frequency
-.055
(0.6)
-.653
(3.3)
.010
(4.3)
-.072
(6.7)
15.210
(1.8)
1.410
(1.8)
-4.742
(3.3)
1.514
(1.4)
-.019
(3.7)
-2.586
(2.8)
763
.782
42.781

Duration
.225
(2.2)
-.069
(0.3)
-.003
(1.2)
.061
(5.2)
2.852
(0.3)
.364
(0.4)
.900
(0.6)
2.502
(2.2)
-.008
(1.3)
.201
(0-2)
763
.3037
5.197

See bottom of table 6.1 for variable definitions.

In summary, all three phases of the empirical work point to the same
conclusion: the interaction variable is positively associated with strike
frequency. That result is robust to changes in control variables and data
sets. Moreover, it holds in a fixed-effects model. Given these findings,
there remains a question that our statistical tools cannot answer direct
ly: why does this association exist? In our best judgment, the most plausi
ble explanation is causation running from the unemployment insurance
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system to strike frequency. The empirical results are thoroughly con
sistent with the hypothesis that a more generous unemployment insurance
system causes a higher strike frequency in states that use the "stoppageof-work" and "innocent bystander" labor dispute disqualification rules.
Moreover, the hypothesis flows logically from a plausible theory of
strike behavior, i.e., in states with these disqualification rules, a more
generous unemployment insurance system leads to less comprehensive
protocols and thereby to greater strike frequency.
This interpretation raises two additional questions that need to be ad
dressed. First, even if certain features of the unemployment insurance
system cause higher strike frequencies, are the effects so small as to
be of little social relevance? Second, if a theory of protocols is applicable,
why is the interaction variable not positively related to strike duration?
With regard to the first question, the coefficient of .010 on the in
teraction variable in table 6.6 implies that a $10 increase in the max
imum unemployment benefit (measured in 1967 dollars) is associated
with a 10 percent increase in strike frequency in states with either UI
Rule 1 or 3. Since the sample mean for the maximum benefit was $50,
that implies an elasticity of .5, i.e., a 1 percent increase in the max
imum benefit in states with either rule was associated with about a .5
percent increase in strike frequency. Alternatively stated, an increase
in the maximum unemployment benefit from $50 to $55 (measured in
1967 dollars) is associated with an increase in strike frequency from
6.8 strikes per 100,000 labor force participants (the sample mean) to
7.5 strikes per 100,000 labor force participants (6.8 x 1.1 =7.5). This
sentence could, however, be seriously misinterpreted if an important
caveat is not noted. The maximum benefit is being used as a proxy for
program generosity. It is not the maximum per se but the level of
generosity proxied by the maximum that has this effect. The point re
mains, however, that the coefficient hi table 6.6 implies that the
unemployment insurance system can have rather large effects on strike
frequency.
With regard to the second question, throughout this work we found
a negative and in most cases statistically insignificant relationship be
tween the interaction variable and strike duration. Such findings may
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cause one to question whether the relationship between the unemploy
ment insurance system and strike frequency can be explained with a
protocol theory. After all, the protocol theory predicts that the interac
tion variable will not only be positively related to strike frequency but
also to strike duration.
The inconsistent results obtained for strike duration may, however,
simply reflect a data problem. The coefficients in our duration models
probably suffer from a selection bias. This is because our data on dura
tion come from a sample of bargaining units that actually experienced
a strike. Since strikes are not generated by a random process, this is
not a random sample. 13 As a consequence, coefficients estimated in this
sample may be biased. Moreover, since our data are aggregate data,
standard "Heckit" techniques for solving the problem are not ap
plicable. u Our duration models, therefore, do not provide a meaningful
test of the protocol theory. They neither confirm nor contradict the strike
frequency result.
Figure 6.1
Before benefit increase, average duration = 10 days.
After benefit increase, average duration = 6 days.
.Cl
Bl

.C2

.B2

Al
0

10

12

Days duration

Figure 6.1 helps to illustrate this point. Consider a sample of three
bargaining units denoted as A, B, and C. Whereas units A and B reach
settlements without a strike, unit C has a strike of 10 days. This initial
position is denoted as Al, Bl, and Cl in the diagram. Since we only
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measure strike duration when a strike occurs, our measure of average
strike duration in this sample would be 10 days. Now suppose that the
state government increases unemployment insurance payments to
strikers, and that the strike duration for unit C increases from 10 days
to 12 days, the strike duration for unit B increases from 0 to 2 days,
and unit A again settles without a strike. This new position is denoted
as Al, B2, and C2 on the diagram. Since we only measure strike dura
tion when a strike occurs, our measure of strike duration in this new
position would be 6 days ([10 + 2]/2). Thus, although no unit experienc
ed a decrease in strike duration (indeed, B and C experienced an in
crease), our measure indicates that average duration dropped from 10
days to 6 days. The problem is that our measure of strike duration does
not include bargaining units that do not go to strike and that thereby
have durations of zero. Only by including those in the sample (or by
adjusting for the statistical effect of their exclusion) can one obtain a
meaningful test of the strike duration effects predicted by protocol theory.

The Effect of the AFDC, Food Stamp,
and General Assistance Programs on Strike Behavior
As noted in chapter 5, although a theory of protocols predicts a rela
tionship between welfare benefits for strikers and strike behavior, we
did not expect to find one. This is because strikers rarely meet the in
come and asset eligibility criteria of welfare programs. Although an
effect may exist, we thought it unlikely that our statistical methods would
be sensitive enough to discern it.
Our strategy for assessing whether welfare programs affect strike
behavior was, however, identical to that used with the unemployment
insurance program. In the first phase, we tested whether the availabili
ty of AFDC, general assistance, and food stamp benefits for strikers
was related to strike behavior in 1970. Several combinations of control
variables were tested during this phase of the work. In the second phase,
we tested whether an interaction between availability of benefits and
benefit levels was related to strike behavior in 1970. Finally, in the
third phase we estimated cross-sectional models for different years as
well as fixed-effects models.
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Table 6.7
Fixed-Effects Regressions on the Frequency and Duration
of Strikes, 1960-1974, with Welfare Variables Included
(l-statistics hi parentheses)
Independent variable
[AFDCAID = 1] x max. UI benefit
Food stamp coverage
UI Rule 1 = 1
UI Rule 3 = 1
[Either UI Rule 1 or UI Rule 3 = 1]
x max. UI benefit
Unemployment rate
% establishments with 100+ employees
% labor force in unions
% females in labor force
% urban in labor force
% of population in poverty
Intercept
N
R Square
F

Frequency
.0001
(0.5)
.022
(0.4)
-.051
(0.5)
-.661
(3.3)
.010
(4.3)
-.072
(6.7)
13.820
(1.5)
1.407
(1.8)
-5.176
(3.2)
1.623
(1.5)
-.020
(3-7)
2.516
(2.7)
763
.782
41.291

Duration
.0001
(0.6)
.044
(0.7)
.229
(2.2)
-.079
(0-4)
-.003
(1.1)
.061
(5.0)
.590
(0.1)
.331
(0-4)
.170
(0.1)
2.673
(2.3)
-.009
(1.4)
.349
(0-3)
763
.305
5.031

Definition of variables:
AFDCAID = 1 if the state has an AFDC Unemployed Father Program and that program per
mits strikers to collect benefits.
Food stamp coverage measures the percent of the poor in the state who reside in counties that
participate in the food stamp program.
Other variable definitions are at the bottom of table 6.1.
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In no case did we find a consistently significant relationship between
a measure of welfare aid to strikers and strike behavior. Although the
estimated coefficients often took a positive sign, in most cases they were
not statistically significant. Nor did we obtain consistent results when
we attempted to replicate the results for 1970 in other years. Table 6.7
illustrates this point. This table adds two welfare variables to the fixedeffects specification in table 6.6. The first variable is the real level of
AFDC benefits in the state multiplied by AFDCADD. As noted in chapter
5, table 5.6, AFDC AID is a binary (0,1) variable indicating that the
state allows strikers to receive AFDC-U benefits. The second variable
is the percent of poor people in the state that reside in counties that
provide food stamp benefits. The table reveals that neither variable is
significantly related to either strike frequency or strike duration. We
conclude that either there is no relationship between AFDC, general
assistance, food stamps and strike behavior, or the relationship exists
but is too subtle for our statistical tools to reveal.

Conclusion
This chapter establishes a link between the unemployment insurance
system and strike behavior. A more generous unemployment insurance
program is related to a higher strike frequency in states that use "inno
cent bystander" or "stoppage-of-work" disqualification rules. This rela
tionship is evidently not a minor one. The regressions indicate that for
such states a 1 percent increase in the maximum unemployment benefit
is associated with a .5 percent increase in strike frequency, ceteris
paribus. Moreover, in our best judgment, the most plausible explana
tion for the association is causality, i.e., certain characteristics of the
unemployment insurance system affect strike frequency.
In stating this conclusion, it is important to emphasize what was not
found. We did not find evidence of a link between the provision of
AFDC, food stamps, or general assistance to strikers and strike behavior.
Moreover, our evidence on unemployment compensation is restricted
to strike frequency; no conclusions are possible on whether the
unemployment insurance program affects either strike duration or
number of workers involved. Finally, no conclusions are possible on
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whether the New York- Rhode Island disqualification rule affects strike
behavior. Either these relationships are nonexistent or our methods are
insufficiently precise to discern them.

NOTES
1. We also tested the effect of the "lockout" rule and the "interim employment" rule on strike
activity. In all of our experiments with 1970 data, these two rules appeared to have no discernible
effect on any measure of strike activity. Consequently, in this chapter we concentrate on the ef
fects of the three rules mentioned here.
2. We used the natural logarithm of the dependent variables because residual plots revealed prob
lems of skew and outliers with the untransformed variables.
3. In a study that used bargaining unit data, Cynthia L. Gramm found that the size of the bargain
ing unit was positively and significantly related to several measures of strike activity. Similarly,
she found that the percent of unionized workers in the bargaining unit's industry who were male
had a positive and significant effect on the probability of a strike. See, Cynthia L. Gramm, "The
Determinants of Strike Incidence and Severity: A Micro-Level Study,'' Industrial and Labor Rela
tions Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 (April 1986), pp. 361-76. In a study that used a pooled time series
cross-sectional sample of bargaining units in Canada, Swidinsky and Vandercamp also found that
the propensity to strike increased with the size of the bargaining unit. See, Robert Swidinsky
and John Vandercamp, "A Micro-Econometric Analysis of Strike Activity in Canada," Journal
of Labor Research, Vol. ffl, No. 4. (Fall, 1982), pp. 455-71. In the United States in the 1970s,
the mean duration of all strikes was about 23 days; in bargaining units with 1,000 or more workers,
however, the mean duration of strikes was 51 days. (Calculations for all strikes based on our
own data; for the mean duration of strikes in large bargaining units, see Gramm.)
4. The coefficients on the interaction between program generosity and the UI Rule 2 dummy variable
would be the equivalent of a regression line fitted to two points. The residuals on New York
and Rhode Island would be forced to zero, implying an implausible model that perfectly explains
strike frequency in New York and Rhode Island.
5. We also tested a model that was identical to the one in column 3 except that the maximum
UI benefit was included as a regressor. The coefficient on this additional variable was negative
and statistically insignificant. The result is consistent with the hypothesis that in states with neither
UI Rule 1 nor UI Rule 3, a more generous UI program does not influence strike behavior.
6. The construction industry is known to be a particularly strike-prone industry. Since the end
of World War n, the construction workforce has constituted about 5 percent of the nonagricultural
labor force; but about 20 percent of the nation's strike activity has been in the industry. See,
David B. Lipsky and Henry S. Farber, "The Composition of Strike Activity in the Construction
Industry," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 388-404.
7. We chose 1960 because the 1960 Census provided demographic data that were not available
for other years. We chose 1974 because that was the last year in which we had good strike data.
We chose 1966 because we did not have data on the labor dispute disqualification rules for 1965.
In each of these years some variables had to be interpolated. Interpolation of the data is dealt
with below in the discussion of the fixed-effects models.
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8. Note that the coefficient on the interaction variables tends to decline over time. This is in part
because the models were run with the maximum benefit measured in nominal dollars. When the
maximums were deflated by a price index, these differences nearly disappeared Of course, signs
and r-statistics would not be affected by a price index.
9. A good reference on fixed effect models is Yair Mundlak, "On the Pooling of Time Series
and Cross Section Data," Econometrica, Vol. 40, No. 1, (January 1978), pp. 69-86 and the cita
tions therein.
10. The regressions were run on 763 observations rather than 765 because data on the unemploy
ment rate were missing and could not be interpolated for Oregon in 1970 and 1971.
11. For example, if UI Rule 1 = 1 in 1960 and UI Rule 1 = 0 in 1962, we set UI Rule 1 equal
to 1/2 in 1961. Variables such as the percent female or percent urban in the labor force had to
be interpolated from 1960 and 1970 census data. Other variables, such as the percent of
establishments with 100+ employees, were missing for only a few years and could be interpolated
in the same way as the UI Rules.
12. The table 6.6 results led us to wonder whether the same would be found in umvanate plots.
That is, suppose one looks at a state that changed rule 1 during the 1960-1974 period. Would
one observe a discrete change in strike frequency at precisely that point in time when the rule
changes? The plots were disappointing. There is no evidence of a discrete jump. Our result is
then a multivariate result. A number of factors affect strike frequency, one of which is the unemploy
ment insurance program. Only by holding other factors constant can one observe the effect of
the UI program.
13. More concretely, the evidence on strike frequency indicates that an increase in the interac
tion variable induces some bargaining units to go on strike. If those bargaining units have unobserved
characteristics associated with short strike durations, then an increase in the interaction variable
would cause a change in sample composition that precipitates a decline in average strike duradon. Thus, even if, with sample composition held constant, an increase in the interaction variable
increases strike duration, we may not observe that increase because when the interaction variable
changes sample composition changes. We obtained some evidence consistent with this line of
argument. We estimated the table 6.6 fixed-effects model using the following three dependent
variables:
FDUR30 = % of all strikes in the state that exceed 30 days
FDUR56 = % of all strikes in the state that exceed 56 days
FDUR80 = % of all stnkes in the state that exceed 80 days
The coefficients on the interaction variable for these dependent variables were as follows:
Dependent
Coefficient on
variable
interaction variable
/-statistic
FDUR30
.00003
.043
FDUR56
-.00057
.445
FDUR80
-.00068
1.503
Thus, roughly speaking, it appears that an increase in the interaction variable changes sample
composition by increasing the share of all strikes that are short strikes and reducing the share
of very long strikes.
14. To see this, let YJJ represent strike duration for firm i. We seek to estimate parameters in
a model of the form,
(1) Y H = X hB! + U H,
where X j: is a 1 x K vector of exogenous regressors, Bj is K x 1 vector of parameters, and
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U i| is an error term with mean zero and finite variance. Suppose that the probability that strikes
occur is of the form,
(2) Prob of strike = Pr(Y2i £ 0),
(3) Y2j = ^2i®2 + ^2i> w^ere ^2i' ®2' anc' ^2i are defined in a manner analogous to Xjj,
Bj, and U^
Now, we only observe duration when strikes occur. Letting YJJ, represent observed duration
we have
Y H = 0 iff Y2i < 0
Following Heckman, the expected value of Y^ in our data is
(4) E(Y H | X H, Y2i 2: 0) = X^ + E(U H | U2i 2r- *2i 83).
In Heckman' s words, "Regression estimators of the parameters of equation (1) fit on the selected
sample omit the final term of equation (4) as a regressor, so that the bias that results from using
nonrandomly selected samples to estimate behavioral relationships is seen to arise from the or
dinary problem of omitted variables." (James Heckman, "Sample Bias as a Specification Er
ror," Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 1, [January 1979], pp. 153-162).
Heckman goes on to present techniques for obtaining consistent parameter estimates. Those
cannot be used in our data because we are estimating models with aggregate data. In essence
we estimate
L NS
1
NS
1 Ns
(5) N
S Y ll<5 = r:
£ XijoB,-!-— £ u,-e
NS j = l JJS Ns j = 1
IjS 1 NS £ i u ljS
Where Ng is the number of observations in state S.
The analogue to (4) in this case is
,
NS
,
NS
i

NS

<6> NS jl, **& = NS jf, X.JS". + NS =„ Wljs I U2i ^ -x2jB2,

There is no simple transform of Mills' ratio that acts as a proxy for the last term.

What is the Proper Policy?
When is it appropriate to provide government transfer payments to
workers who are involved in a labor dispute? One could claim that it
is never appropriate; the transfer payments favor one of the disputants
and thereby violate a doctrine of governmental neutrality. Others might
counter that a fundamental function of government is assisting the needy.
When a family is in dire straights because its breadwinner is engaged
in a strike (an eminently legal activity), then it is appropriate for the
state to assist that family. Clearly, the question raises difficult issues.
At its heart is a philosophical question about the proper role of the modern
state in what are usually distinct spheres: government transfers and in
dustrial relations. To the extent that people differ in their perceptions
of the appropriate goals of public policy in these two spheres, their
answers to the question differ.
In consequence, this chapter begins with a discussion of goals. The
first section discusses goals underlying current government policy in
the two spheres. With regard to transfer policy the key goals are
alleviating hardship and compensating workers for earnings lost due
to involuntary unemployment. In industrial relations the key goals are
promotion of industrial peace and governmental neutrality in labor
disputes. Clearly, it is difficult to formulate policies that simultaneous
ly attain all of these goals. Policy must strike a balance between them.
Given that, the second section examines tradeoffs between the goals
as well as policies implicit in the tradeoffs. For example, if the society
wishes to emphasize industrial peace and deemphasize alleviation of
hardship, what kinds or policies are appropriate? What form should
transfer programs take? Finally, we present our position including our
judgments about the proper role of the state, and a proposed package
of policies consistent with those judgments.
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Goals for Public Policy
It is not always easy to discern the goals of either transfer or industrial
relations policy. Policy may be motivated by an array of goals, some
manifest and some latent. Here we focus on manifest goals that have
unambiguously motivated past policy and around which there appears
to be a broad consensus.
Goals for Transfer Programs
Government transfer programs are usually divided into two categories:
public assistance and social insurance. Different goals underlie each
category. Public assistance programs are the oldest form of govern
ment transfer program. Their goal is to alleviate hardship to provide
a floor of protection so that people do not have to starve or beg. Children
are of particular importance for such programs. Since they are not
responsible for their poverty, and since poverty may affect their future
development, children are viewed as particularly deserving of govern
ment aid. The food stamp and Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) programs are examples of public assistance programs. The latter
program is restricted to families with children. Both programs are only
available to families that can pass a "means test" and thereby
demonstrate material hardship.
Social insurance programs seek to compensate workers for an adverse
event such as disability, old age, on-the-job injury, or involuntary
unemployment. In comparison to public assistance, these are new pro
grams. In the United States they gained prominence after passage of
the 1935 Social Security Act. For purposes of the present study it is
sufficient to focus on the goals of one of the social insurances, unemploy
ment insurance.
The primary goal of unemployment insurance is to compensate workers
for income lost due to involuntary unemployment. For example, a laidoff worker is usually considered involuntarily unemployed and thus eligi
ble for benefits. In general, benefits are a fraction of previous wages
up to a maximum. They are usually not adjusted for family size. 1 It
is important to recognize that unlike a public assistance program,
unemployment insurance does not simply assist people in dire need. In
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1970, more than 40 percent of the payments went to people with an
nual family incomes greater than the median. Only 11 percent of the
payments went to families living in official poverty. 2
Of course, the two goals of transfer programs have implications for
strike-related transfers. Single-minded pursuit of the goal of alleviating
hardship implies payment of government transfers to workers involv
ed in a labor dispute whenever the workers suffer severe material hard
ship. Special emphasis would be placed on providing benefits to families
with children. Single-minded pursuit of the goal of compensating in
come lost as a result of involuntary unemployment implies government
transfers to workers involved in a labor dispute whenever the workers
are involuntarily unemployed. Therein lies the vexing issue of whether
strikers are ever involuntarily unemployed. We address that in the Policy
Options section.
Goals for Industrial Relations
Government policy regarding collective bargaining has undergone a
significant evolution in the last century, moving from outright prohibi
tion of unions and strikes to explicit guarantees for both. Two goals
appear basic to today's policy: promotion of industrial peace, and govern
mental neutrality in labor disputes.
Industrial peace has been a goal of public policy since the industrial
revolution. Unions and strikes were banned in the nineteenth century
because they interfered with the free flow of commerce. Later, in the
debate over the 1935 Wagner Act, it was argued that only by assuring
the presence of trade unions and prohibiting unfair labor practices by
employers could the nation minimize disruptive industrial strife. In a
sense, over the course of a century the goal of promoting industrial peace
remained fixed, while the strategy for attaining that goal shifted
dramatically. Of course, history is more complex than that. Not only
strategies but also perceptions have changed. At one point strikes were
viewed as criminal acts and at another as institutionalized (legal) ac
tions. The point is, however, that throughout history the government
sought to minimize strike-related disruptions of commerce. 3
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The nation's present strategy would seem to be one of minimizing
strike activity by encouraging collective bargaining. While strikes are
a necessary and legal mechanism through which workers express disaf
fection with employers, the government encourages both workers and
employers to find less disruptive avenues for voicing and resolving
differences.
The second goal—governmental neutrality in labor disputes—is more
difficult to document. The goal was articulated in the debate over the
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. It was claimed that the federal government
had gone too far with the 1935 Wagner Act, and that a more even-handed
approach was requisite. The idea was for the government to act like
a referee in a boxing match. It should enforce the rules (no unfair prac
tices), and stop the fight if the situation gets out of hand. As with any
good referee, the government should not favor either party.
The two goals of industrial relations policy have implications for strikerelated transfers. Single-minded pursuit of the goal of industrial peace
implies that strike-related transfers are only appropriate to the extent
that they do not disrupt industrial peace. Single-minded pursuit of the
goal of governmental neutrality implies limiting strike-related transfers
to those cases where they either do not favor one of the disputants, or
where they counterbalance some other policy of the government.

Policy Options
While a discussion of goals is useful for establishing a context, there
remains the original question of the conditions under which strike-related
transfers are appropriate. At the outset, it is important to recognize that
a single-minded pursuit of one of the above goals is unlikely. A more
realistic view would be that we seek to attain two, three, or even all
four goals simultaneously. That raises the problem of tradeoffs. It may
be quite difficult to satisfy the goal of alleviating hardship while at the
same time maintaining state neutrality in labor disputes. A tradeoff may
exist whereby an emphasis on one goal means deemphasis of another.
That implies a somewhat more focused question: in light of the soci
ety's desire to attain more than one of the goals, when are strike-related
transfers appropriate?
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This section addresses that question. It examines the range of feasi
ble policy options that strike a balance between the goals. To keep the
exposition manageable, we deal with pairs of goals. The section begins
with a discussion of policies designed to strike a balance between the
goal of promoting industrial peace and the goal of compensating in
come lost due to involuntary unemployment. Next we discuss policies
that balance the goals of promoting industrial peace and alleviating hard
ship. The section closes with a discussion of policies that balance the
goal of governmental neutrality against the twin goals of transfer pro
grams. Clearly, each discussion is related to the other. In consequence,
the first examines issues in some detail, while the subsequent discus
sions build on that and are briefer as a result.
Balancing the Goal of Promoting Industrial Peace
Against the Goal of Compensating Involuntary Unemployment
At the outset, it is useful to be concrete about the kinds of transfer
policies that are compatible with the goal of compensating strike related
involuntary unemployment. Chapter 2 introduced a number of policies
that may be justified in these terms, i.e., unemployment insurance pro
visions regarding innocent bystanders, work stoppages, lockouts, in
terim employment and extended waiting periods (the New York-Rhode
Island rule). Clearly, some of these provisions come closer to compen
sating involuntary unemployment than others. The unemployment of
innocent bystanders would seem unambiguously involuntary. Innocent
bystanders do not vote on and are not participating in the strike. The
employer has laid them off; they did not choose to withdraw their labor
services. Similarly, the lockout provision could be justified in terms
of involuntary unemployment, since lockouts are initiated by the
employer. Of course, there may be ambiguities here. A lockout may
be a response to union tactics.
More difficult to justify are provisions regarding work stoppages, in
terim employment, and extended waiting periods. In a sense workers
who receive benefits under these provisions are voluntarily unemployed
because they choose to go on strike. In another sense, however, the
unemployment is involuntary. In each case an employer has in some way
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contributed to the unemployment. Moreover, the unemployment is part
of a collective action. To see how this complicates the issue, suppose
a worker votes against a strike, but the majority of union members vote
for it. Even though he would prefer to continue working, he participates
in the strike because the collective has chosen to do so. Is that volun
tary unemployment? In such cases the distinction between voluntary
and involuntary is fraught with ambiguities.
The larger point is that one can conceive of transfer policies that are
arguably consistent with the goal of compensating strike-related involun
tary unemployment. Given that, there remains the question of whether
there exists a tradeoff between the goal of promoting industrial peace
and the goal of compensating such unemployment. In our view, the
answer depends upon how the transfer payments are financed.
If the cost of the transfer payments are fully borne by the disputing
parties, then in accordance with our interpretation of Reder and Neumann
(see chapter 5), there need be no tradeoff. When the striking parties
bear the full cost of the payments, the payments should not affect either
strike frequency or duration. In consequence, if the costs are fully borne
by the parties, the society can both compensate income lost due to strikerelated involuntary unemployment and promote industrial peace. In this
case it is appropriate to provide government transfer payments to
workers who are involved in a labor dispute. Financing is the key. There
are at least four policy options for insuring that the parties bear all of
the costs:
(1) Perfect Experience Rating. Under this provision the employer
would bear the full cost of the transfers payments. The option is clearly
feasible. It would simply require refinement of the current financ
ing system. At present the principal reasons for imperfect experience
rating are minimum and maximum tax rates on employers. The main
route to perfect experience rating is elimination of these minimums
and maximums. 4
(2) Worker Repayment of Benefits Received. Under this provision
workers who receive strike-related benefits would repay the benefits
to the government. In a sense, this would put the government in the
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business of making loans to workers during a strike and collecting
repayments afterwards. Administrative feasibility may be a problem
here. It is not clear precisely how the government would collect money
from the workers after the strike. For example, if the government
used a payroll tax, that tax would have to be targeted on the strikers
and not levied on new workers or workers who did not participate
in the strike.
(3) Union Repayment of Benefits Received. Here the striking union
would repay the benefits. While perhaps easier to enforce than worker
repayment, if the union represents other workers, some of the costs
could be shifted to workers outside of the bargaining unit.
(4) Income Taxation of Unemployment Insurance Benefits. Policy has
already moved in this direction. As of 1987 unemployment insurance
benefits are fully taxable under the federal income tax. All four
policies insure that the parties to the dispute bear the cost of the transfer
benefits.
Suppose, however, it is deemed appropriate for the larger society to
share in the cost of strike-related transfer payments. This is the status
quo. At present, when workers receive compensation for involuntary
unemployment associated with a labor dispute, the payments are financed
out of imperfectly experience rated taxes on the employer. That means
the larger society shares in the cost. In this case our theory predicts
a tradeoff between the two goals: greater compensation for involun
tary unemployment associated with a labor dispute leads to increased
strike activity and less industrial peace.
The evidence in chapter 6 is consistent with this theoretical proposi
tion. We find that in states with a work-stoppage and/or innocent
bystander provision, more generous unemployment insurance benefits
are associated with an increase in strike frequency. Of course, still
stronger empirical evidence is conceivable. It would be particularly im
pressive if it could be shown that more perfect experience rating at
tenuates the tradeoff between program generosity and strike activity. 5
Although more evidence is always better, there are good reasons for
claiming that if the parties to the dispute do not bear the full cost of
strike activity, then the goal of compensating involuntary unemploy
ment comes in conflict with the goal of industrial peace.
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In this case, one is forced to choose between the goal of compen
sating workers for strike-related involuntary unemployment and the goal
of promoting industrial peace. If, on the one hand, it is believed that
the society should do more in terms of promoting industrial peace, then
several policy options appear viable. Certainly one option is to eliminate
some or all provisions under which workers involved in labor disputes
receive benefits. An alternative would be to reduce the level of unemploy
ment insurance benefits paid to such workers. This could be done in
many ways;
(1) Use a different, lower benefit schedule or maximum for such
workers.
(2) Extend the waiting period. This is essentially what is done in New
York and Rhode Island. Workers involved in labor disputes can on
ly receive benefits after an eight-week waiting period. Note also that
several states use the strategy of an extended waiting period for
workers who are unemployed due to a quit.
(3) Reduce the duration of benefits. For example, workers involved
in a labor dispute might receive 12 rather than 26 weeks of unemploy
ment insurance benefits.
If, on the other hand, it is believed that society should do more in terms
of compensating strike-related involuntary unemployment, then policy
would move in the other direction. States might consider additional pro
visions for compensating workers involved in labor disputes (e.g., pro
visions dealing with lockouts, interim employment, and innocent
bystanders). An alternative would be to increase the level of benefits
paid to such workers. For example, workers involved in labor disputes
could have a higher maximum benefit or be guaranteed 40 rather than
26 weeks of unemployment insurance benefits. The appropriate policy
in this case depends upon value judgments about the relative impor
tance of promoting industrial peace versus compensating workers for
strike-related involuntary unemployment.
Balancing the Goal of Promoting Industrial Peace
Against the Goal of Alleviating Hardship
Our assessment of policy options designed to strike a balance be
tween the goals of promoting industrial peace and alleviating hardship
is similar to the above in both form and substance.
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To be concrete about possible policies, note that the goal of alleviating
hardship is usually associated with public assistance programs. It follows
that one way to alleviate the hardship of workers involved in labor
disputes is to grant them eligibility for public assistance benefits. The
workers and their families might, for example, receive food stamps,
AFDC-U, general assistance or benefits from some new program, e.g.,
a negative income tax. In keeping with the goal of alleviating hardship,
only those who can demonstrate hardship would be eligible for benefits.
Like any recipient of public assistance, the families have to pass a means
test.
Is there a tradeoff between the goals of alleviating hardship and pro
moting industrial peace? Our answer is much as before. Financing is
the key. If the cost of the transfer payments are folly borne by the par
ties to the dispute, then there need not be a conflict between the goals.
If, however, it is deemed appropriate for the larger society to share
in the cost of such transfers, then there may be a tradeoff. In the latter
case, greater payments to alleviate strike-related hardship can lead to
increased strike activity and less industrial peace.
The government has several options for insuring that the parties to
the dispute bear the full cost of the transfer payments. The options are
parallel to those in the previous section. The workers, the union, or
the employer could repay the government for the cost of such payments.
Moreover, the payments could be subject to the federal income tax.
This would obviously go against tradition. Public assistance benefits
have historically been financed out of general revenues and not subject
to the income tax. There is no precedent for levies on employers or
repayment by recipients. In the case of strike related transfers, however,
a reassessment of that tradition may be in order.
If the tradition is maintained and the larger society shares in the cost
of alleviating hardship associated with strikes, then increased govern
ment transfers may lead to more strike activity. In this case, one is forced
to choose between the goal of alleviating strike-related hardship and
the goal of promoting industrial peace. The policy options are similar
to those discussed above. If it is believed that the society should do
more in terms of promoting industrial peace, then workers involved
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in labor disputes could either be prohibited from receiving public
assistance benefits or could be paid reduced benefits (perhaps as a result
of a waiting period). In contrast, if it is believed that the society should
do more in terms of alleviating strike-related hardship, then policy would
move in the opposite direction. For example, workers involved in labor
disputes could (if they passed the means test) receive food stamps and
AFDC-U; eligibility requirements for AFDC-U could be loosened; and
states could be encouraged to use their general assistance programs to
aid workers involved in labor disputes.
It should be emphasized that we have no hard empirical evidence in
dicating a tradeoff between strike activity and public assistance transfers.
Although we tested for a relationship, we did not obtain statistically
significant results. That may mean that the tradeoff is minuscule (or
even nonexistent) and that society could provide public assistance to
workers involved in labor disputes without experiencing a noticeable
increase in strike activity. Alternatively, our results may simply indicate
that our statistical methods are not precise enough to discern the effect
of existing policy; a more generous policy of alleviating strike-related
hardship could conceivably lead to a substantial change in strike activi
ty. The point is that our empirical results can not guide policy in this
case. We do not know the magnitude of the tradeoff.
Balancing the Goal of State Neutrality in Labor Disputes
Against the Goals of Transfer Programs
As before, we would argue that there is a form of tradeoff between
these goals. Policies that compensate strike-related involuntary
unemployment or that alleviate strike-related hardship favor workers
and thereby affect neutrality. To see this, consider the problem of the
government remaining neutral in labor disputes while at the same time
compensating workers for strike-related involuntary unemployment.
More concretely, suppose the government introduces a provision
whereby workers obtain unemployment insurance in the event of a
lockout. While arguably consistent with the goal of compensating in
voluntary unemployment, this provision will surely strengthen the hand
of workers. This is true even if the benefits are not financed out of taxes
on the employer. If the government were neutral in labor disputes before
introduction of this provision, then the provision would violate neutrality.
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Only if the government favored employers before introduction of the
provision, could this policy be consistent with the goal of governmen
tal neutrality. For example, one might argue that employers can rely
upon the police powers of the state to constrain strikers from closing
plants. Moreover, when an employer loses profits during a strike, his
corporate profits tax liability is reduced, implying a form of govern
ment subsidy to the employer. From this perspective the government
favors employers, and introduction of the lockout provision helps to
restore neutrality.
A parallel argument applies to alleviating hardship. Suppose the
government introduces a provision whereby striking workers obtain
AFDC-U benefits. Once again, since this provision can strengthen the
hand of the workers, it is only neutral if it serves to counterbalance
some other policy that favors employers.
What about the innocent bystander provision in unemployment in
surance? Is there a tradeoff here? Since the benefits do not flow to the
strikers, why would this provision affect neutrality? As argued in chapter
5, if in the absence of this provision the employer would have compen
sated the innocent bystanders anyway, the employer benefits from the
provision. This is because of imperfect experience rating. Without the
provision he pays the full cost of compensating innocent bystanders out
of his own funds. With the provision part of that cost is shifted to the
larger society. 6
There is then a form of tradeoff between the goals of state neutrality
in labor disputes and the transfer program goals of compensating in
voluntary unemployment and alleviating hardship. If we assume that
at present the government is neutral in labor disputes, then any new
policy that either increases or decreases strike-related transfer payments
will move the society away from neutrality. An increase in transfer
payments strengthens the hand of workers while a decrease weakens
it. Similarly, any policy that increases or decreases the taxes that finance
transfer payments will alter neutrality. Of course, the conclusion changes
if one assumes that at present the government favors one side. In that
case increases or decreases in transfers or taxes can be an appropriate
palliative for unbalanced policy. In a sense, this reveals the weakness

198 What is the Proper Policy?

of the concept of neutrality. There is a troubling "anything goes" aspect
to it. Any government decision could be justified in terms of maintain
ing or restoring neutrality.
A Proposal
The previous section partially answers the original question of when
strike-related transfers are appropriate. It indicates that if the society
chooses to pursue specific goals, then certain types of strike-related
transfers are called for. There remains, of course, the question of which
goals the society should pursue. That is a question of value judgments,
and the social sciences have little to say about such questions. Ultimately,
it is a question that each person must answer for himself or herself.
Having devoted a great deal of thought and effort to this project, the
authors have developed their own views of what goals the society should
pursue and what policies are appropriate. We would be remiss to not
state those views.
In our opinion the goals that deserve greatest emphasis are allevia
tion of hardship and promotion of industrial peace. With regard to the
first goal, in a modern industrial state it is a fundamental responsibility
of government to provide a minimum level of income support such that
people do not have to starve or beg. This responsibility extends to strikers
and nonstrikers alike, and is of particular importance for families with
children. When people can demonstrate material hardship by passing
a means test, they deserve assistance irrespective of the reason for that
hardship. Although compensation of income lost due to involuntary
unemployment is important, we place a higher priority on alleviating
hardship.
With regard to the second goal, the modern state is properly con
cerned about promotion of industrial peace. Strikes imply a costly loss
of output and should be minimized. Of course, that does not mean that
they should be eliminated. Some level of strikes may be necessary to
resolve conflicts and to enhance the effectiveness of other conflict resolu
tion mechanisms. However, to the extent that there are feasible alter
natives to strikes—alternatives that are consistent with worker rights
and democratic institutions—the government should promote those alter-
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natives. We place a higher priority on attaining this goal than on some
nebulous notion of neutrality.
These goals lead us to the following proposals.
(1) Public assistance (AFDC, food stamps, and general assistance)
should be available to families suffering financial hardship irrespec
tive of their involvement in a labor dispute.
(2) Unemployment insurance benefits should be paid to innocent
bystanders.
(3) All strike-related transfers should be financed out of taxes on the
employer.
This policy addresses the problem of hardship suffered by strikers
and their families by providing public assistance to workers involved
in labor disputes. It promotes industrial peace by placing the cost of
strike activity squarely upon the parties involved. Finally, the proposal
includes payment of unemployment insurance to innocent bystanders.
Their unemployment is unambiguously involuntary and thus worthy of
compensation.
We would like to see the benefits financed out of taxes on the struck
employer. This is a simpler administrative mechanism than worker
repayment. Moreover, the workers who receive benefits under our plan
would be quite poor, and would probably find it difficult to repay the
government for the benefits. Asking impoverished workers to repay
government benefits seems inconsistent with the goal of alleviating hard
ship. In our view, however, how the costs are divided between the
disputing parties is not as important as making certain that the larger
society does not share in that cost.
Our proposal is silent on other strike-related provisions of the
unemployment insurance program, i.e., lockout, work stoppage, etc.
Even if the parties bear the full cost of strikes, we find little advantage
to such provisions. They are administratively cumbersome, e.g., the
lockout rule, and they are difficult to justify in terms of either compen
sating involuntary unemployment or alleviating material hardship, e.g.,
the work-stoppage rule. In our opinion, the most desirable of these pro
visions is the New York-Rhode Island rule whereby strikers receive
benefits if the strike lasts eight weeks. This provision has the twin
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virtues of being simple to administer and of providing aid to people
who are almost certainly experiencing material hardship. If it is decid
ed that workers involved in labor disputes should continue to receive
unemployment insurance, then we would propose extending the above
proposal as follows.
(4) Provide unemployment insurance benefits to workers who satisfy
the New York-Rhode Island rule.
(5) Eliminate other provisions that provide unemployment insurance
benefits to workers involved in labor disputes (except for the inno
cent bystander rule).
(6) Finance these strike-related benefits through taxes on the disputing
parties. Consideration should also be given to having the workers
or their union share in the cost of these unemployment insurance
benefits.
Once again, these proposals would move government policy toward
the goals of alleviating hardship and promoting industrial peace. Whether
the reader agrees or disagrees with our proposals, we hope this work
leads to a public discussion of the merits of the present system of strikerelated transfer payments. In our view, that system is flawed. It does
not make sense to provide unemployment insurance to workers when
the involuntary nature of their unemployment is so fraught with am
biguity. It does not make sense to have the larger society share in the
cost of strike-related benefits and thereby effectively subsidize strike
activity. It does not make sense to deny public assistance benefits to
the child of a law-abiding striker, and yet provide benefits to the child
of a jailed felon. In our view the present system is difficult to justify
and in need of reform.
NOTES
1. Eleven states make small adjustments for family size through dependents' allowances.
2. Ronald Ehrenberg, Robert Hutchens and Robert Smith, "The Distribution of Unemployment
Insurance Benefits and Costs," U.S. Department of Labor, Technical Analysis Paper No. 58, 1978.
3. For a discussion of the goal of industrial peace in general and the Wagner Act in particular,
see Douglas V. Brown and Charles A. Myers, "Historical Evolution," in Joseph Shister, Ben
jamin Aaron, and Clyde W. Summers, eds., Public Policy and Collective Bargaining (New York
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Fred Witney, Labor Relations Law, 5th edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987),
Thomas A. Kochan and Harry C. Katz, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, 2nd edi
tion (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1988).
4. For a discussion of this see Daniel Hamermesh, Jobless Pay and the Economy (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press), 1977.
5. As indicated in chapter 6, we looked into this. Due to problems with collinearity, we failed
to obtain meaningful results. Moreover, our measures of the extent of experience rating were
less than ideal.
6. If experience rating were perfect, then the provision would simply codify the status quo. The
employer would continue to bear the full cost of compensating innocent bystanders (who would
have been compensated in the absence of the provision). In this case the provision would be con
sistent with governmental neutrality. It would also be without teeth.
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Appendix B
Sources of Variables
Sources of Variables Measuring Characteristics of Transfer Programs
Variable

Description

UI RULE 1

1 if strikers receive benefits when employer continues to
operate; else = 0
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws

UI RULE 2

=

1 if New York and Rhode Island; else = 0
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws

UI RULE 3

=

1 if "innocent bystanders" receive benefits; else = 0
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws

UI RULE 4

=

1 if strikers laid off from "interim employment" job
receive benefits; else = 0
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws

UI RULE 5

=

1 if workers receive benefits during a lockout; else = 0
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws

UNIMAX

maximum weekly UI benefit in state
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws

UIMETH1

benefits as a percent of weekly covered earnings for
benefits below the maximum in state
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws

AVEBEN1

UIMETH1* AHEMAN (see table 5.7 for AHEMAN)
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws

UITAX

taxable wage base for employers in state
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws

TAXEMAN

=

UITAX/(AHEMAN*2000)
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws

UIMAXRAT =

maximum UI tax rate in state
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws
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Variable

Description

UIMINRAT

minimum UI tax rate in state
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws

UIDIST

Experience Rating Index from Becker
Joseph Becker, Experience Rating in Unemployment In
surance: Competitive Socialism, John Hopkins Press,
1972

COVPC

percent of workers in state covered by state UI laws
calculated from data in Comparison of State Unemploy
ment Laws

DURAT

maximum number of weeks of benefits in state
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws

PCTPOOR

percent of poverty population in state participating in Food
Stamp Program
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Ser
vice, March 31, 1975. Memorandum indicating when
U.S. counties initiated Food Stamp Program
1970 U.S. Census data on County poverty populations

AFDCAID

1 if state allows strikers to receive AFDC-U payments;
else = 0
Office of Family Assistance, Social Security Administra
tion, HHS

AFDCPROG =

1 if state has an AFDC-U program; else = 0
U.S. Bureau of Family Services. Characteristics of State
Public Assistance Plans Under the Social Security Act,
General Provisions (Eligibility Assistance Administration)
National Center for Social Statistics. Public Assistance
Statistics. 1971

=

AFDC maximum weekly payment for a family of four
in state
Public Assistance Programs; Standards for Basic Needs

AFDCMAX
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AFDCBEN

=

AFDCMAX*AFDCAID
Office of Family Assistance, Social Security Administra
tion, HHS
National Center for Social Statistics, Public Assistance
Statistics

GENAID

=

1 if state provides general assistance to strikers; else = 0
U.S. Bureau of Family Services, Characteristics of State
Public Assistance Plans Under the Social Security Act,
General Provisions (Eligibility Assistance Administration)
1962

Sources of Control Variables Employed in the Analysis
Variable
UNMEMLAB =

Description
# of union members/LFTOT
Directory of National and International Labor Unions in
the United States, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1968
Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations,
1971, 1973, 1975, 1977
Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment,
1976

MINELAB

# of workers in mining/LFTOT
Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment,
1976
Employment and Earnings

CONSTLAB

=

ft of workers in construction/LFTOT
Same as MINELAB

MANULAB

=

# of workers in manufacturing/LFTOT
Same as MINELAB

TRANLAB

=

# of workers in transportation/LFTOT
Same as MINELAB

TRADELAB

=

# of workers in trade/LFTOT
Same as MINELAB
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FINLAB

# of workers in fmance/LFTOT
Same as MINELAB

SERVLAB

# of workers in services/LFTOT
Same as MINELAB

PCTURB

LFTOT in urban areas/LFTOT
1960, 1970 Census of Population
Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment

PCTPAMALE =

males between age 25 and 55/LFTOT
1960, 1970 Census of Population
Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment

PCTFEM

# females in labor force/LFTOT
1960, 1970 Census of Population
Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment

AFLMEMLAB=

# AFL-CIO members/LFTOT
Directory of National and International Labor Union in
the United States, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1968
Directory ofNational Unions and Employee Associations,
1971, 1973, 1975, 1977
Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment,
1976

PCTMIG

net civilian migration 1960-1970/civilian resident popula
tion 1970
Current Population Reports

SOUTH

1 if state is in South Census Division; else = 0
Current Population Reports

RTTOWORK =

1 if state has right to work law; else = 0
State Right To Work Laws With Annotations

VALADPC

value added by manufacturing/total - of employees in
manufacturing
1977 Census of Manufacturers;
Annual Survey of Manufacturers, 1975-76;
Annual Survey of Manufacturers, 1966

=
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ESIZE100

=

# establishments with 100 4- employees/# establishments
County Business Patterns

ESIZE20

=

establishments with 20+ employees/^ establishments
County Business Patterns

AVESIZE

=

# employees in state/# establishments
Employment and Earnings;
County Business Patterns

AHEMAN

=

average hourly earnings of production workers on
manufacturing

WCH6970

=

percent change in AHEMAN between 1969 and 1970
Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1978

WCH6870

=

percent change in AHEMAN between 1968 and 1970
Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1978

MEDINC

=

median income of families in state in 1969
Employment and Earnings

POVRTY

=

percent of families with money income below poverty line
in state
City and County Data Book, 1972

URAT

=

unemployment rate in state
Manpower Report/Employment and Training Report

LFTOT

=

number of people in state's labor force

IN D U S T =
AFFLUENC

State Industrialization Index
=

Affluence Index

Source of INDUST and AFFLUENC is David R. Morgan and William Lyons, "Industrialization
and Affluence Revisited: A Note on Socioeconomic Dimensions to the American States, 1970,"
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19, No. 2 (May 1975), pp. 270-271.
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